NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 13A; EAST GERMANY; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 C 4 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- leased or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or international body except by specific authorizatioi. of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made availoWe for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is made to National Intelligence or C the National Intelligence Survey, Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification /control designa- tions are- (U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only (C) Confidential (S) Secret c; APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 0 121 i r {gy p %I l CONTENTS This chapter supersedes the political coverage in the General Survey dated February 1970. A. Introduction 1 B. Structure and functioning of the government 2 1. Legislature 3 2. Executive 5 a. Council of State 6 b. Council of Ministers 6 3. judiciary 7 4. Local government 9 C. Political dynamics 9 I. The SED and its development 9 2. SED organization and membership 13 SEOW e APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 Page Page 3. Party leadership 15 2. Affected groups 29 4. Collaborating parties and organizations 18 a. Industrial workers 29 a. Non-Communist front parties 18 b. Farm workers 29 b. Mass organizations 18 c. Intellectuals 29 Fig. 2 Party and government structure (chart) d. Youth 30 D. National policies 20 e. The churches 31 1. Domestic 20 F. Maintenance of internal security 31 2. Foreign 22 1. Police 31 a. Relations with the Soviet Union b. Relations with other Eastern Euro- 22 2. Countersubversive and counterinsur- 34 pean countries 24 gency measures and capabilities c. Relations with West Germany 25 G. East Berlin 34 d Relations with Berlin 26 e Relations with non-Communist world 27 H. Selected bi bliography 38 E. Threats to government stability 28 Chronology 39 1. Discontent and dissidence 28 Glossary 43 FIGURES ii NO E APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP0l-00707R000200110019-3 page Page Fig. 1 Party and government leadership Fig. 5 Party leaders (photos) 16 (ihart) 4 Fig. 6 Foreign Ministry building (photo) 23 Fig. 2 Party and government structure (chart) 5 Fig. 7 East Berlin panorama (photo) 35 Fig. 3 Administrative subdivisions (map) 8 Fig. 8 East Berlin stores (photos) 36 Fig. 4 Central SED structure (chart) 14 Fig. 9 Control points in East Berlin (tnap) 37 ii NO E APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP0l-00707R000200110019-3 ti X X Es Government and Politics A. Introduction (U /OU) The German Democratic Republic is a step***** of the Second World War, evolving over the past quarter of a century from the status of a Soviet- occupied area ;end scorned satellite to a second German state that commands the allegiance and support of a growing number of its own citizens and has gained increased recognition and prestige abroad. The revolution imposed by the Communists during their long period of control has restratified the society and abolished or brought under Communist control all traditional German institutions capable of commanding a separate loyalty from East Germans or linking them with their countrymen in the West. Using the Soviet Union as their model, East Germany's Communist leaders have established a political and social order which has as its primary goals the perpetuation of one party rule by the Communists and the establishment of even closer links with the Soviet Union, the principal guarantor of thc: GDR's durability and stability. The exercise of political power remains the exclusive prerogative of the Communists who exert and maintain control through the mechanism of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) which was created in 1946 by the forced marriage of once bitter adversaries �the Communists and the Social Democrats. As in the case of the Soviet Communist Party, political power is highly centralized within the top echelons of the ruling SED, while responsibility for implementing policy rests with the party apparatus and the various governmental ministries and agencies. A facade of multiparty democracy has been retained by allowing a number of non Communist parties usually headed by tractable officials �to remain in existence, but they provide no genuine opposition and are allowed to maintain separate organizations only because they provide a convenient channel for organizing segments of the population which would not join the SED. At the time of its founding in 1949 the German Democratic Republic faced an uncertain future because of its public ?mage as a creation c the Soviet Union which had plundered and ravaged large areas of East Germany. Much of this hatred and contempt was transferred to Walter Ulbricht' and other German Communist leaders who were regarded as Soviet stooges lacking both legitimacy and popular support. Aware of its lack of broad support among East Germans, the regime was also uneasy about the firmness of the Soviet commitment to support the development of a separate German state. There were suspicions that Moscow might be prepared to sell out East Germany in order to advance its own interests in Europe. The onset of the cold war, the West German decision in 1952 to join the abortive European Defense Community, and Bonn's accession to NATO in 1954 hardened the division of Germany and strengthened the Soviet commitment to the development of a separate German state under Communist control. Moscow tried to shore up the East German regime by conferring further prerogatives of statehood in order to enable the rump state to compete more effectively 'Ulbricht, titular head of state, died of heart failure on 1 August 1973. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 S with the Federal Republic. Membership in the Warsaw Pact followed shortly, as did the Soviet decision to grant "full sovereignty" to East Germany while retaining the right to maintain troops there. The greater prosperity and stability of West Germany remained an obsessive attraction to the East Germans particularly the trained and the edu- cated �who continued to flee to the West in large numbers. By the early 1960's it had become apparent to the leadership that it could not consolidate control over the political and economic system as long as some of the nation's most valuable workers "voted with their feet" and moved west. The erection of the Berlin wall in August 1961 enabled the government to establish firm control over the society and proceed with overdue economic reforms, which within a decade provided the population with the highest standard of living in Eastern Europe. By the early 1970's East Germany had become the world's ninth largest industrial power second to the Soviet Union in the eastern bloc �with a concomitant growth in prestige which gave added strength to its demands for recognition as a sovereign state and a voice in international councils. Ironically, this period of growing accommodation at home and increasing acceptance abroad coincided with the political demise of the veteran Communist leader, Walter Ulbricht, who had guided the destiny of East Germany for 25 years. Despite his reputation as a servant of Moscow, Ulbricht in his later years of rule had incurred Soviet displeasure by appearing to challenge the U.S.S.R.'s ideological supremacy and by creating obstacles to Moscow's strategy of detente with the West, particularly as it applied to West Germany. Ulbricht's resignation as party leader in May 1971 and the transfer of power to Erich Honecker was accomplished smoothly, reflecting the government's stability and the party's success in tightening its control over practically all aspects of East German life. As the SED's new First Secretary, Honecker typifies the continuity and stability of a regime which has been in power for more than two decades, and which is increasingly confident abo;.it its popular support and its right to govern. A lifelong Communist and heir presumptive to Ulbricht for more than a decade, Honecker is a methodical and energetic manager of the party and the interlocking state organizations. He has brought to the top leadership post a more realistic view of economic planning, together with a recognition that domestic political stability requires the leadership to take steps to ir.iprove the morale of the people. Thus, the regime has assigned highest 2 priority to raising the "material and cultural living standards" of the East German population, although it has not neglected to stress ideological discipline and the SED's political control over the society. After almost a quarter of a century of Communist rule even the most intransigent non Communists in the society have accepted the reality of the existence of a separate East German state and come to terms with the regime and its demands. The resulting process of accommodation has led many East Germans to move from hostility to passive acceptance, and finally toward a degree of positive loyalty and a growing sense of a separate East German national identity. It is difficult to determine with any degree of precision how far this process has gone, but it appears that most East Germans now generally accept the GDR as a separate state for the foreseeable future, approve of some but not all aspects of its social and economic systems, and have developed a sense of distinctiveness from Germans in the Federal Republic. B. Structure and functioning of the government (U /OU) Since its founding under the aegis of Soviet occupation authorities in the early postwar years, the Socialist Unity Party (SED) has been the focal point of political and social power. Although the constitution does not define the role of the SED in the state apparatus, in practice all political power is wielded by the SED whose party hierarchy parallels the state organization at all levels. To insure that state organizations execute SED policy, the key posts in both party and government are filled by the most important and powerful party leaders. At the apex is Erich Honecker, both First Secretary of the SED and Chairman of the National Defense Council. Former party leader Walter Ulbricht retains titular leadership in the Council of State as its Chairman, and by this position has remained East Germany's head of state. Politburo member Willi Stoph is Chairman of the Council of Ministers and thus the head of government. SED control is insured down to the lowest governmental level as shown in Figures 1 and 2. The first constitution of the German Democratic Republic, drafted in 1949 by a Soviet- sponsored People's Congress (a legislative body chosen from a Communist approved slate by 66% of the electorate), formed the basis for the U. S. S. R.'s unilateral transformation of the Soviet Zone into the East German state on 7 October 1949. This document bore a superficial resemblance to the Weimar Constitution of 1919, but the East Germans strengthened the APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 C powers of the central government while paying lip service to the Laender (states) as the foundations of the state. It listed certain "guaranteed rights" of citizens, but, as in other Communist constitutions, these rights were qualified and subject to laws or interpretations of laws put into effect from time to time. Certain duties of citizens were stressed. Men and women legally were equal. Although the constitution appeared to establish a multiparty system of popular representation and a parliamentary form of government featuring legislative supremacy, in practice the executive branch of the government dominated. The executive, which was in turn controlled by the SED through interlocking directorates, made all major decisions and suspended or withdrew democratic rights as desired by the party leaders. At the Seventh Party Congress in April 1967, Ulbricht stated that the 1949 constitution no longer reflected the political and social changes that had occurred during the previous two decades. A constitutional drafting committee was established in December of that year and 2 months later a draft was produced and made public. In an unprecedented move, the draft constitution was submitted to a nationwide referendum on 6 April 1968, and in carefully controlled voting was approved by nearly 95% of those who voted. The relative haste with which the new constitution was promulgated seemed due to a desire to emphasize the sovereign nature of the German Democratic Republic by distinguishing it clearly from West Germany. The new constitution was designed both to incorporate into a basic framework the various ch=anges adopted piecemeal by the regime since 1949 as well as to justify the coercive measures employed by the state to channel and control expression. In addition to codifying the numerous legislative and social changes which had been instituted in East Germany, the present constitution places particular stress on the sovereign political character of the state, and constitutionally anchors the SED in its leadership role. All political power is nominally exercised by the workers and peasants, led by the SED- dominated National Front and its component parties and mass organizations. A whole series of rights contained in the old constitution is retained in the new, including among others the right to inherit "personal property to inviolability of the home; "to social care in case of old age and invalidity and the right "to profess a religious creed and to carry out religious activities." However, other rights guaranteed in the old constitution have been qualified. Thus, free speech, freedom of the press, the right to assemble peacefully, and the right of association can only be exercised "in accordance with the spirit and aims of this constitution." Certain other rights have been defined more narrowly or simply dropped from the new constitution; thus, the individual is not entirely free in his choice of work, and there is no provision which allows workers to strike in order to seek redress of their grievances. In short, the 1968 constitution is more explicit in granting authority to the state and subordinating the rights of the individual to the needs of society. I. Legislature The legislature (Volkskammer or People's Chamber) is one of the elite institutions of the German Democratic Republic and is meant to mirror the social structure of the population, to emphasize the direction the regime wants its citizens to go, and to honor worthy contributors to the building of socialism. Unlike legislative bodies in the West, however, the People's Chamber has little actual power and functions as a rubberstamp, endorsing laws and decrees already formulated by the party. East Germany's first constitution in 1949 established a bicameral federal legislature consisting of a People's Chamber and a chamber representing the Laender. The constitutional revision of 1968, however, replaced the two- chamber parliament with the unicameral People's Chamber consisting of 500 deputies elected for 4 -year terms by citizens who have reached 18 years of age. Candidates for the People's Chamber are proposed by election commissions organized by the SED dominated National Front. The front is a loose federation of nine officially sponsored groups including five political parties (the SED and four collaborating parties: the Christian Democratic Union, the German Liberal Democratic Party, the German National Democratic Party, and the German Democratic Peasants Party) and four mass organiza- tions (the Free German Trade Union Federation, the Free German Youth, the Democratic Women's League of Germany, and the German Cultural Association). Only these nine organizations have seats in the People's Chamber. In legislative elections the [National Front apportions the seats among these groups, designates the candidates who must be approved by the SED, and then nominates them en masse and places their names on the ballot. Because the National Front is exclusively empowered by the regime to put forth candidates, there is only a single- 3 N APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 W4 P A R T Y G O V E R N M E N T Seerearies 9 Erich Honecker (First Secretory) Hermann Axon Gerhard Grueneberg Kurt Hager Werner Lambert Guenter Mittag Albert Norden Paul Verner Werner larowinsky Politburo (23) Erich Honecker Walter Ulbricht J Hermann Axon I. Friedrich Ebert Gerhard Grueneberg Kurt Hager Werner Krolikowski Werner Lambert Guenter Mittag Erich Mueckenberger Alfred Neumann Albert Norden Horst Sindermann Willi Stoph Paul Verner Herbert Warnke CANDIDATE MEMBERS Georg Ewald Walter Halbritter Werner larowinsky Guenther Kleiber Erich Mielke Margarete Mueller Harry Tisch Council of Minister (45) Council of Sate (24) Erich Honecker Walter Ulbricht (Chairman) People's Chamber (SM) Erich Honecker Hermann Axon Friedrich Ebert Gerhard Grueneberg Kurt Hager Werner Krolikowski Werner Lamberz Guenter Mittag Erich Mueckenberger Alfred Neumann Albert Norden Horst Sindermann Willi Stoph Paul Verner Herbert Warnke Georg Ewald Walter Halbritter Werner larowinsky Guenther Kleiber Erich Mlelke Margarete Mueller Harry Tisch Friedrich Ebert Alfred Neumann Horst Sindermann Willi Stoph (Chairman) Willi Stoph Paul Verner Herbert Warnke plus 18 other members Georg Ewald Walter Halbritter Guenther Kleiber Erich Mielke FIGURE 1. Parry and go-ernment leadership (U /OU) slate ballot. Prior to 1965, the voters could only approve or disapprove the entire slate. That year the ballot was expanded to include more candidates than scats available and the voter was permitted to select the "candidate of his choice" from a longer list of National Front approved candidates. Furthermore, it was decreed in 1965 that a third of the membership of the People's Chamber must he replaced every 4 years. Despite the fact that Fast Berlin has not been formally incorporated into the German Democratic Republic, the city is represented in the People's Chamber by 66 deputies. Their special status is partially maintained, however, by the fact that they are elected by the East Berlin Assembly and not directly by the people. The regime's control of the Peoples Chamber extends also to,the legislative process, which similarly includes constitutional prerogatives that in practice are not exercised. According to the 1968 constitution, only the People's Chamber can adopt it constitution and laws, and nobody may restrict this right. It may -I introduce legislation and pass on most legislative matters, including those introduced by itself, the executive branch, or local governments. It is further empowered to decide on the constitutionality of laws, to elect the members of the Council of State, the Council of Ministers, the National Defense Council, and the Supreme Court, and to appoint the Prosecutor General. The People's Chamber approves the conclusion or cancellation of state agreements and determines the state. of defense of the German Democratic Republic. In practice, however, the SED makes all such decisions which, through the system of interlocking diroctorates, are nsually proposed to the People's Chamber by the Council of Ministers. Thus, the "initiatives" of the People's Chamber become mere ratifications, and the legislative body is used by the SED primarily as a forum to promulgate the party line. In contrast to the marginal role assigned to the Peoples Chamber by the SED under Walter Ulbricht, 0 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 V 4? Y 5b 7fd+ n* K^'�" C" i'. t' ti' S 'z?NT3"�7`t?rt''i .