NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY 11; SWEDEN; GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

SECRET 11 /Gs /u "P Sweden May 1973 NATIONAL INYELLIGENCc SURVEY SECRET APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEY PUBLICATIONS The basic unit of the NIS is the General Survey, which is now published in a bound -by- chapter format so that topics of greater per- ishability can be updated on an individual basis. These chapters Country Profile, The Society, Government and Politics, The Economy, Military Geog- raphy, Tronspertation and Telecommunicritions, Armed Forces, Science, and Intelligence and Security, provide the primary NIS coverage. Some chapters, particularly Science and Intelligence and Security, that are not pertinent to all countries, are produced selectively. For small countries requiring only minimal NIS treatment, the General Survey coverage may be bound into one volume. 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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 WARNING The NIS is National Intelligence and may not be re- loused or shown to representatives of any foreign govern- ment or intet'national body except by specific authorization of the Director of Central Intelligence in accordance with the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Di- rective No. 1. For NIS containing unclassified material, however, the portions so marked may be made available for official pur- poses to foreign nationals and nongovernment personnel provided no attribution is mnde to National Intelligence or the National Intelligence Survey. Subsections and graphics are individually classified according to content. Classification "control designa- tions are: (U /OU) Unclassified /For Official Use Only .-1...... Confidential (S) Secret APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 This Section was prepared for the NIS by the Central Intelligence Agency. Research was sub- stantially completed by November 1972. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 CONTENTS This Crneral Surery s- wvrv(-dvv hr oar t1artl Srp. rnihrr 1)67. ropir.v of u;hirh Nhould be rlr A. Introduction Scandinavian political stability, backgroun(I for reformist solutions to Swedish problems, enlitti)ced parliaruontary douwcracy, narrow political dif- fcrencev, th,' Social Dvino �ruts under the leadci- ship of Olul Valnu', the welfare Mate, policy of nonalliance and neutralky, I. Structure and functionintti of the g Mollar by with ccntrahze(i wovvrnmeni, civil service'. L ConstitutiotlFtl syst(r(n i''our funclrunental laws, change to nnicamrrtcl parliament, power of the Riksdag, debate over the Act of Succrssion, respect for inclividn:d rights. .F;C)tI'll APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 Page 2. Executive 3 a. Monarchy 3 Stipulations, power, anti responsibilities. b. Council of State Dominance of the Prime Minister, role of the ministries. 3. Legislative .volution, elections, sessions, censure, tlehato, standing committers, passage of bills. 4. ,judicial system Development of codes, the judiciary. a. Courts Three levels, appeal, the Supreme Court, specialized courts, requirements for judges. b. Penal system Privileges under the enlightened system, number of prisoners, dayfines, treatment of juveniles. 5. Provincial and local government Encroachment of central on local government, influence of the Ministry of Interior. a. Provincial government The governors arid the governor general, election and role of the provincial councils. b. Local government Towns, boroughs, and rural communes, councils, cooperative associations. C, Politicai dynamics Factors making for smooth evolution, develop- ment of the five political parties, rotation of government among major parties, role of minor parties. 1. Social Demccratic Party a. Membership and electoral strength Larj;cst party, support in trade union movernent, victories in 1968 and 1970. b. Organization and leadership Congress and lesser bodies, training of future leaders, activities of Palme, his difficulties. c. Program and policies Compromise and cooperation, strte inter- vention as an issue, social welfare, educa- tional and truditiunal goals, inflation, non. alliance and neutrality, influence of the ***** activists, anti Americanism, defense forces. d. Press and finances Two dailies and others, various sources of funds. 2. Center Party a. Membership and electoral strength Origin and relative size. ii 4 A 7 8 8 9 9 10 l.I 11 12 13 14 15 15 Page b, Organization and leadership 15 National convention and lesser bodies, auxiliary organizations, rise of lealldin. c. Program and policies Balanced economic lower, limits on social welfare, neutrality and ndmalliance,, ordposi- tion to Common Markel, defense, forces. d. Pmts and finances Limited publications, obscure funding. 3. Liberal Party a. Membership and electoral strength Origin, size, support. b. Organization and leadership National convention and lesser bodies, a ?x- Iliary organizations, lendership of Ilelen. c. Program and policies L:conomic concepts, nonnllianca and neu- trality, attitude toward the United States, stron,; defense concept d. Press and finances Two leading dailies and others, chromic financial difficulties. 4. Moderate. Coalition Party a. Membership and electoral strength Origin, size, support. b. Organization and leadership National convention and lesser bodies, auxiliary organizations, Bohman. c. Program and policies Opposition to socialism and the Social Democrats, exponent of strong defense, protective tariffs, home ownership, neu- trcelity and nonalllance. d. Press and finances Two chief dailles, pr',vate donations. 5. Party of the Lcft- Communist a. Membership and electoral strength Origin, size, and support. b. Organization and leadership Congress and lesser bodies, auxiliary or- ganizations, leadership of Ilermansson. e. Programs and policies Formation of people's militia, nationaliza- tion of economic assets, opposithn to the Common Market. d. Press and finances One daily newspaper, other publications, sources of funds. 6. Pressure groups Status, LO and others, role. 7. Electoral procedures Simultaneous elections, method of voting, pn;portional representation, participation by the clectorate. 15 16 16 16 1Q 17 17 17 17 18 18 18 18 18 19 20 20 20 20 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 FIGURES Page Page D. National policies 21 2. Communism 26 General agreement on domestic urd foreign issues. Strength of the. UK, attempts to Infiltrate, Fig, 2 1. D ornestiC 21 front organlzationN. Fig. 7 Organization of the National Police 'Per+denry toward rornprnmisn, reordering of 3, l xtremist groups 27 priorities, industrial expansion, Inflation, so- ftw ftwu Letheorists, rlglrtwing organizatlens, th N. Trends in voting (chart) vial welfare system, housing, in rN terruonal einigre grot Fig. 5 exchange stability. F. Maintenance of internal recurity 28 2. ForOgn 22 1, Police 28 Identification with Western liberal democracy, Conditions concerning law and order, the Na. attitude toward NATO, relations with other tional Police Boe:rcl, organization and rrrpon- Scandinavian countries, support for the United NibilltieN of the National Police, mounted Nations and regioncl organizations, the Corn- police, disrupticnx to public order, technical rnon Market, relations with the Soviet Union Id training futilities. and the Un',ted States, Nobel Prizes, policy 2. Intelligence and security services 29 fornnautlur Limitations and evaluation. 3. Defense a. Intelligence 2.5 30 flexponsibilirles of the three divisions of Position of the military, formulation and Section 11 of file Defense Staff, operations purpose or policy, rising costs, civil defense, of ter Special Bureau, expenditures. L. Security 31 E. 'Threats to government stability fteNponsibilities of the Security Police, 2'S C:. Selected bibliography 31 1. Discontent and dissidence 2,5 Chronology 33 Absence of grievances; stable society; results of dawnte between East and West Glossary 35 FIGURES iii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 Page Page Fig. 1 Structure of government chart) 4 Fig, 6 Katarinaberget Lomb shelter photo) 26 Fig, 2 Stockholm Cultural Canter photo) 5 Fig. 7 Organization of the National Police Fig. 3 Governmcnts since 14132 table) 11 chart) 20 Fig. 4 Trends in voting (chart) 11 Fig. H Intelligence ar.,d security services Fig. 5 Party scats in the Riksdag table) 1 12 (chart) 30 iii APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 Government and Politics A. Introduction (U /UU) The Sc;urcli11;lvian cminlrics have cvicicncrll a I(111g ImIiIical stabililN lillws( unique in c(1r11i11c�11L�11 I� im pe. As the principal 11atimi in Ihc Scandimloal1 area. Sm-dc11 has (1(1111 scl the pm-1. fm. Ihc s(1cial and ccnnr,snrc inu(1\;II i Ilr;,t 1);I, nimic I I I1)(� rcgi(1nal Imlitic;Ii slca(lincss. A 11lun1c�r (if cletcrnrinanls ;1s %m-iatc(I \%illr nimlcrn S\cc(lish s(wicl) hitve IwIpe l I'(1r:n Ihc pipillar� Icuchmil t(i suppoirl nom nisl ralhcr th;ur rccnllrli(1n :1r% ,(111rti(111s in 11ali(1nal Irruhlc11r,: Ihc� Implilali(1n is (IMvptiumll\ hoimo gencuu, and mikers;111\ litc�rnlc�; Ihcrc are crc scri(1u,ly dki,kv u,c�i;11 issues; impid;1r portic�ipatic.n ill the g(1vi nl Irrnccsses at the Inc�al 11\11 has ;1 tradition g(1ing back 1(r the \'iking c1 ;,1,. Aciclitio nall\, S1vedvii is the 11;1111111 le;ulcr ill Ihc� Nordic ;1rca -in side its \vcll as in \vcallh� �halving a gross nalional Irroclocl almost ;IS large as that of Ihc four olhcr Nordic c(1u11lrics c(mibimecl. And nnly the Smdcs, through ;c combination of goOd luck ;1111 it strong milihir; eslablishmc�nl. 11;111 hecn able to aclherc 1() the c(minr�n Nordic dream of neulralily. TI c Mdish p(ditical sysIvin has very mcenll\ cvolvecl into ;1 fomr OI' Iure parliamentary clenurc�racv that has proved c�onsisteolly wwk able almost exclusively in the Sc�anclitimian area. The Cmincil of Statc is directly responsible to the Blksrla/,c, it sirlgle- huuse parliament since jimitary 19 I. Shn111c1 Ihc lilhscln/; imss it vote (If' no conficicncc, h(tw(wer�, the governi�ccnt has Ihc right (cr call for lit-\\ elections. 141-c;11nc Ihc c;lrlicr 1)ica111cr;ll As(1 fcaturccl icgid:11kc ,ulnrllulcc. ;11 Ic;1sl b\ c11,14 pu1, :111(1 v,mcminvids 11nnclhcic,s pi rcnlark;11)k Iahlc. Ihc n;11im c�11lcrs irllcc it It(-\\ jwri (1cl (1I cnFrancecl p;irhamvnl ;1r\ dem( rich c(ilh ju,tilic(I (I)limisnl. hililic;cl (lilfc�rcm-cs (1vcr dmnv,lic jmlic\ arc mi11(ir Mid ;nc unccrnc(I lrrimilril\ \011 tht-1 01�111 1(1 cc hic�h I c glrvcrninvio sh(1ul(I guicic t1)(� ;111(1 ccilh I1)(� scnluc (1I t;mcrimiciil- ,iippirlc(I \ccllc(rc� pr(1gr;1111s. 