OSS - THE CAPE OF VERDE ISLANDS IN ALLIED STRATEGY/REPORT ON JOB INTERVIEW, 1941

? . ?,:-, I!? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170001-5 ,z. 0 -I. .., 76. tait0a,?tVA:-." V: ? IU LAU YKRDEISLAD IN ALLIED Arcs-4 rt r COORDINAIOR Or ItC1i. t The Cape Verde Islands, lying only 480 miles, due west of Dakar, command sea-lanes and air-routes vital to inter-allied supply. Their relation to West Africa and South America is analogous to that of the Azores td Europe and North America. Shipping routes around the Cape of Good Hope to Brittiin, shipping routes from South AmericaltoiBritaigi bir routes from Britain to South Africa, air routes from both Britmin and the United States across Africa-- all these paa4:i close to tIle Cape Verdes, within striking distance of tbk formidbble Vichy outpost at Dakar. Enemy submbrines would find in the Islands an 14ed be for tattocks on Allied shipping. Enemy bombers t-0$ wcal could wreak havoc from the excellent fields alrea4 iltble. Three of the Islands nearest Africa (Sal, Sao flUG Ettie) possess first-class airfields, unGil rtIctILL4 ubec by Lati tnt. Air Fr4nce. Two of these fields 41' It tr: "l'e or Itatalo) ottt ftocommoulte evol the heaviest military f i 4;:it _A S p ,JtIdene. .11A hAi AnnRi.renetna without much :::rotirairsoimmormusvairmionsera.ram Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170001-5 1 -,711 _ - I Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170001-5 frFZ,' 1 -2- str_A4M'M 4 .4. *a r ? 1, ** Cu 3.t t.. I- A L.: In the event of hostile occupation, ourit-;i1- air route from Brazil across Africa, by which we supply the British and the Russians, would be directly exposed to attack. In like manner, the British Alternate Air Route, by way of Bathurst to Khartum and the Far East, would be imperiled. Occupation of the Islands would be a relatively easy matter. Portugues d reinforcements and armaments 11ve been only recently sent and are probably not formidable. No reid resistance is to be expected from the population, whict4 is1..A present racked by famine. But the Islands would be easier to take than to hold. Delt:r has been heavily fortified and manned, and tbk Prenc., heve but recently constructed a number of LirfWc, in 4et Africti. Axts forces, if in control of ? woulc be much nearer the Cape Verdes than would kmerictm or Briti6h forces. They could, therefore, launch tNy ttlititic.s by both eir mA $ee. Bence ally action by Americans or British must be uraae _13 full oroe brio uhould be pert of a larger opera-. ton t,:gt5LA 1R-4,far To hola the lslanas tlgainst hostile Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170001-5 .? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170001-5 - ;..''',.4wgwK.r.0,11,11.'VICrgA7,tgOtt$7A AAA, -3- 1 1 I. 1 1 forces on the African Coast would be hopeless. The occupation must be viewed in connection with the whole West African problem. On the solution of this problem depends the outcome of the Battle of the Atlantic and the maintenance of our supply-lines to the Near East, Soviet Russian and even the Far East. ."1"rev.amtrivr ? .. 4yr ?iv: Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170001-5 Cf"..'Aa' F' ::r".' I`P' 7 ''' 0 Fr 1;) r, ..-.. '" .1" g.'".' :It 1.'0". Z.:... h' , ; I1 / 6 -* t'4 .0V f' l'n 0 t " T." r ? , i ',', `,1',' tn!ii.or, , ?-r , ,r, '- ?.; .i Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170001-5 ta. tztfioltre4-1.;1, Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170001-5 . _ ............. A. k.,1 , ?-n. i ., MOP' t not!. ???? 41.0t. e Colonel Donovan ,Ii*tattn91.1 . ? ma. Turner I. ficliaine Novenber 14, 1941 ? Attchecl hereto is the final report of our interview with icbnlskl. The following is our a, prnia1 of his qualities as an in- former: ? Kr. ieh1s1U is a high-grade, intelligent educated man, whose 17inion of general con- tins and trends may be? giVen some weight, but -1,10 Is not a close observer or acmrate reporter of detn11. For a man -ho Irld spent 14 month in DlIclr h. eouL! give !urprisingly rev ri- "'gots althouh I bclivve- that lack or 1 ft-elass interpreter rartly to 131,tf. ratho.:;,:h b :int inod seemingly ot)SoctYe 'kttituce, ve,ry n rvous, and tLv. tmr.-eni:7'n I got from his wholo story vas k?.ic tnine: mueli lf the !Irittsh, Ivt r-r ,s T-110: r in -!,%,Ivernio.. rl'orne.r istNrct . 't-L 111 ';v obvikly h ch lnd .1,alic,/,tz :;'1.1'Al :0 :n my or-tni, I 1rie ti it rvt.r. I h!xli num, rou..5 ovlstions which nilitnry cArtervvr ! v ln:v red tx.ith 11( ,no1114 n-r.."1. I do no' 11 v* ebti'yto of Lhe ()(f )t cefertses can !so riqied on. '4rt.h rnt I cf, not th,11031,re hvt his ktv r; J,14 ktx:c tic !,cel; r:11. hitz *We'ctly, tttt, tt tntt mrsArale of the oefen- gt Ath other e? v te-rd blt he f!oes not !Ale tti r " I 1 ?. f 1 .itor46 3 I Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170001-5 ;;.--::,izt Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170001-5 4 r*tti ? ..Vq&PV;VA ?S:444, , 1) Colonel Donovan ? ,;. November 14, 1941 "liehzieKi hns an 18 year old son vho was with him the ont ri) tUo in Da4ar, vent to high school tivre and had many frieniAs amotv, the French boys, Mr. Zoltowski belivves that he 'coul%,; givo many details his father could not. Do you thin:4 it Izoald be worth while to bring him down to *rItaliagtan for an 4nt(rvieu? bcqicve ?:11.12c bo extremely helrful to have a question nn4 answor sA.).rthuak; rerortor avikileible for future impor- taut intcrvip,s hvro. 'o;;Id you U.k re ts) Arrange for this? AtItiz TilMcb T.1!.nr.B. J.. or.. t .4 ;I? ' '41A14e?:2 011t' \ . ? , _?;),:a . - W " Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170001-5