+n"r`"N?' ChM.'' f' 1�'*�','` s" a+!'. 4glgi" h^' i '!"',yy.'5r..#1'"jz'i�rA,'}R, -0 t t C PARTY STRUCTURE NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS or Conference CENTRAL COMMITTEE POLITBURO DISTRICT D DISTRICT D District SECRETARIAT District EXECUTIVE C r- Departments, Party C COMMITTEE Commissions, and Conference Party Bureaus Control tr ct District D Commission Commission over all agencies Direct control Elected body BASIC PARTY ORGANIZATIONS w/ Nominal election Appeal orappuiatment GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE PEOPLE'S CHAMBER COUNCIL COUNCIL Supreme Prosecutor OF STATE OF MINISTERS Court General PRESIDIUM t Ministries Cabinet level Agencies controls FIGURE 2. Party and government structure (U /OU) there are signs that the Honecker regime may be prepared to encourage the legislative body to assume a more meaningful role in the governmental apparatus. In his presentation to the Eighth Party Congress in 1971 Honecker called for" improvement" in the work of the People's Assembly and an increase in its authority. The present body has since begun to meet more frequently than its predecessors, and in March 1972 the tradition of unanimity was broken for the first time when 12 representati voted against a controversial abortion bill. The results of the People's Chamber election in November 1971 reflected the great sociological changes which have occurred in the last decade. The older generation of functionaries, for the most part, were retired and their positions assumed by a new generation of party activists. Of the 500 deputies, 75% are under age 50. The representatives are also more highly educated; more than one -third have received a university education and 105 have attended specialized trade schools. 2. Executive The executive branch consists of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers, both of which are constitutionally responsible to the People's Chamber. In practice, the executive is clearly dominant and is 5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 DISTRICT DISTRICT D DISTRICT D District District EXECUTIVE C COUNCIL A Assembly I Party C COMMITTEE Conference tr ct District D District Control C Court P Prosecutor Commission LOCAL County, County C COUNTY AND CITY C COUNTY, CITY, C City, or I and City E EXECUTIVE A AND PRECINCT P Precinct rrence C COUNCILS I Conf r I County C County C County and City C Court P Prosecutor FIGURE 2. Party and government structure (U /OU) there are signs that the Honecker regime may be prepared to encourage the legislative body to assume a more meaningful role in the governmental apparatus. In his presentation to the Eighth Party Congress in 1971 Honecker called for" improvement" in the work of the People's Assembly and an increase in its authority. The present body has since begun to meet more frequently than its predecessors, and in March 1972 the tradition of unanimity was broken for the first time when 12 representati voted against a controversial abortion bill. The results of the People's Chamber election in November 1971 reflected the great sociological changes which have occurred in the last decade. The older generation of functionaries, for the most part, were retired and their positions assumed by a new generation of party activists. Of the 500 deputies, 75% are under age 50. The representatives are also more highly educated; more than one -third have received a university education and 105 have attended specialized trade schools. 2. Executive The executive branch consists of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers, both of which are constitutionally responsible to the People's Chamber. In practice, the executive is clearly dominant and is 5 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 itself controlled in all respects by the ruling party, the SED. i a. Council of State The Council of State was established by constitutional amendment in 1960 to replace the i office of the presidency after the death of Wilhelm Pieck. Its constitutional status was meant to add to the prestige of Walter Ulbricht who as "elected i' j chairman" is the chief of state. It also provides sinecures for leading members of the collaborating parties. According to the constitution, the Council of State is elected by and responsible to the People's Chamber; it is �?mposed of a chairman, six deputy chairmen, 17 members, and a secretary, all of whom serve 4 -year terms. In addition to exercising ceremonial functions normally associated with the office of the president in a Communist country, the Council of State has specified executive duties and one significant legislative function. The Chairman of the Council of State proclaims the laws of the land, swears in members of the government, and represents the German Democratic Republic as h:;ad of state. The full council ratifies or abrogates treaties, appoints and recalls East German representatives abroad, receives 1. foreign diplomats, calls elections to the People's Chamber, and convokes its first session after the r elections. The constitution also empowers the council to frame basic decisions on problems of defense and security and to convoke meetings of the National Defense Council, two additional prerogatives normally associated with the executive branch of government. In its legislative capacity, the council since 1963 has acted for the People's Chamber between its plenary sessions, thus replacing three standing committees of the legislature which originally had been charged with carrying out these functions. The Council of State also has the constitutional power to issue decisio which have the effect of law and to issue binding interpretaiions of laws. In November 1971 Walter Ulbricht was reelected Chairman of the Council of State despite widespread speculation that he might also lose this post because of his retirement as SED First Secretary 6 montas earlier. Ulbricht's reelection was consistent with the theme of continuity in leadership and did not signify that he had retained a power base. In fact, the Council of State appears to have lost status despite the presence on the council of a growing number of high- ranking SED leaders, including Erich Honecker. In October 1972 a law was promulgated which granted the Council of Ministers substantial new governmental powers, largely at the expense of the Council of State. 6 b. Council of Ministers The Council of Ministers (cabinet) organizes, on behalf of the People's Chamber, the execution of the political, economic, cultural, social, and military tasks of the state. All members of the council serve for a period of 4 years. In early 1973 the council, in addition to Chairman (Premier) Willi Stoph, two first deputy chairmen, and 10 deputy chairmen, consisted of 28 ministers with portfolios and four heads of special agencies having ministerial rank, with the following areas of responsibility:' Ministries: Agriculture, Forestry, and Foodstuffs Industry Bezirk Administered Industry and Food Industry Chemical Industry Coal and Energy Construction Cultural Affairs Education Electrical Engineering and Electronics Environmental Protection and Water Management Finance Foreign Affairs Foreign Economic Relations Glass and Ceramics Health Agencies: State Planning Commission Price Office State Bank Workers Peasants Inspectorate Heavy Machine Construction and Installation Constriction Interior Justice Light Industry Material Management National Defense Ore Mining, Metallurgy, and Potash Posts and Telecommunications Processing Machine Construction and Vehicle Construction Science and Technology State Security Trade and Supply Transport University and Technical School Matters Formerly the chairman was chosen by the party having the greatest stre:,gth in the People's Chamber, but under the 1968 constitution the Council of State recommends a candidate for the office of Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the nominee is then dutifully approved by the legislature. 'For a current listing of key government officials consult Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, published monthly by the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. -7� APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 This procedure was not followed in 1971 when Honecker, as SED party leader, nominated Willi Stoph for the post. The chairman is empowered to select his ministers, whose appointments in turn are passed on by the People's Chamber. The Council of Ministers is subordinate to both the People's Chamber and nominally to the Council of State, and carries out its activities within the framework of the decrees and decisions of the two superbodies. The Council of Ministers is empowered to adopt ordinances as necessary to accomplish its objectives and is theoretically responsible and accountable directly to the People's Chamber. The locus of power within the Council of Ministers resides in its Presidium, an inner cabinet composed in early 1973 of the chairman (Minister President) and 13 ministers, 10 of whom are deputy chairmen. The regime has sought to solve its continuing economic problems partly by naking a series of changes in the organization and personnel of the Cou�Acil of Ministers. Since the New Economic System was formulated in 1963, these changes generally have reflected a desire to bring *****er men trained in economics, technology, and management into government work in order to improve the efficiency of the bureaucracy. The introduction of the so- called technocrats into the governmental and party apparatus, however, has not diminished the party's control over economic decisionmaking. Most of the technocrats are themselves ideologically committed to communism and agree that the party must play the leading role in all spheres of life. In October 1972 the People's Chamber passed a law which increased the power of the council and redefined its relation to the other state organs. The primary intent of the law was to strengthen the central economic planning structures. It clarified individual ministerial responsibilities and provided for greater coordination between central organs and local agencies. In an effort to improve planning coordination between rrunistries, the law emphasized their collective responsibilities and ac.:ountability to parliament. SED leaders, moreover, completely control the Council of Ministers. Willi Stoph is Minister President -Prime Minister; 12 of the 14 men who sit on the Presidium are SED members, of whom six including Stoph are also members or candidate members of the Politburo. Furthermore, each of the ministries and administrative units whose top officials comprise the Council of Ministers has a counterpart in the SED apparatus from whom he receives direction and guidance. 3. judiciary The imposition of a Communist regime in East Germany brought about sweeping changes in the legal system which had been inherited from the past. Like the other elements of government, the judiciary is completely dominated by the SUD. After a territorial reorganization in 1952, a series of laws restructured the judicial system and established the framework for court procedure. District and county courts were created to replace the old state (Land) courts, but these new courts and the local prosecutors' offices were subordinated to the Ministry of Justice, later designated as the central body for the administration of justice. The Supreme Court continued to function ostensibly as a separate branch of government, but it became for all practical purposes an instrument of the executive branch. Civil and criminal cases were treated within the same system, with direct appeals from lower to higher courts. Procedural law, changed to accord with the Soviet model, was designed to further the regime's objectives rather than to serve abstract concepts of justice. In 1963 judicial reforms were introduced after IS months of preparation and public "discussion." These changes revamped the judicial system, bringing it still more closely into line with that of the Soviet Union. The new legislation reduced considerably the authority of the Ministry of Justice, attacked intermittently since 1956 as being too Stalinist, by ending its control over the lower courts and prosecutors' offices. The Supreme Court was assigned general supervision over the administration of justice in the lower courts, and the Prosecutor General's office was given administrative control over the district and county prosecutors' offices. Party control remained intact, however, and both the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor General, constitutionally responsible to the People's Chamber under both the old and new constitutions, continued in practice to be "guided" by the SED leadership. The regime also followed the Soviet model in introducing arbitration commissions in residential areas, collectivized farms, and private enterprises, and by extending the use of conflict commissions to settle disputes in factories. These commissions were formed to relieve the regular courts of minor civil and criminal cases by transferring them to nonprofessional units more responsive to pressures by local SED organizations. The 1963 changes also reflected the strong influence of Soviet judicial practice in the emphasis placed on the need to reeducate offenders. 7 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 52 GER NY Ji J/ 1 Spree ssau. Cottbus 1 N C0TTBUS f V i tt Halle f- -r' H A L L S r L Leipzig O to LEIPZIG DR I SDEM1 ERFU RT S0� i t t' Dreade Eisenach Erfurto 1 Y Ge a ^1 1 refeld5 c OKarl -Marx- l` Stadt O Suhl KARL -MARX- Tepllce� lY S U H L STADT T Plauen HO CZECHOSI 10 lxlww 748 tz to /S POTSDAM r POLAND r 1r Odcr- Ila K. nal FED AL 1 til MAG0EBURG' FRANIKFURT `BERLIN I Kietz. REPO PC Kostrzm f -t Frankfurt O Hannover r m -'1 }Brandenburg otsda g Helmstedt Marienborn 1 12 NOUNDARY REPRESENTATION 19 t a NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE EAST GERMANY DE NMARK 80RNHOLM 4 (Danmark) Soviet Zone boundary Bezirk boundary B A L T I C S E A o BeArk administrative center R J 5assnitz 0 25 5 0 7 5 Mites 1 0 ^5 50 75 Kilometers tr SUnd C I J, t0 War e Q V R ostock O S T O C K I POMERANIAN BAY 54 .s� l -5a Wismar Schwerin O NEUBRANDENBURIG Hamburg J jjjJJJ Sic H W E R I N Neubrandenburg I Sz in I I 1 chwanheide (St ela �Is Sc� Ludwigslust r .sf.JI y IA RABUE FIGURE 3. Administrative subdivisions (U/OU) S a� s APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 .i-' Magdeburg I I l l 1 1 /S POTSDAM r POLAND r 1r Odcr- Ila K. nal FED AL 1 til MAG0EBURG' FRANIKFURT `BERLIN I Kietz. REPO PC Kostrzm f -t Frankfurt O Hannover r m -'1 }Brandenburg otsda g Helmstedt Marienborn 1 12 NOUNDARY REPRESENTATION 19 t a NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE EAST GERMANY DE NMARK 80RNHOLM 4 (Danmark) Soviet Zone boundary Bezirk boundary B A L T I C S E A o BeArk administrative center R J 5assnitz 0 25 5 0 7 5 Mites 1 0 ^5 50 75 Kilometers tr SUnd C I J, t0 War e Q V R ostock O S T O C K I POMERANIAN BAY 54 .s� l -5a Wismar Schwerin O NEUBRANDENBURIG Hamburg J jjjJJJ Sic H W E R I N Neubrandenburg I Sz in I I 1 chwanheide (St ela �Is Sc� Ludwigslust r .sf.JI y IA RABUE FIGURE 3. Administrative subdivisions (U/OU) S a� s APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 1 12 NOUNDARY REPRESENTATION 19 t a NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE EAST GERMANY DE NMARK 80RNHOLM 4 (Danmark) Soviet Zone boundary Bezirk boundary B A L T I C S E A o BeArk administrative center R J 5assnitz 0 25 5 0 7 5 Mites 1 0 ^5 50 75 Kilometers tr SUnd C I J, t0 War e Q V R ostock O S T O C K I POMERANIAN BAY 54 .s� l -5a Wismar Schwerin O NEUBRANDENBURIG Hamburg J jjjJJJ Sic H W E R I N Neubrandenburg I Sz in I I 1 chwanheide (St ela �Is Sc� Ludwigslust r .sf.JI y IA RABUE FIGURE 3. Administrative subdivisions (U/OU) S a� s APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 V X In January 1968 the People's Chamber adopted a new penal code to replace the outmoded code which hid formed the basis of civil law in both Germanies since 1871. The new code, which was 5 years in the drafting, is a "socialist" model in that it places great emphasis on the political aspects of "socialist legality," i.e., assuring the submission of the individual to the state. The death penalty is prescribed as maximum punishment for i 1 crimes, most of which relate to political offenses. Several of These are newly created in the code and include crimes against the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic and war crimes. In contrast to the harsh sentences meted out for political offenses, the code prescribes more lenient treatment of persons convicted of various criminal and civil misdeeds. For example, the punishment for petty theft, *****, slander, homo*****ual- ity, and bigamy has been reduced or completely eliminated. As in the case of its educational reforms, the regime probably was eager to focus public attention on certain relatively progressive provisions of the new code as compared to West Germany's archaic 1871 code. 4. Local government Theoretically, independent units of self government are elected at the district, county, city, town, and precinct level. Under the cop the local bodies are empowered to make decisions and organize the citizens to deal with the political, economic, social, and cultural issues which arise at the various levels of local government. In practice, however, each level of local government is closely supervised and controlled by the SED, almost to the same extent as the central governmental bodies. In 1952 the regime reorganized the subordinate units of government, replacing the five historic states (Laender) with 14 districts (Bezirke) whose boundaries are shown on Figure 3. These 14 districts are divided into 218 counties (Kreim), and 8,845 communities (Gemeinden). East Berlin, the capital of the German Democratic Republic, functions in practice�but not legally �as the 15th Bezirk. At each level of local government, the elected assembly selects an executive council, but local autonomy is virtually nonexistent. The local assemblies and their councils actually serve to impose the SED leadership's wil' at various levels of local government. In 1963 further changes were made at the local level to provide still more control mechanisms for the party. In the heavily populated urban areas 750 new residential subdivisions, corresponding