'I'll( 11nrrm\int, (,f p(ditic;ll clilh-rencc,, 1)(111(.\(.1. 11a 11(it becn acc1r111lru1ic(I 1) 1 it cmis4licla1i(1n (1f p(ditic;,l parlic Fkc pialic�s. inclluling the t :nnlmisnisl,. 11+1vc bccrl n Irr(,( 1111 cl (1r1 Ihc 1);111(11 in pa li;lnu�llt;1r1 ciccli(1m (luring Ihc� p'Ist 25 1c ars. �I'hcse partic,, ill gcncr;ll. represcnl Ihc interest,. 4I particular 1�1�(mml1X� ;111(1 ,(1c�ial gr(1ul,s. I'1)(� mo di�riih- So ckil Ovnruc�r;rlic� hir11 tSAI't h;1, 1)ecn clunrinaut 11)(� early 19:itl's� go\enling al(1rn� since Ihc end (1I' \1'111111 War II \1ith 11)(� of 'i -\car period in Ihc car11 imd micl- 1950's. At the Ircak (it' its polrlllarit\ ill the 1968 clecliom, lcherl sijpp()rl 1'ronl cr,11111iIc :(1rr ill unist, (Ii,c11- cha11tccl 1)1 Ihc Sovicl imasion (,f Czed (1slovakia ena1)lecl Ihc SA I' 111 \vin mo rc than 50 (0 the Imlrular v((tv, Ow earl\ c�hnsc as it, ue11 leacicr 11)(� Ilambman1 01of Pabnc. \Ithorlgll it capable p(diticia11. hilrue has ()n occaNion nffen(Ie(I moderates by his internperale criticism of U.S. polio in \'ietimin and Can1b(1c1ia� cven While wdairning it fely ;llmstatc Ichwing SAI' votes. And his almil iutcllectimlisin I :1s bce11 Ili I'a%-( afrl\ conlrime(I \villr the lvurin, r.mlg(1ing APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 IwrsmmIity (,I' II is mentor at 1redl-cessor. T.Igt- ?rlundvr. In 111(. 1070 t-lt'niorrs III(. Social Dvimicntrs' chart' of the� vole (Implud b% alnua 5 Iligh (itws 1111(1 i1111ution Il:tv�� 1 list� 1 governnu nl. but hills fur it Ims avcided a crisis b, ;uceliing the support of 111(� Irnr11u11ist fart i11 order to rrsuster it inaiorik over 1114. bourgeois o11c- ilion. Like its rc.igfrbers, sill in dir No (:ounc ill- it 11;(s totally i11legral -cl its soci;tl 1oiicy, Ssyedc�rI is r-onsrniltpd In crvating ;I scu�ial dentoc�rac�, Fss order to ;rdistribulc� the 11u1ioss;tl sye ;11111 111(1 ucllit-ye soci ;11111 ece110111ic� s.curiI% for all its eiliiens. AI ;III pvry ;Isive welfare ssstern Ilas virlually e1i11sinated individual Irivalioss. Uni(Iuely, this swelfarr state l; Is c�ot'xisled with at'' peon(my th;tl is Gill 90!'' in 1rivale 11,11lds, TI e lack of serious suciu! ;uscl ecc,notuic griv%anc.s, co11lIt-d will' tilt- high or(ler of {x,lilical s(1h{:aication .vfdenccd 1A lle average citizen, mill:,�, Ssycdt'n ;s (xx,r target for sill wer ,.;.e acliyit%. Nm :on11tunisl Iolitical I.ud.rs. the great rnajerik of Iradp ursio11 I.aders, and lilt- Iress luvt- c�coler;tlecl snake tilt' Iwblic awary of p.Ist :ormnnnist uim anti tactics, Ideologically aligned will' Olio democ�r;slie Wt-st, S%l-clis11 {xliliVal Ivaders are Iwvertheie.s tr(mgl% co11srrsilted le lnrrsning .1 11()1X�% of non;11li:11rc�(� ;(nil nl-utraiily. Ssyt-dl-n clues not interlrel this {elicy ;Is Imclu Norrkoping Malmo Norrkoping Loral Councils Lccal Executive Bodies Election ELECTORATE KEY vv Responsibility FIGURE 1. Structure of the government (U /OU) Major executive decisions regarding the preparation of legislation, the execution of Inws, and the issuance of decrees are made in c�abitiet :neetings presided over by the Prince N/linister. The weekly, sessions of the King- in- Comic�il are nu rely the formal registration of these decisions. Tliv King is informed in adv:in��c about the most important natters, score as an act of courtesy than anvlhing else. In contrast to other W(e,tern 1- :uropean govent- nu�nts, the Swedish ninistric�s. with the exception of foreign Affairs and Justice, do not directly acbniaister national laws. 'I'hcv are small units. usnalk wild) no inure than 100 parsons. including the clerical staff. Their I'unction is to aid the King- in- (;oincc�il in APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 prelnrring 1egislatiorr for presentation to the liiksda and for frandling rchtions %Nilh it. and issuing c�xec�utivc orders to central achnirristratke ugeucie,. 'I'hesc scrniarrlonomnus agencies, ihich arc� usually headed h, career ci%il servants. (lirec�tl\ rrdnrinistcr nationc,l lairs. c,lc I imlepcncicntk ()f Ihe ministries, dvi iur; their ;rnthorik h.\ statute rather than from (lire,-lire, of the respunsihll nrinistrc. "I'hcir routine it (Inrini s, (it k inchh(dcs the inspccliun cruel control of uhorclinalc offices. curd then sornetinres ac�t its a(Inriuistralkc c�orrrts of appc;rl. Uec�isic,rrs. rulings. and rcgulat(,r\ dec�rc'cs issued h\ the ;rgerrcies may be inraliclatccl 1) the cabinet or h\ lhc� Supreme ;ldnrinistratire :uurt, brit not hr the indiviclrr;rl r,uuisters. :3. Legislative The Swedish Riksda,, dating frurn 1 is one ur. the oldest enduring 1,arlianrer;ts in the world. "I'he earl} Riksdn was cunrpu,( r( >\cd it constitutional reform that replaced t}re hic;,nu�ral arrangenu�nt \pith an esp;urclecl till ic�anu�ral I(�gislaturv. The reconstituted single chamber has :50 u�,(ts. lust :iI less Ihan the combined slrer,gth of the precious houses. "fhc elections in SeW; tuber 1970 \cere the first 1)d(I for the new Riksdu,rf and ruarked the c�onconritmit adoption (J ii new electoral system ruiner which elections for all parliamentary seats as well a, for provincial and local offices core held c�oncnrrently every :i gars. The First session c,f llrc� single c�hanrher Riksda convened ill J;urrrary 19.1 (Figure 2). Of its :i�iO nernhcrs. :311) are c lee feel I'ronr Ihe 25 districts or c�orrsIitnenc�ic�s on the hasi, popul;rtion. The renu(ining )O se ;rls �Ihe sc, calleil conrpcnsatory seats �arc awarded (,n the basis of total n it ti(,nal return, an(I tend to fay( r the major parties (see below. under 1�;lec�toral Procedures). :anclidac�r to Ihe Riksdag is open to all Swedish citirens yho ;ere ?O yc acs of age on election clay ;rncl who are registered s uteri, a APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 FIGURE 2. Stockholm Cu!t,sral Center. The new Riksdag is temporarily located in these facilities. (U /OU) Annual sessions of the Riksdag venerally occupy; 7 months. The first session convenes in early Janm ry and recesses it June. After this break the Riksdag reconvenes in October for a short fall session that usually ends before the Christmas holiday. "I'he government has the right to dissolve tl(- Riksdag and call for extraordinary elections. S action, which in the past had been resorted to only infrequently, is facilitated b the new constitutional reforms. The Riksdag is permitted to continue to work for as long as 5 months afivr the date for new elections has been set. If it is out of session during this interval, the Prime Minister may reconvene it. During tliv interim between the call for new elections and actual election, the terms of office for members remain in force cznd are terminated only when the newly elected representa- tives actually begin their tenures. "I'll(- Riksdag may censure the cabinet or ally one of the ministers by calling for a vote of confidence. In calling for such i t vote, the member must have the support of at least I K of the Riksdag. 'I'll( reasons for questioning an individual ninister are never stated, and the voting issue is described b simply stating the minister's name. The nnotion is tabled until t1w second meetin!,r after the one ill which it is introduced, and the motion is subject to vote not later than at the third meeting after the one in which it was introduced. 'The charge may be directed against the Prinu> Minister or against an individ ,al minister. The entire cabinet must resign if an absoltnte majority votes against the Prime Minister. Al, ;ibsolute majority is also required to censure an individual ninister, b,t only the minister in question is required to resign. Ili both cases, however, the Prim( Minister has the right to decide within l0 days if the Riksdag is to be dissolved and if new elections are to be held. Under the old bicameral systcm every member of the Riksdag was entitled to express his opinion on the floor without fear of interruption. It was not possible, however, to avoid a legislative decision b filibustering or otherwise prolonging debate. Parliamentary rules governing s Jh conduct have loeg been c.lethiled and specific. Because of the marked ;ncrease in size of the new parliament, some restrictio;s have been unposed or. the time allowed for debate, in the interest of providing an opportunity for all members to sneak. The speaker may suggest that during a particular session the Riksdag decide beforehand lust how long each speaker is permitted to hold the floor. In such instances tle limitations apply to all speakers, including ministers and party leaders. Perhaps the most important single characteristic of the Riksdag is its systcm of standing committees, z which number 16. The Conunitiee of Suppl which deals with government appropriations, is the largest, with 45 members, followed by the Committees on the Constitution and 'Taxation (Ways and Means), with 27 members each. The other connrnittees have 17 members each. Ad hoc committees to address special questions may be. formed. The chairmanship and Composition of the connuiltees are distributed among all the parties; representation is usually in proportion to strength. Cabinet ministers are not permitted to be present at committee nwetings but may be called upon to provide information to the comnitte�es. The speaker of the Riksdag and the, three deputy speakers are also nominated through interparty agr(-(-nuents and are decided upon by a voice vote in the Riksdag, cnnless a secret ballot is requested by any one member. During the first 15 days of cb session every member is entitled to inlrodnce motions on any subject. When government bills are introduced. members have from 10 to 15 days to offer amendments before the hills are referred to committee for thorough discussion. t :onurittees often invite written comments on motions or occasionally hold closed door hearings on government bills. After it second reading, further amendments or adjustments may he made and then reconciled ill committee. A hill mnst be pass(-(] or rejected on the third reading. It is not possible to kill hills in committee, because all of then, must he reported out of corn mittee,to the Riksdag in plenary session. Only rarely, and reportedly never for political reasons, is a hill held over and referred to the next session. 4. Judicial system Swedish jurisprulence, which traces its origins to Old Norse common law, watt first codified nationwide ill the National Legal Codes of King Magnus Eriksson (c. 1350). New codification, the Gene al Code of 1734, was prompted by concepts of Rornan !aw and b\ influences of the Enlightenment introduced by increased contacts with Europe south of the Baltic. Althougl; complete penal and criminal procedure codes were included, they were almost immediately subject to revision because of the continuing strong influence of the Enlightenment. Most notable :acre the impact of the Italian criminologist Beccaria, the British jurist Blackstone, tl,e French political philosopher Montesquieu, and the evolvinv, German criminal law theories. British penology.. relativelv advanced for the period, also left its mark. Although continental influences continued to he felt in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras, reformist impulses, indigenous and from across the North Sea, APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 remained stronger. Such influences, incorporated piecemeal for nearly it century, were definitively integrated into Swedi.!: jurisprudence in the Penal Code of 1864 anti the criminal procedure codes which shortly followed. Subsequent measures curtailing h,rshness were largely inspired by the Swedes .he.-nselves and May be seen in the reforms to the Penal Code adopted in 1890 and 1921, the latter abolishing the death penalty. The most signal advances in enlightened court procedure aril petrology, however, have been made since the earl" 1940's, when Sweden began to lead the world in the Whole field of social welfare. The independence of the Swedisl; judiciary from executive arid legislative interference is assured by the constitution. The Justice Ombudsman -Justitieom- hudsman) and the Chancellor of Justice �a high ranking official attached directly to the cabinet, which the constitution refers to in this connection as the Royal Chancery �watch tlr courts for instances of judicial corruption and prosecute individual judges for malfeasance. Most j dg es are appointed by the King in- Council, and all n.; serve until retirement at the age of 65. Ad lwc juries are used only in cases relating to freedom of the press. a. Courts Thcre are three levels of ordinary courts: the courts of first instance, the courts of appeal, arid the Supreme Court. Until 1971 the courts of t1w first instance comprised 120 gate financed district court.; in rural areas arid small towns aril 30 locally financed cit- courts in the larger cities. As a result of a reorganization that came into effect that year, several district and local court,, were merged to reduce the total number of courts of the first instance to 108; the ultimate goal is to consolid:ae to 100 such ceyurts. Those That are amalgamated are presumably financed jointly by the state and urban community. All cavil aril criminal cases are initially tried in the courts of first instance. Each district court has a judge who is assisted by 18 citizens elected by the local councils. Th.-se laymen deliberate our questions of law as well as evidence and can, by unanimous vote, overrule the judges. 'The principal official in the local lower court system is the president or chief magistrate, who is assisted by a number of other judges arid judicial trainees. Minor cases may be heard by a single judge, whereas a panel of seven to nine judges hears the most serious cases. A decision requires a majority vote of the judges or, in the event of a tic, the decision of the one presiding judge prevails. An appeal from a court of first instance goes to one of the six courts of appeal, located in Stockholm, Gotegorg' Malmo, Jonkoping, Umea, and Sundsvall. Each court has a presiding judge, a varying number of associate and assistant judges, and two or more division heads who are also qualified judges. Each division specializes in certain types of civil and criminal cases and is normally composed of five of the court ridges. hour are sufficient to decide a case provided three of them agree. The S,preme Court (hogsta donrstolen) is the court of final appeal in most instances. It is composed of 24 ustices, 21 of whom form three panels of seven jusCces each. As few as five Justices may hear a case. Decisions by the court are made by majority vote. In case of a tie, the vote of the presiding justice is deciding in civil cases. In criminal cases it tic results in acquittal, or if the disagreement is over the severity of the sentence, the lightest sentence proposed. The Supreme C:onrt as such does not review national legislation for constitutionality; however, the Law Council, operating outside the court system and made up of three justices from the Supreme (,our' aril one justice from the Supreme Administrative Court, reviews governmental legislative proposals for constitutional ity before their submission to the Riksdag. 'I'lrc council's opinion is only advisory but is almost always followed by the government. The Supreme Administrative Court is one of several special courts designed to protect the individual citizen against bureaucratic *****s of authority. Its 16 members handle cases sent up by lower administrative authorities (including the ombudsmen) for final decisions arid also cases on appeal from the central administrative agencies which involve alleged ***** of power by administrative officials against private citizens. 'Theoretically, the National Court of Impeachment tries cabinet ministers and members of the Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court for malfeasance or failure to carry out their duties, but it has not been convened since 1854. The Labor Coit rt, consisting of two jurists, two representatives each from the Federation of Trade Unions (LO) and the Swedish Employers Confedera- tion (SAF), one rep esentative from the Central Organization of Salaried Workers, and one member representing the public, settles disputes arising front labor-management contracts. Other special courts are tic water rights, land partition, arid expropriation courts. Tor diacritics on pla,ee names see the list of nanus al the end of the chapter. N APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 Judges of the courts of first iw4anc�e and courts of appeal are law school graduates %yFrc, attain their wisitions after 15 to 20 varrs of experience in the judicial civil service. Most Supreme Court justices are also chosen from the judicial civil serN jee. Irtrt prominent attorneys and law professors are occasic,nally appointed to the high court he!wh. In terms of salary and prestige the justice, of the Supreme Court and the presiding judges of the six courts of appeal rank highest. T!rc division heads of the courts of appeal are next in importance. District court judges and city court chief judges generally enjo> eclnal distinction. b. Penal system The Swedes share with their Sc�andivayiun neighbors the most enlightened penal system in the world. In the post -World War 11 period tlere has been it strong movement for uniformity in criminal lacy and in prison systems tltroughout the Nordic area. Confined persons in Sweden Wray not only receive visits from relative; and friends but arc given frequent furloughs to visit their homes. bong -term inmates are sometime, afforded the opportunit of spending se veral days during the surnmer with their spouses in pleasant accommodations rented from the slate at cost I)\' the spouse The regalia prison facilities are generally adequate to handle the prison population comfortably, and treatment of iunales is humane. 'I'll(- amount of psychiatric care available, however, is considered inadequate, and authorities are striving to renud\ this. Only prison gu ards ;.ssigiwd to nraxinrurn securit areas carry firearms. Swedish penologists are loathe to risk inflicting bodily harm on inmates in their custody, if "punishrnertt "I they rationalize, for which there would be no justification %vithin the law. In 1968 about 5.000 persons were given probaliort- ary sentences for crimes punishable by imprisonment. Another 10,000 were given prison terms, many for only a few months. 'I'll( number o! inmates in Sweden at any given time is about 5,000 in a total polntlation of over 5 million. "There are some 3,100 prison employees, or nea rly one staff mender for every two prisoners. Many criminals, particularly ***** people, are given institutional treatment for 6 to 5 weeks and then placed under if supervisor who is similar to if probation officer. The supervisors, who number sonit .0,000, are selected, well adjusted, and respected inclividctals who act as big brothers to minor lawbreakers and first offenders. "I'hcy get it symbolic payment, about USES a month, for their efforts. All fines except for drunkenness arul disorderly conduct are set in a fixed nnrnberof units called "da%.- 5 if holdover in tcnnim4op from an earlier era Mien lire ,lour had to pa\ imposed fine, in daily insla!Intenls. 'I'll( contentporar day-fi, range in nurnl;.. r from oue to 120, depending upon the seriousness of offenw. :1 rnaxintnnt of 150 day -fine, Wray be imposed if several crime, are puni,hed concurrently. The amount of at single clue fine varies, depending avowedly on the offender', ability to pa\. This aurcnutt is then tmtltiplied b the nundwrofday- fines imposed. largely pwdctermined ill the peaal code by the nature of the specific offense. A jingle daN -fine may vary in amount from SKr2 to SKr-500. Sweden, like other Scandinavian cnunlries, has ten juvenile courts. ***** welfare hoard,, elected by the local councils, deal \%ith all cases of soc�ia:lly nulaelietsted and delinquent jcn�coil tinder 1.5 years of age: they arc also empowered to deal v ith juveniles between 15 and 1 whose cases call fo,, special corrcc�tiye measures. Offenders aged 15 to 20 gars may be remanded to care under the Chill Welfare Act, even though the regular correctional system is responsible for offenders after they reach their 15th birthday. TIIe ***** %elfare hoards afford advisory assistance, admonish the parents, and supervise the *****'s rellinu� under preventive procedures. Taking a ***** into custody for social care is the last resort. Institutions for ***** care are administered locally by public authorities or, in certain instances, privately. Youth welfare schools for lawbreakers arc operated by tit( state. 