to precincts, were created, and committees were formed within these subdivisions to "help improve life and eliminate shortcon sings." Nominally controlled by the National Front, these committees actually work under the direction of closely knit party organizations guided by the central party organization in East Berlin. C. Political dynamics (U /OU) 1. The SED and its development The history of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) is for all practical purposes the history of the Ge -man Democratic Republic. The SED has created a governmental structure in which all elements of political power are monopolized by the party. Although this system is cloaked in the forms of parliamentary democracy, au interlocking network of party and government controls fires power in the hands of the SED leadership, headed since May 1971 by Erich Honecker. Walter Ulbricht and other C -rman Communists who had been political exiles in the U.S.S.R. during the Hitler period, returned to Germany with Soviet twops in May 1945 to act as the political arm of the Soviet occupation forces. At the outset, Soviet occupation authorities disclaimed any intention of imposing Soviet -style communism, and the German Communists talked of favoring a parliamentary democratic republic. In addition to the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), three political parties �the Christian Democratic Union, Liberal Democratic Party, and the Social Democratic Party �were allowed to organize. Behind this facade of multiparty democracy. the Soviet Military Administration manipulated or coerced all parties into following policies compatible with Soviet aims. In April 1946 the SED was created by a forced merger of the r establisbed KPD, led by Wilhelm Pieck and Ulbricht, and the old Social Democratic Party (SPD), led by Otto Grotew Despite the initial enthusiasm of many Socialists for a unified party, the final merger was in large part the result of coercive acts by the Soviet Military Administration which was determined to develop East German political life according to the Soviet example. Grotewohl and Pieck were elected joint chairmen of the new party, and Ulbricht became the srcretan- general. From thr outset, elements which did not acquiesce in C'.ommunist leadership were deprived of the possibility of giving public expression to their views because of the Communist control of newspapers and other communications media. The SED, conforming to Stalinist policy, proceeded slowly in its attempt to "persuade" the people to choose y l J a F APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 "socialism." Initially, the SED tried to Rain support by stressing "democratic socialism" and German self identity, i.e., the concept of a "German road to socialism." The continuing failure to gain widespread support from the people, however, together with the breakdown of the uneasy cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and its wartime allies, led Moscow and the SED to harden their attitude and to abandon the gradualist approach. Until 1948 the SED was not a cadre party in the Leninist sense, but u Socialist mass part) of 2 million members. The expulsion of Yugoslavib from the Comintern in 1948 provided the impetus for Ulbricht and the other Fast German Communist leaders to transform the SED into a tightly controlled and highly disciplined organization modeled after the Soviet Communist Party. Shortly after, Ulbricht declared the SED "a party of a new type" �in other words, a Leninist party �which was to be the "self- conscious and organized vanguard of the working class." This decision meant disavowal of the concept of a "German road to socialism," recognition of the leading role of the Soviet Commons Party, and certain important organizational changci. Tie top leadership was solidly packed w ith l,ll,richt's adherents from the Moscow emigration and from lira) Communist circles. The party membership at all level was drastically purged, with prominent Social Democrats and those with Western contacts the No to go New party statutes were adopted which reflected the latest Soviet Conmunist Party practims. and n ^w reluirrment% for party mrmbcnhip. involving a period of candidacy and intensive indoctrination. were put into effect. The years 1419 -53 reflected the high point of Fast German "Suilinism With the ulbricht element firmly in eontvol. the party committal itself to an rconormic program of accelerated communisation and imlintrialization. and took the initial strp% toward farm cSnllrrfivisation and emulation of the S oviet rxamplr as the oniv legitimate monirl for the party and the government As popular rrwr_ awnt grrw 1 "Ibrio he .again "irtrd to purges, culminating in the re rx.yal from office it May 19.33 of the party's then wwrrd� ranking man. Fran.- Dahlem. for "political bdindne%% The purges. h~vrr. wrtr ntA a% brutal as lixne shies oururrrd r1w%her� in F.aslrm Funopr, and this may help 113 rxp6url the rrlatt,.r miking." 44 the post- Stalin rraciMr Fvrnts in the U S H caused complictiliors in Vao Germany. Stalin's death and rvk%rncv of mnfu.km and competition among his surevwm were rrf6lyd in conflicting dirmlivm cnncrming %laic ow's German 10 policy and East Germany's internal policy. Within the SED leadership, Minister for State Security Wilhelm Zaisser and putty ideol Rudolf Herrnstadt called for a change in the party line and for the removal of Ulbricht. Internal problems and Soviet pressure forced the regime to retreat from the tough line it had previously taken on such matters as workers' production Am and the attitude toward the middle classes and the churches. The attempt by certain labor unions to resort to strikes as a means of improving their standard of living led to the uprising of 17 June 1953. Although the rioting had a profound psychological impact in East Germany, only about 5% of the industrial work force actually went on strike, and the resulting clashes resulted in only 21 fatalities. SED officials reacted "in a confused and bewildered manner,' as Ulbricht later confessed. Party organizations in major cities where SPD traditions were strong joined the riolers in demands for Ulbricht'% ouster. Even alter Soviet troops had restored order, the party remained badly shaken. Ulbricht with strong Soviet backing �lost little time in moving to re labli%h his authority over the patty and slate. J aiv%cr and Hrrmstadt were expelled from the leadership, and later from the party. on charges of forming a "party faction with defeatist aims Othee prominent SFD figures were rrrwved from their govrrnment positions, and worn wrrr tried and impriwonel lot complicity in the uprising Ulbricht also ousted "enrmy elements in the party. possibly a% man as 20. 0411 functionaries and 7P010 rank -aril -file part members urn purged These mrasu". hocked by the shots of Soviet ford'. wrrr sufficient to present am serious challenge to 11hrichl's Iradrnhip for the next 3 wars The wo- c-alled thaw in Srnirt larmn arxl cultural policies in Itl -3.1,56 did tx,t inobxr Ihr Faro German regime to make mraninitful rntxr%tinn% b, ids own inlrllectoal communit. with llw tmull that man% Fast German writrn awl artist.� inclawling SED mrmhrr�- -Iwgwd that 111'tichl mighl I*- osrorr, because of his idenlilicaliorr with the Stalinist pnlicim condemned h,. Khrnhchry of the 21t1h lwnirl 01mmunisl Part% 01111tr" 11brichl ma"Ked to Iw,id on to his pnutkm b% marx�u,.rong the SED 0 -nital smmillrr Into %istr ssf c.mlArocr. while insliluling a lest limilad measures to Iwortr the rimer sd its Slalinisl past An in%"igwlksn of pest illr"Idirs was lauraciaad. which tesu in .amrw11s lot is large number of political priulnrn A sprcial SFD commission. established to w%lru prsl purses. trtrrmmen" the wh ilitatkm of Da hlrm And nt hrt E APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 5 Y individuals, and many of them were given fairly Important state offices. During the Polish and Hungarian crises in the autumn of 1956 East Germany remained relatively calm. The arrest and subsequent conviction and imprisonment for 10 years of Wolfgang Harich, a ***** professor of Marxist philosophy at Humboldt University in East Berlin and the most outsli oken of the intellectual critics, served to discourage open rebellion. less severe reprisals in the form of removal from jobs, demotions, and reprimands were meted out to other "deviationist" SED intellectuals. The fact that dissident individuals could still escape to the Wcst was also a reason for the lack of widespread active resistance during this penal. The next challenge to Ulbricht's party leadership was far mote serious, as it was led by Karl Schirdewan. Polithuro member and heir presumptive to l.:lbricht. and by Fred Oelmner, the SED's chief ideologist. Both men opposed Ulbricht' dmitr to increase the pace of wxialira lion. mainly on Kroundi of economic efficiency hot apparently alv heca(rsr they thought that %och changes would impede German reunifica- lion. Other high parts official,* backed the die leader%, a% did Minister for State Security Etnst %vollwrhrt. The %houdown cache in Frhnlat% 191A when Schitdrwan. (Tefs%ret. and N'ollwrlrt Awl their followrn weir pnrgel. Schinlrwan anal Wollar'wr "err am(nrd of "factional acti%itim. i e oplwr%ing Ulbrich# The following seat. hour et. all etcrpt Wollwrbet is%urd poiNic recantatiow of their rarfirt prwitions and pledged their loyally In lllotichl Thi% %a% to he the last of the %weeping peirgei of the Politfnttrr. awl for the rwtl decade w so that iwnl% was to be a lairds irliahlr imininwrll of thr purls leadrrship ('IMichl pluna(d lotwanl with A prr.gram rsf Actelrtatrd io47ialisaliotl. Atwl mrntraloalkm furl the %mirl tiwnlel. And rTV w�mic rtpatnl M #in 11w boot of a Se%rn Year Plan -411 ohrdientl% ruhhrhtarnped. h% the l'ifrh Par% Camttmir held in )rib IWA "ihr hash (Arm d +sr in rAtls 19W. "it"i nwnri to test*W1 tri Wihint memtwt% of tllr n*Mlr clans to r/wotr Niitlgrnl rottttols. ,and. a ,*rAt lalrt. the 604" walign;twmI of F.A %l (�rt11an ind"S1111 (o Mille ihr 47"181111 "Invalnrtahk to Nest (;#t n ecMwotook rrmnlot- measrtr". bud to wfunp eesAwoaik (ithlrttl and ttlaos nithts In the Nra Drs(tile thr pttNni%r nl ttlntr purllrntr pllli47umi. oplt lhr hai%h vrcgHlt mmaufm a�ndAtrd with thr hailrling of lily "a "All 641rd the refugee exodus and prevented odic probable collapse of the Ulbricht regime. The Berlin wall, it conspicuous acknowledgement of the serious problems facing the regime, was considered by the East German leaden to be a necessary prerequisite for the economic recovery of East Germany and the strengthening of SF D con(rol. Despite the wave of indignation which the building of the wall evoked in the West, it enabled the regime to halt the refugee flow, restore discipline, and to turn its full attention to necessary changes in economic policy. In 1962 Ulbricht began to abandon the "ideological" approach to economics, dropping the Seven Year Plan and quietly substituting more realistic annual Mans. Al the same time he institute(] governmental organizational and policy changes designed to provide a more rational approach to East Germany'% basic economic ptohlems. This rmphasi %on a more practical approach to economic problems A a% reflected at the Sixth Party C onKrrvt, held in January 196.3. where *****er, icchnicalh trained party functionaries were raised into higher leadership positions. The party'% preomupation with economic problem% %a% (nrlher indicated In the decision of the Party Congres,*. implemented in Februar} 1963. fry terKanisr the party amirding to the "production principle Imitating change% prrviomh initiated in the Srniet Communist Part% In khnnhcNe.. the SF.D (cnvohdaled it% e"rtrol mer the economy In creating wpotatr party hurra(n for the acricslllrital And indrntrial btancl o-% off the Mvirwms Thu change% wrtr mimitrd in a mintani) of the burr le%Pl SED ontaniration While {rasing %one mrasutr of anlonom% to the A%wwiateon% rd Peoplr- r/arwd ind(nttir% O NIl sl. The SED in18ihl (o im18tr it% (control tnri the ecntwom% At the lrwrt Irsrli hs trplaring the fotmrt dislod. Aiwl %c.unl% Irsrl rte nti%r h18trails In (isr -men wwrtlarials 'thr nra ww"IArials (lmaislel of A first Im? 'In Awl %r47trlAtir% lot agrictltotr. iorliolm. agitAti(m. And itdr.aoRs Three ovictural chAnar% wrtr acscrm"ni-ti in mAn� caw h% prru nnrl thangm ahich ro%Aldrd the %F0 1r, trptacr inelfrctisr lone /irhatiri with %"18ngrt Awl rtwtr tr47hnicallt (swroprtrnt men Dri(dtr 1 I1itichl :Iaim. thr ItAl %1r18e118tAl lesetani>atMwl ratmA alnwssl At roam pri.hkms (o+ thr Pohl,* as it v%lsrd Ahhosrth murk liter And rflerrl artr rrww In U�plrnlrnt the per.etih" rhangrs. the SED I41rt quirt{% lollowrd the IrAd of khtaclwllr% WTv* ot. aho twtan in lair 1%%4 10 AbOrAFM 111r Ir rdu47ttnn p4itltiph And in 1.1 1Ahlido Ihr Irttilotial plinYi* A% Illy inirmirm CVWV t in rhr patls's ottAnilwtion Thu SIF-D. hnartrt. 11 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110019 -3 r. -.v.. .r. wr� Jc.'.'," -J k wu w.. r tPw !f[Zl4J1YM1 1. 4 1 i continued to emphasize the necessity of solving economic problems, and Rave lower priority to brooder political and ideological issues. Several high -level party memben later criticized this development, pointing out that ideological work had partially faded into the background because of the preoccupation with economic problems, and that party meetings had often taken on the nature of "pr(Auction discussions." The regime's overriding interest in ecxmomic theory and development fluctuated, as various officials expressed eoncem that the role of the party and indoctrination in Marxism- Leninism were bring neglected At the Seventh Congress of the SED in April 1467 Ulbricht expounded his concept of "the developer social system of socialism" which. as later amplified, implied that socialism as it exisled in the German Democratic Republic was a distinct and independent social order and was not merely a stepping shone to communism. Ile podwyc l the GDR as a model to be follor:ed. this drempha%izing the Sovirf example avid riperience. F uribermorr. Ulbrichi b egan incrra%inghv to sfrrsa national themes, and at times appeared to he drooling went altenliovo to the interests of intetnalional c.mmoni%m as defined h% the 5mirf Communist Part%. Ulbricht fascination with science and atxlrac: economic thetn wrtr not tha"I by all. houmrr In April 19fi9. whit (:mchcnlovak dmclopmenl% �till bring shatpl% debated and idekgicai factionalism at an alltime higfu within the Commooisl world_ Polithuoo member H o rieclter fold the IIN plenum cif the (:cotta) Committee that part% discipline was at important at rtymomic dr%rkvmrnl ile castigaled supixwfrn of thr Iherw%' !i r that capitalism and rnmmuni%rn wrtr coming moor :vrxfl move to trwmhle each other. at wrll as trformrn and tr%itiirtish. aril hinted that his trmatks wet, totrtxkd as much for drMvett tYwnompii'm at (tw knomn nm %rtkkt such as Cr fxwknakia and mini.+nia Fmplatit coot permililan irainin t Icst thn�rgh inicittifird programs ttxwm trd in the socirh for Sport and Trchnolfv% RAT). the F ree (.rtman lmilh 401). avid Ermt thaeltrunn Pwwxrn. al�mt with incirawd part% indowidnalkwt, rntrwigIr d with thr ginrrnvternl t inrv`ratint c.wxrm net kIrssk�tkal dr%ial At hotrvr And a hti.ad Lrading pail% kltwliigist Kurt ilagry tuppnrtrd Ilcwiftltrt In strr�aiteg thr tmprwtancr n) pl.annivit and Ihr parh_t tale in ditimlint klenlitg% and culheral dr%rkj>.xtt% nrKaniralion decidm that the camlidate (I#" nol rt hw-v all the netr�wn Iuali(icatiom to he an SF I) mcnilx�t. it nui% woh +nK hit candidavh prrirxl (tor an thrr ear The dir it,ion of the ImOv p.rh to APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 1';1gA`}{�? y'; 47^ Yt+ tsxlu! s,!. Y.' r� rr; v !t^.,r;!;'!.,r,'y.!J;Rt!'p{ I' i. wm. z:,, pis!' ",rti:;R' tt!tTl'!i:F.1Y! M'rr* !f;A rw r A organization finally to approve or disapprove the candidate's application or to prolong the candidacy period are confirmed by the next highest party organization. In addition to its large party organization, the SED leadership has immediately under its control the Workers Militia (Kampfgruppen), a paramilitary adjunct estimated to number around 350,000 persons, armed and trained by the People's Police. The Workers Militia was formed in 1953 following the uprising in June, and its primary task is the protection c -f the state owned enterprises against acts which would disrupt proxluction or endanger public order. Thev are, therefore, particularly concerned with civil disturbances, and they cooperate with police units in the prevention and suppression of strikes, riots, and other disorders. In addition to being trained in the use of small arms and riot control, the Workers Militia participates in full field exercises employing machineguns, mortars. antitank gams, and armored scou cars. Training has become more rigorous since 1967. and during the (:zechcnlovakia crisis in 1%. h some units reportedly were given orientation lectures because of the possibility that they might sec action in the soccupxation of (.l. ^choslovakia. Part% control of the Workers Militia remains in tl hands of the SED securih leaders from the higho st levels in the (ventral Committee to local securih secretaries and through them to the immediate level cif commanden of the basic groups of 1(X) meta. T hese basic groups are called Hunder(srhaften. a term used by ancient Germanic tribes as early as the first centun to describe the hundred hest warriors in a "immunih. The Workers Militia is the largest organization in fast German, with the etception of the ?egular military forces. to which weap!ns are made available. Although the capabilih of the Workers Militia has been questioned in the exist. recent emphasis on training and indoctrination ma% have improved its of Ie�1i %enM% 3. Party leadenhip until Ma% 1971 Walter Ulbricht (Figure 5) occupied the summit of the SED organization and fvmished the driving force for the party and for East Germam. a. u wluole Boom in I.eiprig in IW3 of socialist parents. ull,richt joined the SPD in 1912 and helped found the German communist Party after World War I t'Ibricht quickly demonstrated the quatitim of Iho;oughnns and pretWence that have since led many biographers to describe him as the perfect bureaucrat. tie was self assured, if somewhat unimaginative, but burdened with the pedantic mannerisms of an old fashioned schoolteacher. Ulbricht was a hard worker, did not drink or smoke, and prided himself on physical fitness. As the SED First Secretary after 1953, he was directly responsible for adopting and overseeing the execution of regime policies. On several occasions prior to 1961 Ulbricht's authority was challenged from within the party, and there were widespread public hopes that he might be purged in the wake of de- Stalinization moves in the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European countries. Ulbricht, however, was able on every occasion