5. Provincial and local government The marked responsiveness of government to the� governed in Sweden it typically sc�andivavian phenomenon stems in important nu�asum from the traditional vitality of the provincial and local councils. Nonetheless, during the almost four decades of Social Democratic political dominvtion. thy� c�cnlrai government has steadily encroached on purely local prerogatives. This erosion of local autononly, opposed I y the other parties and perhaps by if nwjorit of tit( electorate, and a probable campaign issue in the 197 elec�tion,, showed signs of easing in early 1972. Of the national government agencies, the Ministry of Int -rior exerts the v,idest range of inflrtencc over the provincial auld local govermuents. It prepare; national legislation affecting them and considers appeals which arise from decisions or actions of local officials; at the provincial levels it supervises the National Police, the fi-efighting and civil defense systc�tus. and the ac:rninistration of the comprehensive national health programs. Other ministries with extensive local authorit are I ?duc�alion and Elec�lesi as( ic�aI Affairs, APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 Fillance and Fcomom,y. Wd Social :affairs. Both the lust'(�( Onrhruls lit n ;111(1 the (11ancellor of jii"tice arc ellipmered to inyesligale the actiyilies of provi11ci;11 au(I local gmern memt officials and Prosecute or arrange for prosec�utio11 for dewlic�liom of dots. For adrmiuistratiye purposes. Ssyc den is cliyidecl into Provinces un(I towns, boroughs, it( l rural c�omumuues. .kll arc resporesivc to lleir respec�tiye rv a. Provincial govcrnnu Each of tit, 21 provinces (lanner). is heucled by it governor (lands� /rov(jing) the (wily of Stockholm has special statics and is administercd by a governor general, Filch ,governor is.,issiste(l by an administrativc staff--the pro%kic�ial cxec�utiye boar(I and till Office of the Governor General ill Stockholm. The governors and top officials of their staffs, although ;Ippoinlecl by Ile King- in- 1, follow the dirccliyes of the Ministry of Interior, to %%hick then are ire most cases responsible. The governors act as tliv principal age�ncs of the national government, insuring that 11atiom;ll laws are carried out and that national interests and property arc I mt e(-Iv(I. 'I'hc� to iIIc�i,II excculiyc boards adrmiIIisIvr and supervise a yaricty of activities, including tux assessrme11l and collection, civil defense, social welfare, firefighting, roads 111(1 traffic control, and 1)()1'1.1. l, Provincial chief of Police is directly responsible to the board and is considvi-ed a board official. "I'hc police chiefs of Stockholm, Got( bor,g Malmo, and Norrkoping are indepcndcnt of II I( provincial chiefs of Police but are responsibly t0 the provincial board, or in the else of Stockholm to the Office of the Governor General. Each proviiiev is governed by it council; deresek populated Kit lniar is (I iyidcd into two administrative areas. Provincial cot 'I are electe(I every i years o11 a proportional representation systen I,y all citizens 15 gars of age and over. 1 ?a u ch concil selects art executive com mittec of I t Icast five illembers who nay he members of the colnrcil or brought in from ontsidc. This committee pm-pares and a(hninisll-rs the hu(lgct, rm-nagc�s property, prepares am annual report of government activities for the council, and represents the council betsyccetr sessions. It roust approve all matters to be brought before tle connc�il except when the board ,ally i t special session of th(. council. Special nuretings of the council rmay also be called by the Members, the cx(�cntivc committee, or the King -m- Council. Procedures are similar to those of the Riksdag. I,egislltivc proposals may f,c nzulc by tle governor, tic provincial board, lFcc c�onncil itself, or individual members. Council decisions are considered to be ordinances, not laws. Provincial coumc�il Icgisl ;Ilion r!; al PrinciP;tliy with lcallb and care of 11ick. \oc�:1tio11nl :ord ;1(11:11 ec!ul ;uccl social ccr If ;arc. The dcnscly populated c�ilies of Goteborg. Malulo. a(rccl Norrkoptng are governed by scmiallto110- Molrs city councils that (Zeal direclls will, the� u_(tiorlal government. maintaining only linitcd tics to their respec�liye provinc�cs. Greater Stockholm is guyeriwd by if joint city ;Ind provincial colulc�il 01 100 Popularly elected utc rnhe:s. It appoints it board ill' 12 alderntctl from n its IMI, u�ndwrs to supervise administrrtivc I'll ncli0rls. This council also elects nine dircctors to hca(I lhc� ('it\ (Iepartnn nls-- finance, pro Perty. social \wlfarc, cultural 111(1 (1111( Itional motlers. industr city hospitals, srtburbaii planoi11g. amcl housing and construction. 6. local government In 1970 the basic units of local goyc�rnrIIeIIt ac�corncled for 818 local admcinslralive councils. Im I9-16 the Riksdag approved a proposal to cons( :lidatc the nary sparser populated rural comcnum( into larger ones, I 1)roc�e,s "bic�II conti11ucs gr dmilly. 2,281 com11mum(�s s(hic�h cxisled in 1952 had been mduccd to 621 in 1970 b\ a process of merger and COIISO!I(latir >Ir� In acl(lition to the comumumes. 1332 tolyns and 92 boroughs have elected local goyerm- I'lenls. Tlic process of co11solidatiolc aims It achieving a:] efficient proportion of population in (very local unit by 1975. Industrial deyeloprc`rit and expansion cord(' cause shifts in PoPulation that will require ;rdditional restrcturiug of the local governments after 1975. but the basic Irainework will have becu F ;Ic�h local govenrnent is headed by a council. elected 011 a Proportional rePmsentation basis by all citizens 20 years of' age 111(1 over, with it nioncbership ranging from 1$ to 60. The council appoints al, cxecrrtivc� c�onrr)ittee consisting (if' fire to I I nenrbers; it Prepares ticc agenda for council IIi cc t.imgs, -d it IiII is( vrs Properly, dircc�ts administration, and generally protects local interests. 'I'll( coumci. also appoints other c�ornnittcc's to (teal \yith cicclicns, construction, civil cl(.fellsc�, health and care of the� sic l.. and other community interests. Local as well as provincial governments Inay Ievv taxes; lh(�% may also borrow money with till- approval of the national government. "ith the consent of the King- in- Co(rncil, heavily populated areas within a rural commune hay(. beers formed into special cormntluliti(�s; these units remain part of the rural conmIIII( but lave councils of their o%%n to deal will special problems created by their urban characteristics. 9 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 In order to handle the growing duties of local government snore efficientiv, n eonununes have joined to form c�ooperltke associations. Since 1957 these associations have been empowered by law to create� councils and exec�utiyc cernnrittees from arnong their rnendwrs. An association fetnctioning as it corrllc�il may not levy taxes brit rllay request financial contributions from the participating governments. In addition to these associations, coil n rnav orrr, special associations to furthe cooperation in regional planning, traffic direction, and civil defense. C. Political dynamics (C) Significa;rt social and economic factors have contributed to the staple evolution of Swedish polities in the present century. Noninvolvement in external wars for a centurN and a half, the exceptional eth homogeneity of tilt� population, and a decentralized and diversified industrial base of the economy have helped foster a spirit of cooperation and pragnlatisnl. Political compromise has become normal in the effort to avoid any disruption of orderly soc�ioecotlornic� growth. Although recent developments h;.tve introduced sonle instability i nto the politi"., systenr. tilt traditio �rat )rlttcrn still holds for the most part. This stable ;)arliarnentary government matured only during the Mast four decades. As elscwher. i Europe-, modern political parties developed in Sweden in the latter 19th century ;.ding essentially class lines and engaged in somewhat the same class struggles. The fundamental dorru'stic issues of the past �the nature and extent of parliamentary government, extension of the suffrage, the respective roles of government and free enterprise in the economic systell" urrd the institution of suite directed social welfare were largely resolved b the early 19 'fhe cooperative effort in governing Sweden has provided a model for the other Nordic countries. Since the mid- 1950's the non- Conl ill unist political parties have broadened their platforms, each one attempting to attract the floating voto, chiefly of farmers, small husinessme_n, and the growing group of white- collar workers. A systern of proportional representation in national and local elections, while tending to disfavor the smaller parties, distributes the scats broadly in accordance with the popular vote. Major and sudden changes in the strength of the significant parties tend to he rare, as are radical shirts in public opinion. On the other hand, in line with the rising tide of re volt among many Swedish vouths, thev tend not to follow traditional voting patterns hilt to 10 shift to more extr positions oo the right :out particularly the tell. There are five major political parties: the Swedish Social Democratic Workers Party usually called the Social Democratic Party, drawing most of its support front the� workers; the Center Party (CI)) suppe.,tecl print, rily by white- collar workers and farn)ers; the Liberal Party (1'P), representing for the roost part the middle class; the Moderate Coalition Part' (MP� of(en called the Conservatives), supported principally by the upper social and ec�orronlic� sectors of t';c IX)pulation but with souu middle class hacking; and the small Party of the heft Conlnrl"list OTK), made up of mirkers with it sizable admixture of professional and inf)�Ilechl:rl groups and gaining scrpport among yotrtb. During the 19?0's and early 1930's no combination of parties with ;.l parlianiviitary majoril proved possihle, and corlseque'n(I the go werninen rotated among the Social Dcnlocrats, Liberals, and (:o s, each making compromises in order to gain office and to gc�t legislation enacted. By 1932, however, the Social Dernocre,ic� P:rrty I;ad gained sufficient popular support to enafle it to become clorrillant, and for the next four decades it governed alone or in coalition %%ith the C enter Party, or, as during World War 11, in a national coalition with all the other non- (:ornnlnnist parties (Figure 3). The comprehensive' social welfare legislation in force to day was enacted over the past four decades, f'regnently With the support of the Liberal and Conservative opposition in return for cornp:r on other i,siws. Retveen 1957 and 1968 the SAP govemod alone without rnajority parliamentary support. As a minority government it frequently had to rely on its majority in the Upper House or occasionally on the support of the Communists in the lower (louse. In 1968 the Social Dercocrats won an absolute majority, bolt their nurnerica! suprenlacv disappeared in the 1970 elections. In the new Riksclag the Social Democrats have been able to muster a majority on roost issues with the support of one or more of the bourgeois parties (Moderate Coalition, Liberal, Center). Minor parties have played a limited role in S\V politics. The only such party of ally significance in the last 15 years is the Christian Democratic Union (KDS), a rightwing splinter group whose principal ol)jec�tive is an expanded role for Christianity in Swedish everyday life. It appeared in the 1964 elections and received 1 8% of the vote but no scats. It was still active in the 1070 election, and while improving on its 1:?