to counter all challenges and dash the hopes of the populace by convincing the Soviet leaders that his demotion or replacement would weaken the regime nand raise a threat to continued Soviet control of Fast Germany. For almost a decade after the erection of the Berlin wall in 1961. Ulhricht's authority was virtually unchallenged and he proceeded with great vigor to consolidate. Communist rule in East Germany. Although he slowed his pace somewhat, delegating more power to other members of the Politburo and attempting to assume the role of an elder statesman who was alorve day -to -day events, them w�.as little doubt that Ulbricht remained in control of the SED and of Fast Germany. Even while Ulbricht remained envYnced as part% leader. it group of able *****er men had begun the climb to top positions in the party. Despite their differing views on the problems facing the regime, this *****er group had risen through the party ranks under Ulbricht's tutelage and they were all apparently convinced of the necessity of continued East German dependence on the Soviet Union. There were reporh and speculation that SED leaden were divided. with the "hard" faction or "dogmatish" allegedly led by Erich lionecker (Figure 5). and the "xft" f +;ction or "technocrats" Ind by Premier Willi Stoph (Filtorr .i). There was no firm evidence to substantiate such repxrts, however. particularly when the leadership dertumstrated that it was capable of closing ranks and presenting it united fnrnt when other potentially divisive i%sa.es anise Since taking the reins of txwrr. llonecker has pnven to be at capable and acceptalale %txxr%%ir to Ulbricht Despite the laatirr's long years of dedicated wrvicr. there were apparently few tears shed at his demotion. Initial Western press speculation pnstalated that Ilonmker was tow colo,rl and too) %tomialized in cadre and securih af fairs to he able to sucYrs handle the "implicated economic problems which had been the focus of criticism since the 14111 plenum 15 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 in December 1970. It was predicted that a triumvirate, possibly consisting of Stoph, Honecker, and Guenter Mittag would be formed. Honecker has, however, established himself as primus inter pares. Erich Honecker was born in 1912 in the Saar. At the age of 10 he was enrolled by his father in the Communist *****ren's movement, and later trans- ferred to the youth movemew where he rose quickly to high -level positions. After spending 10 years (1935 -45) in Nazi prisons, he returned to the Soviet occupation zone where he was given the very important job of organizing the Free German Youth (FDJ). Honeeker's success in building the FDJ led to candidate membership in the Politburo in 1950. llr. was promoted to full membership in 1958 and became the secretary responsible for security and cadre affairs. Long before the actual transfer of power, Honecker's position as Ulbricht's heir designate had been unquestioned. His experience and connections in the FDJ, the party bureaucracy, and the security apparatus assured him the support of these key .elements. Even more important, howe Honecker was acceptable to Moscow because of his unswerving loyalty to the Soviet Communist Party, his seeming immunity to nationalist tendencies, and the likeli- hood that he would he prepared to subordinate SED intcrest -r those of Moscow if a situation were to arise in which a choice had to be made. The Honecker style of leadership combines a strict adherence to ideologi*****) principles with a willingness to find pragmatic soluutions to diffucuit social and economic problems. Though his strength lies in organizational and cadre -vork, he opposes a beavyhanded bureaucratic approach to salving problems. At the Eighth Party Congress he criticized tendencies which had developel under Ulbricht including ohstinacy, bureaucratism, paper- pushing. and the penchant for taking too optimistic a view of developments. Honecker is deeply devoted to the SED, but he wants it to be a party which does not rely on punitive administrative measures to command loyalty Several trends have become evident since Honecker took office. On the one hand there has been the Nttempt M strengthen political cor*trols of the SED over Fast German society. This included KivinK increased weight to political attitude, over performance rreards. and assigning an increasingly important role to the cabinet -level Worken and Farmers Inspectorate (ABI) which has the responsibil� ity to implement party resolutions affecting the economy and society. Simultaneously, the SED has also taken steps to raise the morale of the people by lrlM Ilan -Mar fine Secreurr (1951)� wariw Lawb.ra N1*10- 40%71 4 trrllll lagU wale. urwkht A16M Nwdm PnA hewer Sammy (lM) FIGURE S. Party Lt>adsrs MOU) 16 rZil M APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 we Hermann Axon International Affairs (1965)� 4440 L A echenberger lfo lei Horst Slndermann Herbert Werwke i Friedrich Ebert Gerhard Grueneberg Kurt Hager Agriculture (1958)` Culture. Science. and Ideology (1951) Werner Krolikowski JOINED CENTRAL BORN PARTY COMMITTEE CANDIDATE TO POLITBURO �FULL POLITBURO MEMBERS: HONECKER (First Secretary) 1693 ULERICHT (Chairman) 18991 AXEN EBERT r� GRUENEBERG HAGER KROLIKOWSKI LAMBERZ MITTAG MUECKENSERGER NEUMANN NORDEN SINDERMANN STOPH VERNER WAANKE CANDIDATE MEMBERS EWALD r HALBRITTER JAROWINSKY KLEIBER MIELKE T MUELLER TISCH 1 1 1 1 l l 1 1 1100 1910 1120 1110 1110 1150 1W 1170 Geotg Ewald t Margaete Mwller 11) 1 fA Harry TI�ch Supply (1911)' 'Arta of r iW'ry end Free of e00- m"'tnt M Se.eMeetet I C- r d000% Walter Halbrltter Werner Gwnther Klelber Erich Mielbe Foe" Trade P4 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 ECtN'ryyr' ^?h *l. m:, ar� 't}w T:� p., r, wn; a� t! r+ xr. n?msaCr" EM? l` t" B:` 7fi'tlus"F!4'ry'R9YS!s1?ProTI r y "4r'"S'J' dux, l, 3?! a yl!rP; :,vR V i I improving living standards and increasing outlays for social welfare. 4. Collaborating parties and organizations In addition to the SED there are four other political parties, all of which are virtual adjuncts of the SED and are permitted to exist only because they lend democratic coloration to the regime. The collaborat- ing parties, along with four of the more important ltass organizations and the SED, are organized collectively as the National Front. The collaborating parties serve the SED chiefly by organizing those sectors of the population which the SED would have difficulty in reaching �the surviving remnants of the bourgeoisie and small farmers�and by providing channels through which the East German line can be propagated among West German parties representing similar interest groups. An indication of the extent to which the collaborating parties are captives of the SED is provided by their decision in the spring of 1972 to le -id the drive to nationalize industries which remained in private hands. These parties also provide personnel for East German missions to foreign countries, especially nonaligned countries, where the presence of such "non- Communist" functionaries is inte-ded to strengthen East Germany's claim to be a democratic republic. Leading officials of the collaborating parties are often assigned to head various friendship societies and are given representa- tive positions in the government�especially in the Council of State �in an effort to stress the rnultipariv nature of the rt gime. a. Non Communist front parties The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), formed in I 1945, originally represented the same Christiar- oriented, middle class elements which organized the CDU in the Western occupation zones. The CDU soon ran into difficulty, however, because of its opposition to the SED a -il conflicts with the Soviet Military Administration, as a result of -vhich prominent pane leaders were forced to step down. The CDU had lost as independent character by 1948, and since then it h is functioned as an auxiliary of the SED. Ai its sixth ;tarty congr s, held in 1952, the CDU reorganized itself on the SED pattern, creating a political committee (cor:espording to the SED's Central Committee) and a presidium (Politburo). Gerald Goettiag, long the most powerful figure in the CDU, became the formal head of the party when he succeeded August Bach as chairman of the CDU aft -r the latter's death i.. Match 1966 Goetting had >:arlier been rewarded for faithful service to the SED by being placed on the Council of State. Although the CDU is organized on a district and local level and publishes several newspapers, thereby giving the impression that it is a thriving organization, its membership has steadily dwindled from a high of approximately 217,000 in 1947 to t ^ss than 80,000 in 1968, at which level it appears to have stabilized. Tlw German Liberal Democratic Party (LDPD) was formed in 1945 to represent middle class East Germans who had a "liberal creed and democratic political convictions." The party accepted the need to work with all anti Fascist parties, but its espousal of private property and a free economy soon placed it in conflict with SED and Soviet authorities. In the face of constant pressure and harassment, the LDPD leadership slowly retreated from its original program and by 1952 it agreed to participate in "the building of socialism" in East Germany. In 1957 the LDPD accepted the leadership of the SED, thereby confirming its position as a mere adjunct of that part;. The LDPD is led by Dr. Manfred Gerlach and is estimated to have a membership of about 75,000. The German National Democratic Party (NDPD), headed by Dr. Heinrich Homann, was formed in May 1918 to extend the SED's influence over former low level Nazis who had "broken with their past" and professional soldiers, to whom the party appealed by ern r hasizing the r ationalistic aspects of East German policy. Like the w.her collaborating parties, the NDPD has attempted to contact similar elements in West Germany, apparently with only minor success. Unlike t're other non -SED parties, however, the NDPD has increased in membership, growing from 1.,000 members in 1949 to approximately 120,000 in early 1W9, where it has stabilized. The German Democratic Peasants Party (DBD) was created by the SED in 1948 to win over the farmers and farm workers to the party's brand of socialism. Once nominally representative of farmer., with small holdings who had profited from the SF:D's early land reforms, the DBD surrendered all pretense to being independent when it supported the regimis decision to collectivize agriculture in 196(1. The party is le I by Ernst Goldenhaum and Paul Scholz and has appruaimately 80,000 members. Of the four collaborating parties. the DBD is perhaps the least influential. It. Mass organizations Like the four political partir-,, the so- called muss organizations have been .ta`lished w appeal to genuine or alleged group interests, and they operate 18 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 k''?'� 9r:'!,'^ f3.�?, S' F, rl.'' fm' fA .wE+vrt::,rq'!'Mrd!r+xFr ra5! s. GC^ S?^ q' tfl'*�. Ffrrw. r� m,.,+� wc' N!!! YC" P:^ rt?!! rtn*?'.' N"-^ Y'! r.., r: t*�" 1K-: i:!+ rM' ft' iA4": vc:*+G.'Ff�M.!`,,!Cr'4tW`f'"y x. �f A0. '+'nrp ��;?STHA7�h.'1PIK.'' under direct SED guidance. The four major organizations are the Free German Trade Union Federation (FDGB), the Free German Youth (FDJ), the Democratic Women's Leagu,, of Germany (DFD), and the German Cultural Association (DKB). From the regime's point of view, the organizations provide a convenient channel for transmitting party directives to the rank and file and mobilizing the people to achieve variolis objectives set by the regime. At the same time because these mass organizations are represented in the national and local legislatures through the National Front single -list elections tickets, they afford a supplementary means of directing popular interest into regime- approved channels. From the viewpoint of the ordinary citizen, membership in the organizations is attractive only because certain privileges can be obtained. Marry persons wishing to rise economically or politically find that participation in one or more of the organizations is a prerequisite. The FDGB, organized in 1945 and affiliated since 1949 with the Communist controlled World Federa- tion of Trade Unions, is the organization which nominally represents all East German workers. In contrast to the role of trade union federations in the West, the FDGB does not represent the interests of the workers but instead functions as an agent of the regime, cooperating with m in the nationalized industries and with the state administra- tions in Setting up and enforcing production quotas and in maintaining control over workers. The FDGB also -administers the social insurance program and operates rest homes. The federation and its member unions are organized on a territorial basis, with executive bodies at national, district, county, and local levels. The highest body of the FDGB is its congress, which meets every 4 years to elect a chairman (SED Politburo member Herbert Warnke in 1972) and a presidium to lead the organization. In 1972 the FDGB claimed 7.2 million members (or about 88% of the total work force), but many persons have joined the organization merely to avoid losing jobs, privileges, or certain benefits. The FDJ and its junior affiliate, the Ernst Thaelmann Pioneers, whic;i includes the ***** Pioneers, were among the first organizations permitted by the S(,viet authorities in 1945 -46. Patterned after the Soviet youth organization, the FDJ exercises important functions in the educational and political indoctrination of East German *****ren and youths. Its chief function is to prepare future cadres for the SED. The FDJ maintains an extensive program of activities and facilities, including sports events, premilitary training, trips and expeditions, parades and rallies, recreational centers, and vacation camps. An affiliate of Communist -front World Federation of Democratic Youth, the FDJ accepts members 14 to 26 years of age; most of these members were previously enrolled in the Ernst Thaelmann Pioneers, which is open to *****ren 6 to 14 years of age. The FDJ organization is patterned after that of the SED, with bodies at the local and district level receiving direction from the nation. I leaders. A congress meets every 4 years to elect a central council, a bureau, and a secretariat to conduct FDJ affairs until the next congress. The FDJ claimed 1.7 million members in May 1972, while the Ernst Thaelmann Pioneers had some 1.8 million. Despite strenuous recruitment campaigns and the preference given to FDJ members for the most desirable jobs and for admission to the universities, the FDJ has not attracted East German youth to the extent desired by the SED. Only about 60% of the 14- to 26 -year age group are members. Various concessions granted by the regime to youth and efforts to enliven the g:nerally monotonous FDJ meetings and publications have not been productive. The Democratic Women's League of Germany (DFD) was founded in August 1948 with the goal of drawing women into more active participation in the economic life of the nation. Despite intensive membership campaigns, the majority of women have not joined its ranks. Total membership has remained constant at 1.3 million. The German Cultural Association (DKB) was created in 1945 by the Soviet military authorities and was ittusted with the task of unifying all members of the intelligentsia. Since the early 19.50's the creative artists, musicians and writers, have had their own autonomous organizations, but the association, with its 185,000 members, plays a peripheral role by sponsoring lectures, discussions, poetry readings, concerts, and exhibitions. Other large organizations include the Society for German- Soviet Friendship (GDSF) and the German Gymnastics and Sports Association (DTSB). Each organization is patently designed to propagandize and control a specific cross section of the population. A more specialized role is played by the Society for Sport and Technology (CST), which was organized in 1952 under the Ministry for National Defense to provide guidance and facilities for premilitary training and sports activities which are useful in military service. The society offers marksmanship, driver training, telecommunications operation, parachuting, and other related activities. 19 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 E t 4 4 The National Front, in addition to representing the parties and mass organizations, purports to represent the population as a whole and functions as the vehicle for presenting candidates for office at all levels of government. The National Front is organized on a residential basis; each apartment house or group of houses (in rural areas, even the smallest hamlet) elects a delegation to the National Front Committee for a specified locality or region. From these local committees a hierarchical structure ascends to the central controlling body called the National Committee of the National Front. The entire organization propagates the official line whenever the regime wishes to make the "popular will" apparent on questions of national significance� particularly in connection with elections. D. National policies (U /OU) In the early postwar years the Soviet occupation forces laid down the policy guidelines and the Socialist Unity Party (SED) acted, for the most part, as an executory agent. Soviet officials determined the breadth and scope of the reforms social, educational, agricultural, and industrial �which overturned the existing system and provided the framework for the development of a new social and political structure. In their day -to -day decisions, however, the Soviet occupation authorities appeared to be pursuing contradictory policies, wavering between harsh exploitation of German resources through confiscation and reparations and attempts to set up a viable governmental structure. The resentment and alienation resulting from these policies came to be focused on the SED. Disregarding popular opposition, the Soviet occupation authorities and East German leaders introduced sweeping reforms which paved the way for the development of a Communist society modeled after the Soviet Union. An indigenous elite gradually emerged and Soviet control became less direct. East German ideology still proclaims that the Soviet Union is the model for socialist development, and the SED leadership has shown itself sensitive to Soviet policy and practice. Both Walter Ulbricht and Erich Honecker have held the position that the GDR can find its place in the sun only by close cooperation with the Soviet Union. Today the leadership commands the loyalty of a large, dedicated bureaucracy and technical intelligensia, which increasingly identify their own interests with those of the regime and rec -gnize the stake they have in advancing the 20 legitimacy of the East German state by contributing to the successful implementation of government programs. 1. Domestic The primary goals of the domestic policies pursued by the regime are to assure the perpetuation of SED control of the society and to continue the process of transforming East Germany into a viable state separate and distinct from the Federal Republic of Germany. Until recently, the major barriers to achievement of these goals have been t!ie problem of legitimacy �the GDR was born of foreign occupation rather than domestic revolution �and the lingering desire of citizens of both Germanies for reunification of their divided nation. Prior to 1961 the East German citizenry had a choice as to whether they wished to be a part of the new society that the Communist regime was molding in the part of Germany under its control, or move to West Germany which had received general recognition as the only legitimate German state. The escape route through Berlin provided the means by which the East Germans were able to "vote with their feet," as a result of which a steady stream of the nation's most highly trained citizens technicians and professional people, including engineers, scientists, and phys,cians �fled to the Federal Republic of Germany. The readily available escape route allowed the remainder of the population to take a "wait- and -see" attitude toward the SED. In fact, the general state of relations between the regime and the people was measured by the flow wf refugees to West Berlin. The construction of the wall on 13 August 1961 had the immediate effect of stopping the exodus of technically skilled manpo Ner, but there were also longer range consequences. For the first time since the creation of the state, the regime had control over its own borders, a development that gave the entire party and governmental apparatus a measure of confidence that had previously been lacking. In addition, it was now clear to the people that they had no choice but to remain, and that in order to improve their own material well -being they would have to come to terms with the regime and its demands. In its initial period of development the German Democratic Republic, like other Communist states, placed great emphasis on completing large show projects, particularly in heavy industry, with ie result that consumer goods industries suffered and the creation of a broad economic infrastructure was neglected. While viewing economic growth as a goal in itself, the regime has also attached great importance I a APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 v C G) to economic achievement as a measurement of the state's ability to compete with West Germany and of the regime's legitimacy to rule. In 1963 the Ulbricht regime adopted a sweeping program of reforms, the goal of which was to encourage efficiency by giving greater play to such factors as profitability, realistic price -cost relationships, material incentives, and increased initiatives and responsibility at the managerial level. Ulbricht, who was considered a hard -line dogmatist on many questions, was instrumental in bringing in *****, technically trained experts to responsible party and governmental positions. Practical economic problems came to dominate party meetings and Ulbricht personally sponsored the development of theoretical economics and encouraged the develop- ment of a computer industry. In fact, Ulbricht's fall may be partially traced to his economic theories which tended to look to the 1980's rather than coming to grips with the immediate problems facing the regime. The Polish riots of December 1970 were seen by some East German leaders as an example of what could happen when concrete daily needs were ignored in favor of long term goals. Since May 1971, when Honecker replaced Ulbricht, the SED has tried to strengthen domestic stability and improve the morale of the people by devoting more resources to the long- neglected consumer goods industries. In addition, Honecker announced at the fifth Central Committee plenum in April 1972 that the regime intended to expand the existing social welfare programs in order to provide additional care and services for the people. It cannot be assumed that the promise of a greater volume of consumer goods and various services will automatically be translated into greater acceptance of the regime by the population. The comprehensive social welfare system, for example, reorganized and further developed by the regime, provides the people with a greater degree of security, particularly with respect to the health care field. These benefits have won the regime few converts, however, perhaps in large part because they are not innovations for Germans who have a long tradition of comprehensive social and health insurance programs that go back to the Bismarckian era in the late 19th century. The SED leadership has at times been willing to attempt to win popular support by easing restrictions on travel and cultural activities. These concessions in the past have not always led to positive results from the regime's point of view, and such gestures as allowing greater freedom of expression to writers and artists, agreeing to pensioners' visits to West Germany, negotiating the Berlin pass agreements, and encouraging contacts with the non Communist world were regarded as counterproductive by the leadership. After a rash of youth riots in 1965, the SED leaders again tightened controls and were reluctant to experiment further with "liberalization." As the Dubcek reforms swept neighboring Czechoslovakia in 1968, the East German regime placed even more. emphasis on strengthening the SED's commitment to orthodox Marxism- Leninism. The regime began to pay more attention to paramilitary training of students and intensified the indoctrination of youth groups in the party and mass organizations. During the first weeks following the Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1968, most military anci paramilitary units in East Germany were either activated or placed on alert. Popular support for the East Lerman role in the suppression of the Czechoslovak experiment was far from general, and the regime sought to neutralize pro Dubeek sentiment at home by involving as many citizens as possible in military activity. There was evidence that antiregime sentiment was prevalent among intellectuals, and there were scattered reports of wavering among military personnel, government workers, and even party members. The dissent that did surface was not widespread or well organized, and the regime quickly and quietly suppressed the sporadic student demonstrations which occurred in a number of cities. Soon after assuming power, the Honecker a leadership took tentative steps to relax some of the more onerous restrictions on cultural expression. At the Eighth Party Congress in June 1971 Honecker exhorted the artists' unions to conduct "frank, businesslike and creative discussions." Later that year at a Central Committee plenum, Honecker declared that there should be no taboos in art or literature either with regard to content or style, but he went on to warn against "feeding on the modernism of a :world which is alien and even hostile to us." During 1972, the Honecker regime appeared to be in the process of determining the guidelines for its cultural policies, but it was far from certain that the first tentative steps t taken by the regime represented a real change in policy rather than being merely tactical concessions. q The Honecker, leadership, like its predecessor, attaches great importance to indoctrination of the population as a means of winning popular support and approval. The SED controls all media of mass communications, and party officials responsible for propaganda and ideology together with other top levels formulate the main lines of doctrinal policy. 21 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 t These policies are reflected in all the relevant media and are given further dissemination by political, educational, social, recreational, and professional organizations. Although the points of emphasis in the propaganda disseminated by the regime vary from day to day to reflect the current party line, ti. general thrust of East German propaganda has remained consistent throughout the years. The major themes relate to the achievements of the regime and Communist nations ;Isewhere in the struggle to assure peace, progress, and prosperity for all people. The art of winning support through persuasion has taken on new importance under Honecker who has stated that "the art of leadership is the art of persuasion." The party has been prodded to get to know the workers and to speak their language. Several themes have been repeatedly emphasized, particularly the central role of the Five Year plans and the obligation of each citizen to participate in strengthening socialism. By attempting to show citizens that they have an opportunity for "true" participation in the governmental process, as opposed to the "sham" participation found in the West, the regime is waging a battle for the loyalty of East Germans. The old slogan, "Plane mit, arbeite mit, regiere mit" (plan with us, work with us, govern with us), expresses the Marxist Leninist view that the dictatorship of the proletariat brings real democracy for the first time in human history to the great majority of the population. The degree of success enjoyed by the regime in its drive to establish the legitimacy of the SED as the nation's leading force is difficult to determine. There undoubtedly is discontent and there are some who reject the concept of an East German state with the SED as its ruler, but these numbers are declining. Since the building of the Berlin wall in 1961 there has been a slow, rather subtle, process of enforced reconciliation between the population and the regime which seems fairly well advanced. As long as the regime is able to continue to register impressive gains in economic growth and in satisfying popular demands for goods and services, growing numbers of East Germans are likely to identify their own Werests with those of the regime, thereby hawuening the division of Germany and establishing the legitimacy of the GDR. Although the regime proclaims the primary mission of its well- organized and well- equipped armed forces to be the defense of East German territory against foreign enemies, an equally important task is their supporting role in maintaining internal security and 22 r order. The primary duty of the Frontier Command troops, for example, is to prevent escapes from East Germany into West Germany and West Berlin. Civilian authority over the military, exercised by regime leaders, is virtually complete. There is no conflict between military and civilian leaders, and there is no indication that the East German military is prepared to assume a role that would challenge the primacy of the party's civilian leadership. 2. Foreign The major foreign policy objective of East Germany is to secure international acceptance and formal recognition as a sovereign state. A corollary of this policy is the intensification of the drive initiated under Ulbricht �for systematic differentiation (Abgrenxung) of the two Germanies on the basis of their social and political orders and' their alleged contributions to peace and stability in Europe. The regime has established contacts and relations with a growing number of states since the fall of 1972. Evidence of increased acceptance and recognition abroad will strengthen the position of the East German leaders with their own people by dispelling the notion of the transitory nature of the GDR and placing the final seal on the existence of two separate German states (Figure 6). East Germany's dependence on the Soviet Union as the guarantor of its continued existence as a national state and the integration of its armed forces into the Warsaw Pact combined command are effective deterrents to the formulation and implementation of a defense policy inimical to the interest of Moscow and the nations of Eastern Europe. In the event of war, strategy would be dictated by Soviet leaders, and the employment' of the armed forces would be in accordance with Soviet plans. a. Relations with the Soviet Union East Germany's international relations continue to be circumscribed by the fact that it must frequently subordinate its own interests to those of the U.S.S.R. The East German Soviet tie has gradually changed, however, from the vassal- master relationship of the Stalinist period to one in which East Germany has become more like a junior partner in a joint venture. By the early sixties the East Germans had begun to assert their own interests more vigorously; they were gradually allowed to determine their own internal affairs and were given some latitude in managing relations with West Germany and the nonaligned nations. But Moscow has retained the decisive voice 9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110019 -3 46 ,i ti -r on issues affecting rel ations with the Western powers, partict!I �rly West Berlin, and has restrained the East Germans from undertaking actions which might directly challenge the position of the three Western Allies in the divided city. Continuing Soviet control is guaranteed by the 20 Soviet divisions stationed in East Germany. Although Soviet and East German interests have generally coincided, there is evidence of some differences between the two regimes and a certain amount of friction in their relationship. The Soviet failure to sign it separate peace treaty with the GDR in the early 1960's and Khrushchev's cautious flirtation with West Germany in 1964 particularly irked Ulbricht. More serious problems arose after 1968 when Moscow's interest in pursuing detente with the West coincided with West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. Ulbricht felt that Brandt's eastern policy (Ostpolitik) neglected East German interests, and he attempted to h alt or at least redirect Soviet and East European initiatives toward West Germany. Ulbricht continued to maintain that an improvement in relations between the two Germanies required the Bonn government to recognize the German Democratic Republic, even though it had been evident for some time that the Soviet position on this question had become more flexible. Ulbricht's unwillingness to eni'er into any agreement which might downgrade East German claims to the western half of the city also created difficulties in Four -Power negotiations on it regulation of the status of Berlin. From the Soviet point of view, Ulbricht �in his prime, a master of maneuver for political gain �had become so inflexible that he could riot adjust to the change in the international climate and the consequent shift in Soviet policy objectives. Although Erich Honecker had a reputation as a hard -line dogmatist, he went it long way toward meeting Soviet demands. This was not accomplished without some Soviet I,rodding but, in general, Honecker has been prepared to acknowledge the regime's dependence on Moscow both politically and economically. Honecker has been responsive to Soviet interests in the area of foreign policy, as was evident in the spring of 1972 when he unilaterally took several steps which aided the passage by the West German Bundestag of the Soviet Federal Republic treaty renouncing the use of force. The leadership has echoed nearly every nuance or shift in Soviet attitudes on a variety of issues, ranging from the need for it European Security Conference to the possibility of eventual agreement e troop reductions in Europe by the United States and the U.S.S.R. East Germany also continues to lend its wholehearted support to M OSCOW on such issues as. Romanian nationalism, the occupation of Czechoslovakia, and the Sino- Soviet dispute. The regime has also championed the Moscow line on issues concerning the so- called third world nations, including staunch support for the Arabs in their dispute with Israel. 1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 FIGURE 6. New Foreign Minis'ry building, East Berlin (U /OU) 23 Y A. Tz S�rY. LL. ..n': Y.. 4.....:, xu:L- �:y.' N a+. ...c ...w r. 1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 FIGURE 6. New Foreign Minis'ry building, East Berlin (U /OU) It. Relations reith other Eoxtern European countries Recognized as a sovereign state by all the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, East Gennanv strives to obtain from its" fraternal socialist" allies a binding commitment to support all East German political objcctiv In particular, East Germany relics on the other Eastern European countries to support the regime's drive to gain membership in various international organizations and to encourage other nations to establish official relations. Tit,- Communist nations of Eastern Europe have been willing up to a point to support the GDR in attaining these objectives because they clearly regard the existence of a separate East German state to be essential to their own security arrangements. Relations with these countries were strained at times, however, because of such issues as West Germany's Ottpolitik, which the East German regime tried to block and which the other Communist nations regaeded favorably. Another irritant has been the receptivity of thew nations to Bonn's drive to expand trade relations with Eastern Euronc, along with the succesr, of the West Germans in negotiating agreements for exchanging trade missions with Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechmiovakia, and Bulgaria. From the East German point of view, a particularly galling aspect of these agreements has been the implicit recognition by the Communist nations of Bonn's claim that West Berlin is a part of the Federal Republic. Bonn was unable or unwilling to follow up its early successes immediately, but in earl 1967 the new West German Government again sought improvements in West German relations with Eastern Europe. Its efforts met with some success when Romania established diplomatic relations with Bonn, and Prague and Budapest agreed to rec^ive Bonn's emissaries. This led to feverish East German diplomatic efforts in early 1961 to convince the Warsaw Pact states that they should not improve their relations with the Federal Republic until Bonn gave up its claim to be the uIe representative of Germany and recognized the German Democratic Republic as a sovereign state. This diphmatic activity was highlighted by a series of visits by Ulbricht to various Warsaw Pact states and the signiag of mutual assistance treaties with Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. From the East German viewpoint, these, treaties provided reassurance that East German interests would not he completely ignored even if other Eastern European countries eventually established diplomatic relations with Bonn. 24 R% 1110-1%8, relations between Pankow and other capitals in Eastern Europe had worsened. Bonn's 0,11polnik was proving to be attractive to other bloc countries in addition to Romania, and the East German regime feared eventual