(iS returns (in the expanded electorate) by 0.3"0. :vas unable to do any better than its initial showing of 1.8%. The maverick Bourgeois Rally Party in swrthern Sweden APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 FIGURE 3. Governments since 1932 (U /OU) PARTIES IN iii VERNMENT PRIME: MININTER TENURE Social Denioeratic Per Albin Hntims... (S).......... Oct. 111:32 star. 1936. Agrarian A. Pehrmson- Briv ;iscurp (A) Mar. 1936 Sep. 1936. Social Democratic and Agrarian...... Pcr Albin llanacon (S) Sep. 111313 Dee. 1939. Social Detno rat,ic, Agrarian, Liberal, P- r Albin I3anxMon (S) Dee. 19:31) Aug. 1945. and Conmervative." Social Democratic Per Albin Ilansson (S) Aug. 19-15 Oct. 15151. Dif -d in (Iffire; snr4.4f -df-d Inc 'Page Erlander Oct. 19413.) So 1) it atic and Agrarlao...... Tage lrhander (S) Oct. 11)51 (act. 1957. Social Democratic 'Page Erlander (S) Oet. 1957 Oct_ 1969. Social Democraticc 010f Palme (S) Oct.. 1909 present. S, Social 0enioerntie, A Agrarian. OBecamc the Center Party in 1958. "Bec�arne the Moderate Coalition Party in 1969, managed to take tIIrcc parli.i tit �nt.Iry scats in 196 -1, but two of Ihcsecvcntuallc rcunitcd %%i(it tlivirorigin:al parties. 'I'hc tiny Cotnnrttnist Leaguc for Marxists Leninists (KI Ml.) participates in elections but rc�ceis ��d a scant 0.4',' of talc vow in 1970. t. Socia! Democratic Party a. Membership and electoral strength 'I'hc Social Democratic Parh, founded in I %Brig. is Swcden's largcsl lout in toots of popular support and actual nnrnnbership. Since 1917 it has regularly polled more votes in national cicetiotis than any of Icr party, and after 1914 it consistently hehi tit( Ialrgc;t iminber of seats in the Lower llouse of the Riksdag. In the 1970 elections the Social Democrats obtained 15.?i of the popular vote, clown from their all time high in 1968 (Filrure 4). In size the party is almost four and a half tittrs larger than its nearest competitor; its 1967 mcrnbership of some 886,M0 was 11.2 of the total Swedish population that year. More than 7Mi cf the Social DctnocratsI strength is the track union movenwnt, but tit(- party also has cousidcrable support among white collar workers and sinall businessmen and, to a lesser extent, among intellectuals. 'I'hc landslide vic' ry of tit( Social Dcinocrats in 1965 was in good measure attributable to the efficient organization of the election campaign, which had been stiinulated by the heavy losses sustained in the local cicctions in 1966. All parties campaigned vigorously, howcvcr, resulting in a Swedish election record; 89 .7= of the eligible voters cast their ballots. Nearly :III of the 620,000 yoursg people eligible to vote for the first titne participated and were probably attracted to the modern, progressive Social Dcnnlcnlhc� platform. '11h^ impact of tail� Soviet invasion cif Czechoslovakia. which oc�currcd less (ball .1 weeks before the elation, clearly deterred matt\ \%bo r onld norinally have voted Communist. Most of these disviichanted icftists drifted their votes to the Social Democrats. n 10 t+Fa W. r)n4Ir taw tigttenrulha �Forty q+e1 flee. rprton'` MY Center trprlan to f 957; L'bntar to 1958 unist 70 FIGURE 4. Trends in voting since 1944 (U /OU) APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 FIGURE 5. Party seats in the Riksdag: Lower House, 1944 -68; unicameral, 1970 (U /OU) Ili 1970 the Social Democratic P:Irt l(st its majority in the hiiks(lag, partly bec the ap ;)state Conununists who 11,1(1 (lefec'tecl to the Soci;tl Democrats in 1968 rettlnied to their party fold (I igur(- 5). The Social Democrats attributed' theirbacl showing to if lackluster campaign and voter apathy; illey Poiutcd out that a lower percentage of voters turned out than in the 1968 elections. TIWN found it neevssary to tailor some controversial legislation to suit ill Cornrrunisls in order to assure a nzljority of support in parliament. While the bourgeois parties still luck the r( cohesiolt ifecessary to unseat the Social Dernoc'rats, as evidence(I by the litters' success in gaining occasional support from the Center Party, the bourgeois parties have Moved closer together since Novembe, 1971 In the face Prime Minister Paint's confrontation politics. k Organization and leadership The SAP is the (rest organized of the non Comnrttttist political parties. Discipline has peen generally well rnaill taiIJV(I clespite the increase in internal strains during the past few years, The highest authority is the party congress, rnacle up of 350 delegates clectc (l b\ till rncrnbers In a system of proportional representation. Theoretically the congress is tie highest policyrnaking hotly; because it usually meets only once every :3 years, however, nI, t of t!Ie actual power, except the election of ;dl principal national officials, rests in the hands :)f the national and executive Committees. The national Committee, nadC up of 28 numbers selected by the congress, ineets regularly once i t year as the highest authority between congresses. In this capacity it makes polic regarding all aspects of party activity. ht national committee selects seven of its rnvinbers, who must be 12 Stockholm residents, to act as the executive conrn)ittet. This book tmrts at least once it rnonth;utd has the primary function of carrying out (lec'isions of the congress and national Its seven me;nlwrs are the SAP chairman and secretary, who are Cx Offi(I" numbers; the chairman of till. 1,0, with which the SAP has close ties; the cxeeutiwc director of the :cutup !ir "'.(rizalion of Salarie(l f?rnpl sees (TCO); ar(1 three top part\ leader~ in lie cabinet, other than t!u c; :Airman. The l all of the party chairs its parliamentary group ;!n(1 also serves as the Prirrle Minister. The sevretary is responsible for executin;; party Policies and decisions and coordinating all national activities. TIIv national organization is duplicated on tike district a?i(l local levels. District COMIllittees act as liais,)n between national bea(I(tuarters and the labor communes, which are the basic units for recntiling and training rovinbers atxl propagandizing the electorate. These c�omnlunes also set up special part associations in resi(lential areas and clubs in places of work; their main function is to counteract Cornlnunist activity through political propaganda. To train future lea(lers the SAP uses the Workers 1 ?dtrcalional Association, organized by the party ;111(1 tiles 1,0 in 1912, to complement the regular school system arcf provi(le general education. "I'ht Swedish Social Detnocn,tic Youth Association (SSU) provi(les ***** people with more practical lrainin) in party and national a'fairs. The SSU, which wits organized in 1917, is the s largest and most influential political Youth 9 1011 P in Sweden and had some 72,000 nreinbers in 1972. In addition to being a source of future party leaders, tit SSU is a vehicle for con(.lucting educational an(1 propaganda uetivities within life party and among the electorate. Al the APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 MO(�t Al. No 0 o F. It AT F: Y F;AIt DEMOCRATIC 1.I11 KIt A1, CO ALIT 10N CFNT KIt COMMe NIMT o'r II F; It TOTAL 1944....... 115 213 :311 35 Ifi 1) 230 1948....... 112 57 2:. :30 M o 2:30 1953....... 110 :58 31 213 5 0 230 ;956....... 100 :58 42 111 1958....... 111 38 �15 32 6 5 0 23! 1960 114 40 :11) 31 5 1) 231 19(3.1. 113 I'' :i:) :35 0 232 2:33 1908... 125 31 32 :31) 3 1970....... 163 5M 41 71 17 11 23:3 1) 1 50 *Formerly t.h:� ;'otiservulive Party; bevitnu the !Moderate Coltlit.ion Party in 1999. *Formerly the AKrarinn Party; became the ('enter Agrarian Party in 1957, 1 and the Center Party in 1958. "One deputy xubscyvently joined the Liberals and one the C.,nservatives. Ili 1970 the Social Democratic P:Irt l(st its majority in the hiiks(lag, partly bec the ap ;)state Conununists who 11,1(1 (lefec'tecl to the Soci;tl Democrats in 1968 rettlnied to their party fold (I igur(- 5). The Social Democrats attributed' theirbacl showing to if lackluster campaign and voter apathy; illey Poiutcd out that a lower percentage of voters turned out than in the 1968 elections. TIWN found it neevssary to tailor some controversial legislation to suit ill Cornrrunisls in order to assure a nzljority of support in parliament. While the bourgeois parties still luck the r( cohesiolt ifecessary to unseat the Social Dernoc'rats, as evidence(I by the litters' success in gaining occasional support from the Center Party, the bourgeois parties have Moved closer together since Novembe, 1971 In the face Prime Minister Paint's confrontation politics. k Organization and leadership The SAP is the (rest organized of the non Comnrttttist political parties. Discipline has peen generally well rnaill taiIJV(I clespite the increase in internal strains during the past few years, The highest authority is the party congress, rnacle up of 350 delegates clectc (l b\ till rncrnbers In a system of proportional representation. Theoretically the congress is tie highest policyrnaking hotly; because it usually meets only once every :3 years, however, nI, t of t!Ie actual power, except the election of ;dl principal national officials, rests in the hands :)f the national and executive Committees. The national Committee, nadC up of 28 numbers selected by the congress, ineets regularly once i t year as the highest authority between congresses. In this capacity it makes polic regarding all aspects of party activity. ht national committee selects seven of its rnvinbers, who must be 12 Stockholm residents, to act as the executive conrn)ittet. This book tmrts at least once it rnonth;utd has the primary function of carrying out (lec'isions of the congress and national Its seven me;nlwrs are the SAP chairman and secretary, who are Cx Offi(I" numbers; the chairman of till. 1,0, with which the SAP has close ties; the cxeeutiwc director of the :cutup !ir "'.