isolation if West German initiatives succeeded. The prospect of a liberal, Western oriented Czechoslovakia toned the most serious and immediate threat. As it result, the Ulbricht regime launched a vitriolic attack on the Dubcck leadership with the purpose of raising cdouLt�. about the ideological loyalties of the government in Prague and reversing the trend toward liberalization in Eastern Europe. East Germany's criticism of Dubeek was often more vehement than that of the Soviets, and on 20 August. when Soviet-led Warsaw Pact foxes invaded Czechoslovakia, it was made to appear in East Germany that Ulbricht's policies had been vindicated. During 1969 -70 the Ulbricht regime pursued an active but defensive foreign policy in its attempt to coordinate and restrict East European approaches to Ronn. The East Germans succeeded in dclaving moves toward detente between Bonn and the Communist world, but the regime suffered a sharp setback in August 1970 when the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression treaty with the Federal Republic. The agreement was a particularly bitter pill for the Fast German Government to swallow because it violated a key axiom of GDR policy �that the Communist nations would refrain from taking steps toward normalizing relations with West Germany is long as the Bonn government continued its policy of not recognizing East Germane. Comulka had also) dropped this as an issue in the talks between Bonn and Warsaw. The more flexible policies of the Honecker leadership toward West Germany have eaw d tensions with fast Germany's allies, especially "Oland and Czechoslovakia. Honecker visited his closest Communist neighbors in the fall of 1971. and at the fourth Central Committee plenum the following December he declared that a "new historical phase in the Irothrrlp relations" was being introduced. One concrete result we- the conclusion of special agreements in January 1972 allowing visa -free Iravcl between these countries. The East German regime also remains a staunch supporter of economic and technological cooperation among the Communist nation. through the Council on Economic Mutual A- tance which is headquartered in Moscow. a APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 c. Melallona with West Gemwny In one sense, Fast Germanv serves a% a mere instrument of Soviet policy toward the Federal Republic of Germany, the West Berlin authontim, and the Western Allies. The range of Soviet interests I% %o great and the issues are so sensitive that the Soviets have not permitted the East Getmans to develop a truly independent policy towanl the West. Their interests broadly coincide, h,owevrr, and the U.S.S.R. recently has tended to allow the East Germans a longer tether on foreign policy issues than it did formerly. The G, man Democratic Republic's claim to It- a vrvereign state dictated it basically hostile attitude toward West Germany. Nonetheless, the Cast Germans paid lip -service to the idea of an East -West Groman confederation, which would include the .wparate 'ctritory of West Berlin a% a first step toward reestablishing Germany unity. Ulbricht reaffirmed this paition in his 1967 New Year's message. adding the caveat that unification is imixnsible until West Germany u::democs a "radical democratic revoltition." Ulbricht alvo reiterated %evrral of East Germany's longstanding demand% it calling for agreemenh which would lead to confederation. The East (;romans atgned that the two German states should establish normal diplomatic relations: recognize existing nationa" frontier in Europe; renounce control of or participation in the control of nuclear weap ons, and declare their readiness to participate in a nuclear -free none in Europe. rrsprct the independence of West Berlin. and establish a commission to examine how the Potsdam agreement had torn implemented in East and West German. Although they denounced the West German Government a% ieing unrepresentative and revanchist. the East Germans constantly utilized varioits stratagems to induce Bonn to enter into talk% at a ievrl which could loc used to bolster the GDR's claims to sovereignty. The West German% refrained fnm official negotiations. limiting their contacts with the Ertl German to technical discussions among repre- sentatives from %uch agencies a% the Trusteeship Olficr for Interzonal Trade, which handle% economic and traffic matters. Neverthelew there were intcrmini%- terial contacts on technical matters %uch a% communication and tranport. Both %ides also found it advantageous to use private citizen%. particularly church leaden. In conduct nonofficial negotiations which occasiorially led In government sanctioned agreements, a% in the case of the prisoner exchange agreement in 1%4. In 19Ffi the two Germania s appeared about to initiate a high -level %to: ulcer rtchange between the West Getman Social Democrats, headed by Willy Brandt, and leading member- of the SED. The East Germans, however, became increasingl% apprehensive al�nt the course of the talks and hacked out, allegelh over B no's reloctance to rescind a law tinder which East Getman leaden could be %object to arrest in West Gertnan In the negotiations for the proposed speaker exchange, prowl %icon was made for temporary %n %pension of this law, Iut the Ea%t Getman gime was fearful of %pontaneous tmpulat demonstral,ions as well as longer range political effects if the popular Brandt and other well -known West German leaden appeared in East Germany. These fears were c nfirmel when Brandt and Stoph met in F:tfnrt in 1970, where Brandt received a tumoltiNu: welcome In the clo Ling months of the Ulbricht regime, the theme of unit% of the German nation of the de%irahility of %ome form (of Grrman cmnfederation lorgan to receive less emphasis and wa% finall% dropped cntiret%. It was replaced by a polic% calling for it Complete differentiation between the Iwo states AIRrenzunR �which has been given added cmpha%i% by the Nonecker regime. Under this iwxlicy. relation% briwc. it the two Getmanim are to Ix� like those between an-; two sovereign and independent states. Fast Getman leaden losid1v and unetuivocall rcr-.t Chancellor Brandy% contention that the two Germanics represent two states within one nation and that a special relationship exit% between them. llonecker and his ideologists instead insist that West German can no longer ignore the nrw %ocialist vcicty which has been created in East German. since it rrprrwnt% an irreversible development in the histon of the German people. De%pitc the AbgrrnzunR campaign. lionecket has taken a numlort of %irp% to case relatiom brt Arcn East and West Germany. Under the umbrella of the Four- Power Berlin Agrrcment concluxlel in Srptrmbrt 1971, the East and West Germans negotiated an agreement nn transit traffic to West Berlin. in addition to Iwn agreements on rxchangr of territory. in Berlin and travel for West Belinen to East Brr ion and to Flo %t German. In eariv 1972 the East German Government initiatrd a General Traffic Treah with the Federal Republic and look several steps which made the passage of Bonn'% treaties with Moscow and Warsaw easier. On 13 June 1972. the East and West German r*****t- enlatives opened preliminary talks on the normalization of relations through conclusion of a treaty which would establish certain xvicral principles governing relations, while leaving specific (xoint%to he 25 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110019 -3 agreed on in zulrsequent negotiations. It became evident at a fairly early stage in the talks that ba %ic disagreements had arisen because of Bonn'% insistence that a measure of recognition be granted to the gist -nee of "the German nation," and the desire of the West Germans for reaffirmation of Four -Poaet right in Germany a% a whole. The GDR categorically rejected "the German nation" concept and preferred to downplay Allied rights in all of Germany. Aftet much tough bargaining the two governments initialed a general political treaty in early "ovember 1972 and signed it a month later. The treaty contiincd only an indirect reference to the "national question." It called for Iotthet ag.rments on -o operation in such fields as commerce, scic-ice and technology, transport, health, and %p ort. The two sides agreed on the inviolability of borders, to refrain from the use or threat of force, to respect each others independence and autonomy, and to eschangr permanent representatives. d. Relatimm tdth Berlin For almost two decades after the end of the Second World War the Berlin issue was the focus of rontrovenv and tension in Fast -West relations. Despite the establishment in 1419 of the German Democratic Repoblic with its capital in Fast Berlin, the Sovict Union retained tight control over prohlems concerning Berlin because of it own awareness of the potential for conflict that misted in the tug of war over the rights of the occupying powers in the city. By the early %ixlie% the Soviets began to allow the Fast German regime greater freedom of maneuver on zone issues affecting Berlin. apparently in response to pressures by the Ulhricht regime. The regime hoped a more active Berlin policy would enable Fast Germany to carve out for itself a more important role in determining the future of both Fast and West Berlin. During most of the mid- and late- %hlir% the Fast Gcrmars� undoubtedly at Soviet behrst �werr careful to avoitl serious thmah In Allied right in Wc%t Berlin and concentrated instead on disrupting West German tics with the city. Following the student rioting in West Berlin in April M. S. which was triggered by the attempted assassination of firebrand leftist leader Rudi Dutschke, the Fast Germans arbitrarily furred travel through East Germany to members of West Germany's rightwing National i Democratic Party, as well as to high ranking Bonn officials. This was followed in the summer by the imposition of passport and visa requirements for West German travelers. and vow and personal identity card requirements for We%t Berliners visiticig or transiting 26 Fast Germany. The Soviets supported Fast Getman actions of this kind a% long a% they did not run counter to Soviet policy and did not involve the risk of a cnfmntation with the Western Allies. The Ulhricht regime apparently had considerable frrdr,m of action in its dealings with die West Berlin city administration (Sent, particularly in negotiating the several pass ag- cements which were concluded from M3, to M6. In their relations with the West Berlin authorities, the Fast Germans were interested mainly in encouraging the Senat to recognize the MR, at Iraqi on a de/acto basis. Although differences occasionally developed between West Berlin and Bonn author: irs ever the proper response� to harassment of access to the city, the Fast German: genetaliy failed in their efforts to create dissension between the city government and Bonn. In Jme 1912 the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom. France, ar.d the Soviet Union, and the U.S. Secretary of State sncccssfully concluded nearby 2 years of negotiations by signing the Four -Power treaty on Berlin. In the agreement the Soviet Union formally agreed �for the first time since the partitioning of Germany �to share respensihility for the copeditious handling of traffic and communications into and out of West Berlin. In practical terms. the U.S.S.R.'s assumption of this respon%ihility was a blow to the Fast German regime which had been delegated control over the access route~ by the Soviets in 19aa. The Soviet Union's decision to negotiate the agreement underscored Mcscow*% interest in reaching detente with the West and in pavi.ig the way for the ratification by the Aundestag of the Srrvict -Writ German treaty of August 1970 renouncing the trx of force. The Wmirm Allies had specified to the Soviet Union that ratification by the Bonn parliament was dependent upon an agreement on Berlin. In the agreement the Sirrvict Union recognized the original rights of the three We item powrn to maintain their presence in West Berlin. which it had often denial. Moscow also atsrpir d a wide range of political, economic. and social ties between Bonn and West Berlin. thus retreating from its earlier position that West Berlin was an "independent political entity." In addition, the Federal Repuhlic was authorized to reprewnt West Berlin's interests abroad. cocept in those matten affecting the security or %talus of the city. The %tiemsful conclusion of the Soviet -West German treaty and the Four Posner treaty on Berlin opened the dkior to talks between Fast and West Germany which led to three agrrrmrnt% affrcting Wrst Berlin and iGs tiro to the West. One agreement APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110019 -3 i l eased the movement of people and goods. between the Federal Republic end West Berlin, and two others between the GDR and the West Berlin city government liberalized the rules for travrl by West Berliners between West Berlin and Fast Germanv and prepared the way for the elimination of enclaves within Berlin itself through territorial exchanges. On balance, the treaties and agreements of 1970 -i2 required decisive shifts in the regime's posture on the all- important question of its relations ith the Federal Republic and West Berlin. Perhaps because of a pragmatic reassessment of East German interests, or because of Soviet pressure �or a combination of froth �the Honecker regime was forced to �:treat from to number of long -held pcaition%. in particular that West Berlin was part of East Germany, and that East Germany controlled access rout(.. to the city. e. Relations with the non-Communist world Since 1969 the GDR has made significant progress toward achieving international recognition and the prmpcc !s are g(xxf that in the next several yeah this pattern will continue. General recognition has long been the goal of the East Germans. They have wanted it Froth as a manifestation of the regime's legitimacy and as an entree to Western markets and technology. Because of its pivotal position in the East -West power struggle, however, Fast Germany accepted the need to sclxordinate its aspirations to those of the Sovirt Union, and relations with the West were held in abeyance. It fell to Erich Nonecker, a% the Soviet interest in detente grew. M oversee a dramatic- turnabout in Pankow'% attitude toward the West. The signing of the inter German political treaty on 21 December ISi2 opened the door to Fast German's acceptance in the West. Most Wcoern powers. including France and the United Kingdom, have recogni>.cd Pankow, and the remainder air very likely to follow suit. Fast Germany has fakra its seat in several international forums, such as the Conferener on Security and Ccooperation in Europe, and can hook forward to full U.N. membership by fall IW3. As the CDR prepares for full diplomatic relations with the West, it mint make a number of delicate measuremen!s. The speed with whin it moves will depend in part on the disposition of the regime'% slender diplomatic resources. It most balance the benefits it finds in Wesirm markets and in its new feeling of legitimacy against some real difficulties. It must take cirr not to get out in front of the Soviets, and above all it mint weigh the impact of closer contact with the West on the East Cermun people and on its own ability to build a Socialist Germanic state that is the true equal of West Germany. Some of the nation's most talented individuals are employed in the foreign service. Many of them are tireless in their efforts to enhance East Germany's position in the countries to which they are posted. In Burma. for example, the East Gewan consulate negotiates government -to- government ,rade and aid agreements and cultural exchanges. East German consular officen have regular access to the Burmese Foreign Ministry and are allowed to disseminate information and propaganda on the same scale as an embassy. For nearly two decades East Germany struggled to gain diplomatic recognition from non (;communist countries, and it finally achieved a breakthrough in May 1969 when Iran agreed to exchange diplomatic missions. Recognition from several other diddle Eastern, African, and Asian coumtrics followed in quick succession. The most important of these was the United Aral) Republic (Egypt), which recognized Pankow in July. Fast Germany maintains a high level of official reprr%entation in Egypt. with an embassy in Cairo+ and it consulate in Alexandria. Communist support of the Araln against Israel and the increased Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean probably contributed to the decision by Egypt to recogaize East Germany. Furthcrmc.re. Bonn's reluctance to take retaliator measures, other chow to withdraw its amhassadon� when Cambodia and Southern Yemen had earlier recognized Fast Germany may have encouraged the Egyptians to act. Cairo was also) %0I aware that the West German Government was divided at that time on the question of invoking the so- called Ilallstein Doctrine under which Bcnn refused to maintain diplomatic recta "_ions with countries recognizing East Germany. and neither of the governing parties wished to make it -in issue in an election vrar. East Grrm.ny'% successful wooing of Iriq came 4 yean after the Aral) nations had severed rrlation with West Germany over the latter'% recognition of Israel in 1965. Although West Germany continued to conduct extensive economic relations with a number of Arub states, its ties with Iraq had not been significant. Indeed. Iraq had little to hoe and, from an economic point of view, much to gain by yielding to the strong Fast German pre.scure for recognition. Syria and Sudan, which recognized the GDR in June 1969, were similar cases in point. Foust Germany has also %uffered some sharp setback.