(rizalion of Salarie(l f?rnpl sees (TCO); ar(1 three top part\ leader~ in lie cabinet, other than t!u c; :Airman. The l all of the party chairs its parliamentary group ;!n(1 also serves as the Prirrle Minister. The sevretary is responsible for executin;; party Policies and decisions and coordinating all national activities. TIIv national organization is duplicated on tike district a?i(l local levels. District COMIllittees act as liais,)n between national bea(I(tuarters and the labor communes, which are the basic units for recntiling and training rovinbers atxl propagandizing the electorate. These c�omnlunes also set up special part associations in resi(lential areas and clubs in places of work; their main function is to counteract Cornlnunist activity through political propaganda. To train future lea(lers the SAP uses the Workers 1 ?dtrcalional Association, organized by the party ;111(1 tiles 1,0 in 1912, to complement the regular school system arcf provi(le general education. "I'ht Swedish Social Detnocn,tic Youth Association (SSU) provi(les ***** people with more practical lrainin) in party and national a'fairs. The SSU, which wits organized in 1917, is the s largest and most influential political Youth 9 1011 P in Sweden and had some 72,000 nreinbers in 1972. In addition to being a source of future party leaders, tit SSU is a vehicle for con(.lucting educational an(1 propaganda uetivities within life party and among the electorate. Al the APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 congress in 1970, the SSI was chided fcrr living u debating s(wiet) Mull out of Iuuc�h c.ith (fee ccurken. Tritde unionist leader Arne G -iier wMnied the c�ottgress that his pow( rkI labor organization. it nu(jor c�otrportertt of the I.O. would establish it cmilpeting socialist youth group from antcmg its �1(H),000 %uung wcakers, but this threat appeared to be stemtnc(1 following tilt' SW in J une 1972. As Ei L!!wer c�onficlanl ;mall protege for 15 years, I'alme ac�te"I ;is the stAking horse for the party's leftwing. A sharp critic of U.S. policies in Southea%( Asia, Pulnue contributed to the increasing strui 1 in S-m�dish -U.S, relations b marching adougside M North \'ietnurr: se diplomat in if clemonstnttion against the United Stales in February 1968, This gesture enclearecl him t,r lefhying elements bvt caused clisyniel among much of the parl\'s leadership and rank and file. The sweeping victory of the Social Denuc�raIs in September 1968 and the certainty of Iris succession to the leadership lee! NMlnte to try t improve his standing ccith the more conservative� trade union and inichlle class members. In the months before the congres in 1961), Palne stressed the theme of unity among conflicting elements ill Swedish society and tried to soften the more radical inr;tt!e that had c�haracterize(I his political styis Since 1965. Strengthened by the Social Democrats' witiorit) in parliament and their unanitnorts endorsement of his policies, Prince Minister Pxlntc gained a sense of confidence. The initial discncha fit ncnt began it few wet�ks after he assumed offi whets Foreign Minister To) rstct: Nilsson riled Swedish busincssnton by presenting long -range plans to ai(1 North Vietnam as concrete measures to be taken its the near fnhtre. Patine was forced to quiet the clamor Mncl conciliate local commercial interest by downplitNir(g Nikson's remarks. Although Palms� succ�eedo(I in mollifying more conservative opinion, his inwgv as a c�hantpion of leftwing causes was tarnished. The 2 -month long wildvat strike in December 1969 by miners in the state- iron chines in Norrbottell threatened to spread to other industries. The strikers' grievances, not all economic, inchi(led charges of inclifferenc�e mt the part of the govcrnrncrrt is well :is the unions to the welfare of the miners. PMlrnc condemned the strike, thus further alienating labor militants, blot acknowledged that the work( complaints had some validity. Leftist supporters because c\ (-if more dissatisfied when Paline roac�ted to the annotntecnrcn( of U.S. military operations to Carnboclia by delivering only if mild rebuke. flis scorning abandonment of leftist causes probably contributed to Communist gains in the 1970 election. GrosciiiK amt business fit ilunvs continued h plagl,(� 1 through 1971, and in the Lill he was forced to release government funds for investuuvlt. This move Mppease(1 business interests mill cyaS designed to get the ec�oromy through the winter with the v\pec�lalion thitt proclnc�tion and entplo\ tnc�nt \%mull improve cc the nornmil c�yc�licA upturn in the� spring. The Soc�ia1 Democrats are ple(Iged to maintain Sweden's high stmi(larcl (if' living, mill unless PMltne can improve the domestic economy, the authority of Ifte leaders ncay be sharpl\ challenged It'\ more radical elements ccithin the parh. e. Program and policies The Social Democrats in Sweden, like those in other S; iindinayian cmintrics, akm(lonecl their purely Marxist doctrines of class carfare and socialization of the means of production at un curly date and developed into it :nodera(e. reformist part. 'Phis change ryas effec�lecf ,incler nimlertte leaders, who found it necessar, to cowprotnise and cooperate \cith other parties in or(ler to eslablisl! universal suffrage. parhimientmrianisnt, and an advanced system ref social security and welfare. It became� apparent Ihat the party haul to broaden its inontbership base to inciude traditionally middle class groups if it were to continue in power. The party adopted governinent-adntinis- tered social and economic programs which hays souglt to maintain it mixed economy, in which private I'nterprise would remain dominant, but pub'icl owned companies would operate most public utilities mill certain basic inclust ;ies. The (Iliestion of the extent of state intervention in the cc�ouotm is still uu issue in Sweden, but only the ;omntunists and if haoditil of nulical Socialists support nationalization of all privately o\yned industries and business enterprises. Approximately 9:V of Sweden's total industrial production reinaincd in private hands in 1970. ()illy about 200,000 workers. 6 "1 of the told gainfull\ cnployecl labor force, were employed govermnc�nt owned or government controlled firms. 'I'ftc formation of the :'\1inistry of Indlostri ;il Affairs in 1961, however, presaged some nuasure of increased official initiative in managing tho ccouotn\. The first major project of the new nrinistrs was the formation and operation of additional state -owned industries. Blit plans to b(n up failing small businesses proved so costly that they lime! to be dtastically nurdifie(l. Because the SAP hats been clontinanl for many it number of party policies have become government policy. At home the earl\ has supported social welfare and insurance programs as i f means of raising the I-3 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 living standards of lower inc�orne groups, and programs for inc�reash.g the income of the rural population to attract its s tplxrt. It has also hacked changes in the school system in an effort to bring educational faciliti(- above the elementary level within the reach of larger numbers of the lower income groups. I'll(- party program continues to place greatest emphasis on traditional goals, such as maintaining Full vntplo'- ntent, raising this standard (if living of lower inconu� groups, and increasing productivity in order to enable Sweden to compete in world markets. These relatively noncontroversial goals have lhc� support of most Swedes, whereas sonte of the party's more recently enuncicated proposals�such as increased government planning and control over banking and industries have been sharply attacked and are likely to tile(- considerable opposition. One of the most crucial problems facing the party, and a potential threat to its dominant position in Swedish political life, is the continuing high rate of inflation. The "temporary" �tee freeze instituted by the government in October 1970 remaived in eff(-ct until January 1972. Plant closures and unemployment reached serious proportions in the winter of 1971 -72. A tax reform bill adopted in May 1972, which gives relief to lower and middle income groups by increasing pay roll taxes for the employer, threatens to prolong unemployment difficulties. In foreign affairs the SAP supports Swedcn':, traditional policy of nonalliance and neutrality. Thc� party reflects the views of the overwhelming majority of Swedes, who remain opposed to membership in NATO, despite the fact that Sweden identi`ies itself with the other kk'estern dernocracies. Thc Social Democrats are also opposed to full membership for Sweden in the EC; because of the political and military tics to the Western alliance entailed by membership. Nevertheless. the government recognizes the reality of c ^onontic dependence on the EC countri. s as markets fo: Swedish products and is prepared to negotiate it treaty providing for an industrial free -trade arrangement that would protect many economic interests of Sweden without requiring it to assume political oblifrations that would compromise its neutrality. The attitudes of party ivaders and the rank and file toward the U.S.S.R. do not differ markedly from other segments of Swedish society. Despite certain ideological affinities between social democracy and communism, most party supporters remain suspicious of Soviet intentions toward the non Communist world and are repelled by the atmosphere of coercion and fear that characterize life in the Soviet Union. 14 Since the early 1960 s domestic political consid era- tions have impelled tk- SAP to assume it more neutral stance in its foreign policy. Yount; activist members of the leftwing, restless user what the% regarded as it trend to tit(- right by the SAP, criticized the leaders for their stavd on it nomber of foreign policy issues. In mid -1965 the more radic�a: element began to press for an '.ndependent, "Social IN-moc�ratic�� foreign policy that wotdd after the part%'s traditional conjolitn,eul to nonalignment and reluctance to criticize either Ili(- blast or the %%'est and lead to a nurc� s igorioo, approach to foreign policy issues. As international opinion began increasingly to foc�cts on Vietnam, there was growing pressure oil the part leaders to adopt an anti -U.S. position on this issue. In order to forestall Possible defections from its leftwing to the Cornnn.tnisls, the SAP leaders decided to placate the left on foreign policy issue.;, while aolvocating a middle -of- the -road approach to domestic problems. This was un effort to minimize opposition from its moderate labor following. At first, the inme to the left as limited to public remarks b 1) roruinent goverument leads rs. In January 1969, hc: %vver, the Swedish Government became the firs, Nordic country to recognize North Vietnam, placing it considerable strain on relations with il United Stales. sifter Palate became Prime Minister, the government sought to dissociate itself from the strident anti- Arnericanisnt of the party's leftwing that had clouded bilateral relations. The ebb and flow of anti- Americanism have since been subject to the degree of fighting in the (�ntnbat zone. \Vith the intensification of the Vietnam syar in tit(- spring of 1972, leaders in the Riksdag, led by the Prince Minister, stepped up their harsh criticism of the united States. There is considerable division within the party regarding the size and mission, c,f national defense forces. Most members hold that Su; cien should maintain sufficient forces to deter it potential aggressor, but there is also widespread sentiment that military expenditures should be reduced in order to permit further expansion of social welfare benefits. Indeed, Swedish military commanders predicted it significant reduction in the effectiveness of the military as a result of inadequate defense appropria- tions passed by the Riksdag in June 1972. d. Press and finances Since the demise of the morning daily Stockholms- Tidningen in 1966, the Malmo morning daily Arbetet Labor) has been the principal organ of the Social Democratic Party. The Stockholm dliily Aftorthladet represents the views of th(- leftwing and has the larger APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 circulation. lit addition to these two leading dailies, the� party pullisIt es it number of small daily newspapers throughout Ssseden, the rnajorit} of which are owned by the trade unions in the 1.0 and operate in the red. '1'lhc� LO a n(I the SAI'sabsidize mativ of the papers. The party's chief source of inc�onu1 is membership clues, which vary in aniount in different parts of the counts. Another source is payment to the national c�- n:mittee by tit( labor cenuriunes and the party district committees, which cars on or- ganizational work at a local level with one� committee to cac�h district. 