% in its drive to establish diplomatic relations with non Communist countries. In 1971 the Central African 27 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110019 -3 Republic suspended its relations with the GDR, and this was followed shortly by a himbian request that the Fast Germans close their trade mission in Lusaka. Relations with the Sudan soled. and the reestablish merit of relations between Boon and Cairn in 1972 was viewed critically by East German leaders. Many Asian and African states conttnvaed to turn it deaf car to Fast German requests to upgrade relations. In its initial forays into Western diplomacy, Pankow has tried to project the image of it responsible and constructive participant. The Fast German media have expressed satisfaction that Fast Germany is being accepted as an "equal anb sovereign" state while voicing regret that acceptance had not come earlier. In their new chairs at international conferences, East German diplomats have generally (N- ncenirated or. the issues at hand and have avoided polemics and chauvinistic challenges to their West German colleagues. While looking westward, the East German Government is by no means relinquishing its role a, loyal supporter of bloc policies. Both as observers at the United Nations and in the preparatory Conference on Security and Coop, ration in Europe, Fast German representatives have staunchly �if quietly supported Soviet initiatives. E. Threats to government stability (U /OU) 1. Discontent and dissidence The erection of the Berlin wall in August 1961 not only halted the crippling exodus of trained manpower from the German Democratic Republic, but it also set in motion a slow and subtle process whereby the East Germans' previous hostility toward the reginnc changed first to passive acceptance and then in a growing number to positive loyalty and a wn+w of a separate Fast German national identity. Throughout the fifties, the will to resist by segments of the population had been undermined by the regime's coercive tactics, the threat of Soviet intervention to crush any uprising, the flight of potential resistance leaders to the West, and a sense of abandonment by the West which had remained aloof during the Fast Berlin riots in 1953 and the erection of the wall in 1961. The passing of the years and the maturation of a generation hom under Communist rule is a major factor in the accommodation of the population to the demands of the regime; more than 30% of all Fast Germans were ixnm after the war and more than 506 have no active memory of any other system. This demographic trend is reinforced by ideological 4 indoctrination, increased rc oomic security and well- being, and the considerable pride of the citizenry in the accomplishments wrought by their own labor in the absence of any substantial foreign assist nee. As the regime has developed a greater sense of self confidence, the controls based on force and intimidation which were instituted in the fifties have been replaced boy more institutionalized restraints staessing persuasion and reward. The long term process of accommodation and adaptation by the citizenry does not automatically exclude manifestations of dissatisfaction or low -key resistance to the regime and it, policies. A major irritant in the past has been the regime's insistence on the mouthing of slogans and propaganda as evidence of loyalty. Even prior to Ulbricht's departure, however, the regime had begin to deemphasize these frequently superficial demonstrations of allegiance to the regime and to attach greater importance to professional comtetence. The Berlin wall and the development of sophisticated devices to discourage escape across the border have reduced the refugee flow to a mere trickle, but occasionally individuals, and even families, are lucky or resonurceful enough to carry out escape plans successfully. Those deeply dissatisfied persons appear to be as distinct minority, however, and in all probability a growing number of Fast Germans would not he prepared to leave their present pos4ions, homes, and the manner of life to -.vh;ch they have become accustomed for the uncertainty of beginning :anew in West Germany. There also appears to be growing optimism over the prospects of improving life at horse, and a determination among many to remain and strive for this goal. A main source of discontent in the past was the failure of the regime's economic policies to effect a rapid improvement 3n living standards. These problems were heightened by Ulbricht's unrealistic ^corunmir plans and his concentration on the development and expansion of heavy industry to the detriment of the c nstrr:acr goods sectors. Under Floneeker the regime has tried to increase domestic political stability by taking steps to improve the morale of the people. A package of new social measures was introduced in 1972 which aimed at improving health and welfare facilities, and the regime- has also promised a greater volume of goods and variety of sources over the next 5 years. The government has moved to deal with longstanding ccnmplaints directed at the stringent controls over travel and the restrictive cultural policies. Although it is now relatively easy for East German APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 X citizens to travel in Eastern Europe and millions have taken advantage of this opportunity. there is little likelihood that the tight controls on travel to the West will be relaxed in the near future. The regime has made tentative moves to allow writers and artists more freedom of expression, but there appears to have been no fundamental change in the policy of closely monitoring the activities and output of the cultural elite. 2. Affected groups a. Industrial workers Discontent among industrial workers, arising from specific economic grievances, is a source of deep concern to the East German leadership. The lesson le. rned in 19x3, when an uprising was triggered by construction workers in East Berlin who resented an increase in work norms and who nitiated a spontaneous strike, has not been forgotten. Under present circumstances, however, workers are unlikely to take to the streets, because there is no desire to risk sacrificing whatever has already been achieved and because of the certainty of reprisals. The regime has a pervasive and efficient security system which has usually been able to discern and deal with workers' grievances beiore they became widespread. In addition, the government has been known to grant limited concessions or has otherwise taken steps to eliminate sources of major grievances. In April 1966. for instance, the regime attempted to eliminate one chronic source of complaint by revising the workweek schedule so that all workers would have a 5 -day workweek every other week, thereby reducing the average workweek from 48 to 45 hours. In September 1961 a general 5-day workweek was introduced and, after some initial difficulties stemming from complaints by shoppers who found that their favorite stores were closed on Saturday along with factories and other enterprises, seemed to be working reasonably well. The decision of the regime to increase production of consumer goods and expand social benefits is intended to raise the living standards of industrial workers and to show that the leadership is concerned about their problems. Despite these measures, various complaints have cropped up periodically, including charges of inept management and unkept wage promises, rumors of price rises, and demands for more democratic procedures. The workers on occasion have tried to highlight their grievances by resorting to brief strikes, gathering petitions, engaging in slowdowns, and passively resisting exhortations for more production. While not a threat to the regime in themselves, these grievances are taken seriously by the leadership. The Polish riots of December 1970 are a vivid retnimler of what happens when the government and pariv lose touch with the workers. b. Fawn raorkers The redistribution of land under the 1946 land reform resulted in some dilution of the traditionally conservative attitudes of the rural population, since many of the new farmers had either Social Democratic or Communist backgrounds. However, the eollectivi- zation campaign culminating in th all -out drive of 1%0� resulted in the flight to the West of thousands of farmers and farm workers, including many who had been in fuv:r of the social and ec,nomic reforms instituted during the postwar period. Since 1963 the regime has been able to overeorne resistance to collectivization to some extent by sharply raising farm incomes. This policy has improved lanor productivity and reduced passive resistance, but it has riot solved the problem of persuading youth to choose a career in agriculture. c. Intellectuals Intellectuals and iersoas in the professimis express their disaffection in more subtle ways, although their opposition to the regime's determination to imix-se limits on the freedom of the individual is at least as strongly; felt as that of the workers and farmers. Freedom to think, write, publish, and work without political interference has not fit in with SED attempts to restructure East German society along Communist lines. Many of East Germany's more prominent writers, artists, and professional men fled to West Germany, leaving few who might crve as rallying points in opposition to the regime Many of the members of the intellectual community who have chosen to remain are committed Gommunists, though they may question specific policies of the regime. Ilowever, both groups of intellectuals �the Marxists as well as the more refractory non Communists �have been reluctant to challenge the authorities head on. Rather than engaging in outright criticism or an exchange of polemics with the regime, many intellectuals employ satire and innuendo to express their dissatisfaction. On the rare occasions when intellectuals have taken a firm stand against regime policies, retribution has been swift. Prof. Wolfgang llarich, a journalist and professor of Marxist philosophy at Humboldt University, was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment in 19-37 (only 7 were actually served) for writing 29 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP0l- 00707R000200110019 -3 articles criticizing the regime at the time of the Polish and Hungarian revolts. Prof. Robert Havemann, another Humboldt faculty member, was dismissed fron� his post and dropped from the SED in 1964 for advocating freedom of inquiry. In 1956 Havemann further antagonized SED officials by advocating a democratic re irganization within the SED Welf and by having his suggestions published in a leading West German weekly. Again the reaction was immediate; H: vemann was dismissed from his job on the staff of the East German Academy of Sciences and expelled from the academy. The regime further forbade academy members from maintaining any contact whotever with the "dissident" professor. During the tense days just before the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, Havemann was quoted in the West German press as advocating Dabcek -style reforms for East Germany. There was no evidence that Havemann was Personally involved in the rash of pro Czechoslovak demonstrations throughout East Germany that followed the occupation, but his two *****age sons were arrested for taking part in rallies. The regime generally has sought to control its writers by using tactics less harsh than those employed against Harich and Havemann. These include financial inducements, petty harassments, chicanery, and the denial of a forum for dissenting views. Writers who have been particularly offensive from the regime's viewpoint notably playwright Peter flacks and balladeer Wolf Biermann �have been publicly censured. Others have been compelled to engage in self- criticism. Under Honecker's leadership, the SED approach toward the intelligentsia has altered, reflecting in part personnel changes in the cultural sector of the SED Central Committee. The regime has clamped down on the nonideologically oriented technocrats who are now required to receive more intense political indoctrina- tion. Those who refuse to cooperate are threatened with professional isolation and economic deprivation. The guidelines for the artistic intelligentsia have been relaxed somewhat to allow more room for creative expression. The works of some artists, authors, and film producers previously withheld from the public have appeared. At the fourth Central Committee plenum in September 1971, Honecker said that there should be no taboos in either style or content of artistic works, but there is no indication that the SED is prepared to loosen its grip on the cultural field. At a time when East Germans are being exposed to new ideas through travel abroad and through contacts with visiting foreigners, the regime is trying to make sure that it can rely on the intellectuals for support. 30 d. Youth In the eyes of the regime, the youth represent one of the most difficult and defiant elements in East German society. The party's intensive cradle -to- college indoctrination, while shaping some ***** people into obedient Comm. unists, sparks rebellious- ness in many others. Prior to erection of the Berlin wall in 19-A, nearly 50% of the refugee flow to the West was comprised of ***** people in search of greater personal freedom and better jobs, and *****ren accompanying parents. In its efforts to control East German youth, the regime has alternated between a policy of cajoling and threatening, neither of which has produced entirely Positive results. Dissatisfied with the results of its earlier policy of close regimentation, the regime relaxed its pressure in the early sixties and drafted a youth communique which allowed ***** people more time free of governmental and party supervision. This new policy, however, enabled ***** people to use their new -found leisure time to adopt fads and styles popular in Western Europe. Regime sponsored activities were ignored, as youth sought to imitate the Pop culture of the West, with its rock music a,.d distinctive d �ess. Incidents of "antiregime" activity occurred sporadically throughout East Germany, and frequently party youth leaders even found it difficult to control meetings of the official youth organization, the Free German Youth. The period of relaxation was quickly terminated after seriour. rioting broke out in Leipzig in October hA5 when police attempted to prevent students from singing songs proscribed by the regime. Following a crackdown on rowdyism, the regime introduced a new Family Code aimed at strengthening moral responsibility and reminding parents of their obligation to supervise the conduct of their *****ren. Now forced to stay in East Germany, ***** men and women and *****agers remain a source of great concern to the party leadership, because they are the most vociferous critics of the regime and of life in general within East Germany. "Hooligans" have disturbed the smooth operation of factories and farms. *****age students have upset the educational machinery by asking searching political questions, by emulating their counterparts in Western Europe, and even, on occasion, by staging demonstrations against the regime's policies. Probably the most serious incidents of this type occurred in the weeks immediately after the invasion of Czechoslovakia when sporadic pro- Dubeek demonstrations took place in cities throughout East Germany. Although these demonstrations were easily contained by the regime, i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 .l they took on added significance because of the large number of st,ulcnt demonstrators whose parents were members if the party and government elite. The confidence of the regime in the effectiveness of its political indoetrinatiop program was understandably shaken, and it number of high- ranking party and government officials whose *****ren were involved were either fired or demoted. Despite vigorous efforts by the SED to instill political "reliability" in the ranks of the ***** Pioneers and the Free German Youth, many of their members have retreated to a position of passive participation in the activities of these organizations, while a number of others have become sophisticated critics of the government and its imlicies. The disside,t, movement among ***** East Germans was fragmented after the crisis in Czechoslovakia subsided and now consists of numerous small, normally massive, loosely organized and ideologically differentiated groups. They meet to discuss politics and to exchange dissident literature and only occasionally display their opposition to the regime overtly, since such actions often result in the arrest of the participants. The authorities monitor the dissidence closely and attempt to keep it under strict control, but they have not been able to eliminate it. The ***** dissidents oplxise the regime on grounds that it is not representative of the population. They favor greater personal freedom and are particularly critical of the regime's restrictive cultural policies and of the inefficiency of its overcentralired bureaucracy. e. The churches The Evangelical and Roman Catholic churches have been the only nongovernmental institutions permitted by the regime to maintain independent contacts with West Germany. However, strict governmental control of the domestic and foreign activities of the churches, particularly contacts with West Germany, severely limits their effectiveness. The contacts of the Evangelical Church with its sister church in the Federal Republic were further restricted in 1969 when a regime- sponsored plan was adopted providing for the formation of a sep arate East German church and the subsequent severing of organizational ties with the Evangelical Church in West Germany. All eight established territorial churches (Landeskirchen) of the Evangelical Church in East Germany yielded to pressure by the regime and agreed to establish a separate organization called the League of Evangelical Churches (BEK), but the constitution of the new organization continues to stress the all- German aspect of Protestantism in both East Germany and the Federal Republic. Despite regime pressures, church leaders have refused to delete thes references from the BEK's constitution. The Roman Catholic Church, like the Evangelical Church, is it potential rallying point for opposition but church authorities have gone out of their way to avoid it confrontation with the regime in order to prevent additional restrictions and harassment. On what it considers vital issues, however, the Catholic Church has tended to be more outspoken than the Evangelical Church and more adamant in its stand. In order to protect its own members and clergy in East Germany, the Catholic Church generally avoids focusing international attention on the internal last German situation unless a specific issue is considered worth the risks involved. Both the Roman Catholic and Evangelical churches arc extremely circumspect in voicing opinion on secular matters. Even during the tense period of the Czechoslovak crisis, the reaction of religious leaders %vas muted. By accepting restrictions on their traditional rights and freedoms in secular matters and by demonstrating their willingness to "render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's" religious leaders hope to ensure the continued existence of the churches. Although some Protestant churchmen have lent their support to the regime, for the most part the churches have tried to resist Communist indoctrina- tion of the faithful and other ideological pressures. Despite the conciliatory gestures of the Evangelical and Catholic churches, the SED continues to regard organized religion as a competitor for the loyalties of the people and a potential source of dissidence which the state is compelled to neutralize, if not undermine and destroy, regardless of past agreements. Under Honecker there has been a renewed attempt to isolate believers from the rest of society and to diminish the role of the churches. Thus, in March 1971, the regime moved to restrict even further the activities of the clergy by requiring