'They assess extra dues for election campaigns and special drives. 2. Center Party a. Membership and electoral strength The (:enter Part% %%as originall} established as the Pariiwrs' Union in 1913, subseynently took the name :lgraria n Pi.rty, and then, in 1957, became� the (;enter agrarian Party in order In appeal to lot riiraI elements; its present name was adopted it year later. From 19 -1.1 to 196.1 the party generally ranked fourth in popular appeal. although it moved to third place in terms of scats wnti to the national elections of 1944 and 1 >)64. It incurred its greatest electoral losses while cooperating with the Social Democrats from 1951 to 1957, after which it pride steady though modest gains. In the provincial and local elections of 1966 the party won 15.251 of the� total vote compared with 13.4' 1 its 1964. Its sricc�esses at the polls continued in the national elections of 1968 and 1970. It is the second party in terms of eirctoral support and third in size of nu�rnbership, with approximately 120,000 numbers in 1969. No longer only it farmers' party, the UT derives much support Irons office and factor\ workers. h. Organization and leadership The structure of the Center Party is somewhat similar to that of the Liberal and Moderate Coalition Parties (see below), but its tighterorganization is more tike that of the Social Democrats. The Iighest authority, the annually asserriblcd national conven- tion, elects the party chairman and two vice chairmen, who sit ex arj''cio on the national conunittcc. The national committee. most of whose members are elected by the Jistrict organization, prepares the agenda of the rational convention and advises tlu� eight mernber executive committer. This committee principally through its appointed secretariat directs the affairs of the party between conventions. Four members of the executive cominitt c are elected by the national committee and four by t,hc convention, to which it is re�spo risible. On the district and local levels the national organizatiou is reflected in smaller scale replicas. The basic� unit of party organization is the local section. The (:e fart% relies heavily on its atixilias organizations to s ipplernent and expard its actix ities. I'It (:enter Part\ Youth association is the largest of all the politically based youth groups, with some 90.0(X) nu�nilwrs in 1969. It has won i t considerable folio wing among rural vollth through educational and recreational .ic�ti%iIi vs� including shidy courses, Iectnres. and sports and travel facilities �and provides training for futtire part\ leaders. F(hicational activities are also conducted by the the Center Women's League, which hail 6110)O members in 1969, acid by its student nrganization, the Swedish Rural Sttulent Association. Party propagan(la work is promoted by it special press assoc�iatiort. A change in the party leadership occurrcd in June 1971. when the 70 year -old Cainnar I ledbnd ,leppe(l down after svrvii ;g for 22 %,�ars as head of lbe part). II ;s protege and st,c�cessor, the 14 \ear -olcl Thorbjoru aildiii, inherited it clear title to head any eventual bourgeois coalition than may result from the 197 :3 elections. ()It the basis of the last hwo c�Iec�tions party fortunes appear to be rising. and its opposition leader in the Riksdag, Palldin is likeh to be an ;,nportaoit leader ern the political scene. flis parlia ;nrentas experi�iocv is equal to 1'.ilme's, both leaders having eciterecl the Riksdag in 1956. Moreover, I1e retirement 2 wears before the iwxt election has given Fall(lin ample time to establish himself with the electorate. n. Program and policies Since 1958 the domestic program of the Center 1'arty has been designed mainly to expand its appeal beyond farming groups. The program emphasizes the need to find a brlarte�e� between the concentration of economic power in private and public spheres, the need for individual enterprise, and the promotion of decentralized self government as it means of protecting the individual from the "experts" and ��society planners. The program also maintains that all "small enterptise" rather than just the small farmers should be protected and favored. to practice, party leaders contir.tiv to favor the formers' interests, advocating increased gov ^ntme subsidies to supplement agricultural income and improved rural living conditions, expanded credit facilities, and reduced taxes on lower incomes. The party favors social welfare and security programs, but wants to impose limits on government expenditures for them. 15 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 In foreign aff airs the Center Varty strongly supports the traditional Swedish policy of neutrality and nonalliance. The party's aversion to the Comrnoa Market reportedly contributed to I'almc's decision to seek something less than full membership in it. Althougl tilt- party tends to be isolationist, tl;e leaders and the rank and file: are equally strong ill support of democratic ideals and identify saederr with the Western European and knicrica n democracies. Mernbvrs have been inclinrd to question increased defense expenditures, but once convinced of such a need, tile}' have gone along with the other no"- Communist parties in supporting the reorganization and modernization of the defense forces, in contrast to some of their Norwegian and Danish counterparts. Ott the Vietnam i "'w, the pasty has tended to take a middle -of- the- risiai position. d. Press and finances 1'hc Center Part has no newspaper which is read on it nationwide scale. Its leading organ is the Malrtu,- publis;ted Skanska Oagbladet iSkane D.til\ Nt-\%s which has at relativel% mall circulation. It 1969 the party published only 1: I.tily_ newspapers throughout Sweden. Because the pat. keeps the sources of it funds confidential, there are no estimates of its financial status. "I':. e local sectiow, keep about 2W( Of the clues collected and forward the remainder to the district organizations. Mjich, in turn, keep 801i of the amounts recei\-ed and forward the balance to higher units. 3. Liberal Party a. Membership and electoral strength The Liberal Party, organized in 1934 by the inerger of the hilightened People's I'arh and the swudislt Liberal Party, has been out- of the principal opposition parties throughout "lost of the poshvar era. Its electoral support bas varied from about I i, to 2051 of the popular vote. In size the Liberals rank fourth among the parties, with it 1969 membership of about 100,000. Support comes from disparate elements- basically middle class but often with conflicting interests including white- collar workers, small businessmen, small farmers, professional groups, and some financia; and industrial interesis. Its most dependable supporters are members of nonconformist Protestant sects and the temperance movement. h. Organization and leadership In some structural aspects the Liberal Party is similar to the Sm'. Its lines of authorit\-, lu,wever. are 1 6 not ne arly as elc arfv defined; it is probably the most loosely organized of tl:c Swedish parties. The highest antbority is the national party convention. which is composed of 360 delegates and meets ever\- 3 vears. All but scvvil of the� delegates are elected by tilt- district party organizations on i t proportional basis. The c�m\-ention includes four representatives of the party's p trlianientary group, and oat- repmsentative each of th- youth, women's, and press associations. A 68- n:, tnber advisor\ council, chaired by the national chi srtnan and including 10 members elected b\- tilt- natto,lal convention and a representative of each of the disWO orgarti.'�itions and of the two special Stockholm ,'istricts, rnects once it year to make decisions on ma:}ers not taken up by the convention. The 2-- nrem1wr na,ional committee. which consisis of the chairman, sc�cr,! trv, 22 members elected by the national convention, out the chairmen of the youth. women's, surd press as +ociations, meets at least three times it year. \Cti\-itirs o4 the� executi\-e cot"ntittt-e are determined by the nationa! cornntittee, and it nanes special cornnriltees to collaborate oil recruitment, orgauization. and propagaurcla. The national committee selects nice of its rnentl:ers to form Ibt- exccutive committee, which. together ith :ht- secretary, carrie out the decisU "ts of tilt- national cotunrittee, the advisory council, and the convention, and directs the day -to -clay activitivs of tilt- part% bVtWecu conventions. The national organization is drtlrlicakd on the district and local levels in much tilt- same way as that of the SAP, except that the basic units at the lowest level arc clesigrtatecl "local sections." and propaganda activity is carried nn mainiy by the district organizations. The Liberal Party depends to at great extent on auxiliar\ organizations to supplement its owls activity in training party leaders. The most important of tbest- orgamizations is the Liberal Louth League JT established in 1934. The NPU plays an important role in carrying -,)It general educational as well as propaganda .activities. The party maintains it women's organization, the Liberal Women's Association, and the Liberal Student Association. The Liberal Party is heaut-cl by chairman Gunnar Helen, who succeeded Sven \Veden in 1969 when he tctired because of poor health. Me of the primary problems facing Helen when ht- took charge was the increasingly radical tone of the youth organization, which threatened to destroy the unity of the party. 