the churches to report all "nonreligious' functions to the police, a requirement that is being fought by the Evangelical and Catholic leaders. In addition, new requirements for admission to the universities discriminate against youths who are avowed Christians. F. Maintenance of internal security (S) 1. Police The primary mission of the police forces is to ferret out and control domestic opposition to the regime. Combating ordinary crime and protecting the rights and safety of the population are secondary functions 31 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 of the law enforcement system. A shaft in emphasis is likely to occur, however, as the regime becomes more confident about its legitimacy and suceptance by :a majority of the citizenry; in addition, as the economy becomes more consumer oriented and the acquisition of goods and propert becomes the objective of growing numbers of citizens, there is likely to be a rising incidence of crimes which Communist regimes have always insisted flourish only in capitalist societies, such as robbery, theft, and burglary. In late 1971 the attorney general claimed that crimes against property accounted for more than 50% of all criminal offenses. All police and security organizations, as well as the courts, are under the direct control of the SED. The inner circle of SED leaden charged with formulating security and penal policy are members of the Central Committee Security Commission, headed by Paul Verner. Actual day -to -clay policy and administrative decisions are worked out by the Central Committee Security Department. On the governmental level, the Ministry of Interior is the organization primarily responsible for controlling the population and combating crime. The ministry has at its disposal, directly or through its 15 district headquarters, not only regular civil police but also the Alert Nice. which are militarized security units trained for riot control, and personnel of the Civil Air Defense Commando It reportedly controls about 100,000 full -time armed police and security personnel. The higher echelons are composed for the most part of trusted SED members, and there is a significant number of SED members and sympathizers in the lower ranks. Directly subordinate to the ministry is the Main Administration of German People's Police HVDVP), which exercises day- to-day control over the major police functions and operations. The IIVDVP has at its disposal several operational civil police organiza- tions totaling some 89,000 personnel, including: Regular Police Water Police Traffic Police Factory Guards Prison Guards Criminal Police Transport Police The HVDVP also exerts control, through district SED headquarters, over the approximately 11,000 heavi armed Alert Police. Several of the operational police organizations, notably the Criminal Police, coordinate their operations with the Ministry for State Security. The Ministry of Interior also directs the Main Department for Passports and Registration, which acts as a central file for inforrnaticn on East German citizens. Through coordination between the record offices of the Ministries of interior and State Security supplemented by local police files, a careful record is kept on nearly every aspect of the life of an individual citizen. In the case of SED members, this information is supplemented by local and SED Central Committee cadre records. Various other organizations exercise supplemental police and internal security functions. These include the SED controlled Workers Militia with 3:50,000 members available for duty during civil disturbances, and the army's Frontier Command, which has 4'),5(X) men engaged in border control. (A full description of the duties of these forces is found in the discussion of their parent organizations.) The secret police organization, the State Security Service (SSD), which is subordinate to the Ministry for State Security, has responsibility for certain aspects of domestic security and counterintelligence (counterespionage and co untersubversion). It includes a 3,500 -man Security Guard Regiment. In all, the active members of both police and security forces (uniformed and plain- clothes) probably total about SW000 �or about 3% of the population. To supplement the large police and security forces, the regime has also attempted to organize an extensive network of informers, particularly in regions bordering on West Germany. Although so-ne people, usually SED or F DJ members, willingly act as police informers, most recruits for this task must be coerced into service. The police maintain a complex and extensive system of checks and controls over the population. In addition to the usual regulation of firearms and ammunition, fire and healtl..iazirds, and dangerous chemicals :end drugs, the police have established controls over individuals, their associations, and their movements. Each citizen over 14 years of age, for instance, must carry a personal identity card (Personalausweis) which bears his picture; a copy of this picture is kept on record by thu police. Every employed person is required to carry a work and insurance certificate which contains a complete record of his employment history. The police also maintain surveillance of population movements through a general registration system which requires every person to notify the police of any change of residence, including temporary visits exceeding 3 days. Both the population registers and the identity card system are administered by the regular police. Neither uses fingerprints for purposes of identification. To identify i APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 V suspected lawbreakers, however, the Criminal Police use the Bertillon system, which includes a 10- finger procedure of fingerprinting. They keep complete files on all suspects and convicts. Travel both within and outside the country has increased, especially since the introduction of visa -free regulations with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the increased travel of West Berliners to East Berlin and to the rest of East Germany. East German officials have expressed some concern over these increased flows, but there are no indications that security considerations would lead to curtailment of this travel. The government has, however, imposed currency restrictions for Polish citizens to prevent them from buying out East German consumer goods. The regime controls the travel of foreigners; special permission is required to enter certain areas, including the frontier zones and the uranium mining area in the Erzgebirge. Some administrative measures have been taken to curtail contacts with West Germans. Special passes are required to enter some factories. Police permission is also necessary for meetings and public collection of funds, and clubs and social organizations are required to have licenses issued by the police. Radio and TV receivers must be licensed by postal authorities. Contacts with the West are closely regulated. Letters and printed material originating in West Germany or West Berlin, and to a lesser extent in other Western countries, are censored or excluded. The number, size, and content of parcels received by individuals are monitored and subject to control. The regime discourages viewing and listening to television and radio broadcasts from the Federal Republic and Western Europe, but controls have been largely ineffective. Attempts at jamming radiobroadeasts have generally been ineffective, except for the occasional difficulties created for broadcasts by the U.S. Government managed Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) from West Berlin. The police system, with the backing of the East German military forces, appears capable of dealing with any popular disturbance short of a spontaneous uprising of nationwide proportions. Buttressing the system of pervasive police controls is the legal system which is modeled closely after that of the Soviet Union, and functions as an instrument to perpetuate Communist rule. The maintenance of an impartial, comprehensive syst .m of criminal and civil jurisprudence has been of less concern. Accordingly, the legal system reflects little either of the traditional German or the present -day West German system. By Western standards, the penal code is harsh and arbitrary, clearly weighted in favor of the prosecution, normally the state authority. The severe principles operative in the state's early years were summarized by the Minister of Justice: The announcement of sentence is the goal of the criminal proceeding. It must in this connection be emphasized once again with all clarity that the task of defending our state against all threats and disturbances of our order continues to be the crucial task. Therefo!e, we must understand that we dare not show either soft- ness or weakness in relation to the enemies of our order, and that hard sentemos are also correct sentences. By 1963, however, the regime shifted ground slightly in order to reflect changes which had been introduced in the Soviet Union the year before. A new decree stressed reliance inn persuasion and education in judicial proceedings, and increased collective responsibility for apprehending, prosecuting, and reforming offenders. A new penal code was adopted in January 1968, and while considered a judicial model in Eastern Europe, it continues to emphasize the political aspects of justice in a Socialist state. The new code is primarily designed to reinforce the unchallenged authority of the state and is tailored to meet the security needs of the regime. Under the code, many criminal offenses carry relatively light sentences as compared with penalties meted out by West German courts for similar crimes. On the other hand, crimes against the state, regardless of how trivial, are subject to harsh judicial decisions, some carrying the death sentence. Execution is by firing squad. The Prison Administration, subordinate to the Ministry of Interior's HVDVP, controls several hundred prisons, ranging from county jails to large penitentiaries and labor camps. In addition, the Ministry for State Security controls two security prisons, at Bautzen and Waldheim, where mpjnr political prisoners are incarcerated. Nearly all prisons, as well as the labor camps, employ the inmates as laborers; in some cases the prisoners are used in outside work detachments as well as within th prison itself. Information on the exact size of the prison population is not available, but it has been estimated that as many as 6,000 persons may be in custody for political offenses. Since 1964 East Germany has concluded several "ransom" agreements, whereby it has released approximately 3,600 political prisoners in return for payment by the Federal Republic of DM10,000 per prisoner. In October 1972 Honecker proclaimed a broad amnesty for several thousand persons convicted of minor crimes. This number included some West Germans. The amnesty was intended to demonstrate the internal stability of the GDR and to aid West German Chancellor Brandt's reelection campaign. 33 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 2. Countersubversive and counterinsurgency measures and capabilities The regime still lacks the total suppc t of East Germans, but the discontent which exists is mainly of the grumbling variety and is unlikely to lead to large scale demonstrations or riots. This can be attributed not only to the well- discipL ned police and intelligence forces, but also to policy decisions made by the top SED leadership aimed at preventing minor problems from developing into serious disputes. Public demonstrations of dissatisfaction are quickly and easily controlled by security personnel who have demonstrated their loyalty by carrying out even the most odious tasks, such as firing on citizens trying to escape over the Berlin wall. The SED bureaucracy controls and aids the police forces in fulfilling their security functions. The party leadership in East Berlin is regularly informed about the state of public opinion and often quietly intervenes in situations which have the potential for leading to civil unrest if left unresolved. It is not unusual for SED leader Erich Honecker to concern himself with minor contentious problems. The agreements reached by the two Germanies in mid -1972 to facilitate visits of West Germans to the GDR aroused fears of a large influx of West Germans, and certain categories of governmental officials were refused permission to receive Western relatives. There have been no indications, however, that the visits are creating security_ problems for the government. In the event of civil disturbances which the East German security forces could not handle, the regime could count on the intervention of the 300,000 Soviet troops stationed in the country. If these troops were to be withdrawn at some future date, East Germany's own security forces would be prepared to assume full responsibility for internal security. The internal security system has broken down only once and that occurred in 1953, the year of Stalin's death. At that time about 300,000 workers (5% of the work force) went on strike in protest against increased work norms. The demonstrations turned into full fledged riots directed L Linst the government and were finally brought under control by Soviet troops. The uprising did not provide a severe test for the security forces, ho�ever, because of the reluctance of the SED leadership and Soviet military commanders to order the use of extreme measures against the rioters. By underestimating the seriousness of the situation and failing to appreciate the depth and magnitude of the workers' disaffection, East German and Soviet authorities apparently avoided more serious bloodshed. However, by the time order had been restored, 21 of the rioters had lo- their lives. Despite widespread discontent during the remain- der of the decade, there was no repetition of the 1953 disorders. The building of the Berlin wall in 1961 made the job of the security forces easier by facilitating control of border traffic. There were small scale student riots in the midsixties as well as open criticism of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, but the security forces had no difficulty containing these overt expressions of dissatisfaction. After almost a quarter of a century, most East Germans have come to terms with the Communist regime and accept the reality of Communist rule for the foreseeable future. The trend toward accommoda- tion between the ruled and the rulers which has been on the ascendancy in recent years, has given the regime increased confidence in its legitimacy and strengthened the faction in the party which favors securing the cooperation of the people by tactics of persuasion and reward instead of relying on the discredited policies of coercion and arbitrary rule. G. East Berlin (U /OU) East Berlin, described by the Communists as "the democratic sector of Berlin," is the capital of East Germany. In practice, it is treated by the Communists as the 15th district (Bexirk) of East Germany, although it has not been formally incorporated into the German Democratic Republic. Because of the symbolic character and historical associations of Berlin, the East German regime has sought to develop its half into a more attractive city than other East German population centers (Figures 7 and 8). It still has not achieved the vast rebuilding and broadly based prosperity so evident in West Berlin. The evolution of Communist control in the Soviet Sector of Berlin has followed a more complex course than that in East Germany because Berlin as a whole was originally governed separately under Four -Power authority and did not form part of the Soviet Occupation Zone under the basic quadripartite agreements. Before the establishment of a Four -Power Kommandatura in July 1945, the Soviet authorities already had licensed various political parties to operate throughout the city, at the same time installing Communists in key positions in Berlin's administrative system. But when the Soviet authorities moved to expand their control after the formation of the Kommandatura, the further development of citywide political activity virtually ceased. The attempt to merge the Communist Party of Germany s IIffi is t- WE @I NF& lffro FIGURE 7. East Berlin panorama (top) and part of the restored 4 Unter den Linden (bottom). The extensive reconstruction and face lifting of recent years has been impressive and has greatly im- proved the outward appearance of the city. (U/OU) 14 r 4 s r APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200110019-3 35 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200110019 -3 ,0 A 5 661 (Kill)) and the Snc�ial Demnenilic Yams (SNI)i failed onlright in (Vest lierliu: both orguaizutiotis were eventttafly liiculkwd by the Kontrnundaletra to operate ill all parts of the city, and tit- SM) continued as a srpurilc org:uiiurtiom in F. u, i3crliti until 1961. 111 fast Ce'rtilatty the Sill) disappean�d as a wixtrale cttlity ill 19.16. With the breakdown of Dour -Nusv. rcuhuborilion in 19.18. two svpikmte Iretlitie:d syslettts evolved. A dials meeting organized by the (:o11lnuutisls on 30 \oyrmher 19-M irMalltKf a new governmvnl in East licrlin. Sitter fled time� 111r� Soviet Sector has ill practice alx�relrcl :is nn in(vV! al part of flit- East Cerinan political acfministr.itive systrni.'I'hc sc�Irarate clurtctcr Of East 1$Tlirt syas eiNtn:dize�d by the ervelion of the Rerun wall which rnforeed a drislic� curlailmetil on Ile 111,1', meat of lx�mple Ixtercrn tl, Suvicl Sector and the time Allied svelars; in )Vest Rcrlin. Actual I a%I German .�ou(rol liver Earl Berlin w�as acarU�d rs-eil 36 FIGURE 8. The East German regime provides a relative obundonce of consumer goods end food t the shops of East berlln. Shown is a clothing shop on the Rathoussirosse (fop) and a food market an Leninplatz (below). (UJOU) more forceftdh in August 1962 cslem am 1 {ast German KorniliandeNuro n�placed flit- Soviet city votttmaod 111 cOMM%rttlitm of agreerrtents that only mililars lxrsm inel of the� four Powers could he permitted in lk-rhit. substantial E nst Getman military forces u11w operate in Ile city. A ft-%% rernuattts of I our- l'owt-r stalir estst, however, motahly the right of Wc%tern ritililary patrols to visit I:ost Berlin' wilhoal voillrol h% liasi German aulhorities. "fliese palroh, 311d :ill 11lher fon�iga nalimiAs. enter East Merlin mill throngl ClivAlmint Charlie, 1111 Cif the seyerol ,�rolling points '�lick esist between h:ast and West Berlin lt'igum 511 As a result of the agri signed betty ce�n flit \Vest Ift�rlin Senrtl aucl flit bast German Coscrnnx�nt on 20 Dect�11ibe�r 19; 1. file number of crossing points for \Vest Berliners aas imcmasetj to l3. �flit� gersrrnnu�nt of Easl Rerlin consisls of a eit exutncil l \4etgixdrettl of Ili member.. beaded h) u I ord \1ay11r (Olre�rh tie rgernteister). 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