'I'll( results of the 1970 elections suggest that Ilelen toil\- have succeeded ill taking some of the sting out of the vocal youth group and placating more conservative elements. The known friendship of thiv APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 c�h;.innan tot\ard the United States, however, makes him vulnerable to further criticism from the dissident element of the part\. c. Program and policies The Liberals have had difficulty developing a program on which their heterogewus supporters could continue to unite, once the g,,als of a parlianentar\ democracy and uni�� rsal suffrage were attained more than it half century ago. Since World War 11 the platform in dornestic affairs has been designed to attract a broad spectrum of voters and in general does not differ greatly from that of the SAI except that the Liberals put more stress on restricting intervention by the state in the economy. The party supports it comprehensive system of social and economic security, along with opportunities for education and vocational training; it has generally backed Social Democntlic efforts to eliminate gross inequalities in the distribution of income through taxation and social welfare programs. The Liberals have accepted the supplement ar\ retirement pension system as o scheme "that has come to stay, although th(�\ oPpose the turnover or value added tux (which contributes to the revenue needed for financing the social welfare programs) as unnecessary and call instead for less lavish spending. They also favor profit- sharing in industry, a shorter working period during the \car through either longer vacations or more free Saturelays, and the promotion of rural elevelopnent I)\ officio support for light industrial anal commercial development in the countr\sidv. Policies regarding foreign and defense matters have reflectc(I differences among the factions. Platforms in wc�ent \ears have been purposefully broad cm(l vague in stating objectives. Oil foreign policy the liberals adyocatc cnopenatiou with other peoples to prnnnotc inter- national order and we and to increase internnotional trade. Par le;tdt'rs support the tra(I iIion:iI nomellianc'e curd nelltraIit\ police. small \ling, however, consisting mucstI of urban and military cicnu'nts, has long advocated Swe(lish nnctnbership in NA "fO. The part\ is divided over the issue of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia, despite the fact that sore leaders are strong supporters of U.S. polio\ in general. The radical leftwing minority, including nennbers of the FIT, has vociferousl\ criticized the United States, ;and the liberal Stude nt Association vigorously channpioned Swedish recognition of North VietlY;mn. 'I'hc Vietnam issue appears to have become it clistrac�tion which has diverted various elements of the party from focc:,ing on special u.: ctivcs, such as isesta)lishnent of the church caul dissolution of the m(cnarc�h\. In mililar\ matters the Liberals have consistently favored a strong defcuse bolt have smpported reductions in the� military budget in line with tbcir support for fisc�ai disc�iplinc across the board. Despite fairl\ general agreement amtong leaders and mnun c,f the rank and file that great:'r defense efforts were necessar\, both the Liberal and Center Parties reluctantly went alcntg with the go\crurmcnt's decision in 1967 to nlairlain defense spending at existing levels in order to permit un expansion of various social welfare programs. Although the (Iv �lion of the Liberals nwy have stemmed in part front it desire to placate the party s antinifitarist youth., it more significantly reflected the practical politics that have become a tradition in Sweden. d. Press and finances The two leading dailies supporting the liberal I'arh, the Stockholm- publislu'(I l)anens :\'ltheter and Expressen, are the most wide I\ rea(I of Al Swedish newspapers; t1w Goteborgs- Po.stcn, another Liberal paper, has the fourth largest circulation. In adclitimi, the part\ published more than 10 other dailies throughout :Sweden in 1969. 'I'll(- Liberal press, for the most mart, is strong enough financially to be independent politically and plot its ntuajoremtphasis on le\\s. The part) IIowe\er, has chronic financial difficulties and has to rely heavily on voluntar\ c�ontributinus: special fund- raising drives and lotteries are conducted to meet election campaign expenses. I'hc national contyeuticcn sets the ,amount that the c luctoral clistric�t associations must pa\ cacti \ear to the uatioual organization from membership dues. Sitnilarl\, pa\ments most be made to the district association by the local scc�tions. 4. 'Moderate Coalition Party a. Membership and electoral strength The predecessor of the present Moderate Coalition fart\ was formed in 1935 through the anw1gantation of two ,onservAk e parliamentary groups one in each house of the old 13ik.sdag. Originally known as the Conservative Part\, its name was changed to the Hoge'partiet, or Party of the Right, in 1952. Then in 1969 it bec�anne the or Modenate Coalition Party. Prior to 1918 the party ranke(I second inn eleclond strength. but during most of the posNar ern it trailed the Liberals in terms of popular support. In recent \cars the Moderates have dec�linc(1 further and arc now the smallest of the nonsocialist parties in terms of parliumcntan representation. Its fairly extensive organization has IN APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 enabled the part to enroll some 300,000 numbers, slaking it the second largest political grouping in the country. The Moderates obtain their principal support from estaie owners and large fariners in rural areas and from industrialists and employer groups it: the cities. Additionally, some tipper level professionals, high ranking military officers, and much of the clergy of the Church of Sweden may Ire eouted among the partx 's supporters. b. Organization and leadership The structure of the Moderate Coalition Party closely resembles that of the Liberal 1 arty. Its national party convention, which nuets every i years, elects tit(. executive committee, "yhic�h consists of the chairman, two vice chairmen, and 10 other members. The advisory committee includes the entire executive committee, in addition to 10 elected representatives. as well as representatives front other part organizations. The district organization is the prince local authority. The most important auxiliary organizations stlrplemelttifig party activities, especially educational and propaganda work ct'ul the training of future part leaders, are the Moderate Yotltit Association, \yitit approximately :35 ,000 menlbc'rs. and the Moderate \1'onlen's Association, with soft'(' 55,000 ntentbers (both figures as of 1970). signific�antiy large proportion of party voters are wont(.n. Tile S\\edisll Moderate Student ;kssurc�iation. organizationally independent of the part\, is the largest political student organization in lit(' country. The Moderate Coalition Harty has experienced considerably more turnover in leadership over the past 20 years than most other Swedish political partier '111 present leader, Costa Bohrtuul. is the fourt!t sin (.e 1950. Boltntan, born in Stockholrt in Jannary 1911, succeeded 1'ngve Ilofrlberg in November 1970, when he was blanud for party losses in the� 1970 viections. Boftman has been it member of the Riksdag since 1958. C. Program and policies Moderates historically have he�en the� chief opponents of socialism and (be SAP'.' The park has been the principal exponent of a strong defense force and protective tariffs for indt'stry and agriculture. It supports social security and welfare rneasuves for humanitarian reasons, although it opposes the� use� of these programs as i t means of redistributing income. It stands for the reduction of government expenditures. particularly for social welfare, so that corporate, inheritance, an(I iltconu taxes stay be lov. The 18 p art\ however, ia:., be(�t' nininfizing dernands for a reduction in social welfare benefits, Itec�ause its past position on th;s issue Contributed to election losses. With an eve to broadening their appeal among the vie�ctorate, tit(- Moderates have urged the creation of it universal property owning democracy, i.(.. every Swedc to he it fwnrcowner. Tbr� party maintains that this objective is obstructed by confiscatory tax rates, wbicb stake it difficult to accumulate sayings for the ptlrc�hase of it hunt(., and by the government I s housing progr which entpltasizes the construction of" apartments itstead of inclividual homes. Although the part\ supports educational reform art(! expansion. some of its followers are appreftensive over the inevitable lowering of aWialvrlic� standards in if tburouglik dcrnuc�ratized tipper secondary and university system. The Moderates are the principal defenders of tL�e ntunarcln and the establisbe(1 Lutheran State Church: rnauv baye never accepted lfle fail ac�cornpli of tit(- welfare st,:te. In foreign affairs tit(. party offic�ial!\ supports Sweden's policy of ncutralit and nuualliauce. but strong efentrn;s have advocated joint defense measure with Norway and 1)enntark. and it minority. particularly th(. ttilitary. favors nunrbership in N:kTO. The Moderates buy(. consistently aclvoc�ated greater defense expenclittrres. Oil the vietnatn is.ue. tlfe party and its pre have supported the l'.S. position. d. Press and finances 'ft\(. chief newspapers supporting the Ntoderalc� Coalition I'arty are the Svenska Oagbhcdvl. published in Stockholm, and the St/d Svenska I)a/;bladel snallposh'n, ptblishe(I in Malfno. In a(ldition. 4') other party dailies were published in 1969 �t1e largest ntntfwr :sf newspapers for any Sw(.dish party. T'T Moderate press. like the� Liberal press, is self supporting. Most Swedish advertisers prefer the paper.. that cater to the affluent upper and middle classes rather than the Social Democratic press. which is aimed principally at the� working class. The party depends largely on private donations to finance its operations and campaigns. The ntet!lod of collecting and fomarding ntentbersbip dues front the local to tit( national level of die party is similar to that employed I)v the Liberal Party. 5. Party of the Left Communist a. Membership and electoral strength 'fhe Swedish Cont,nunisl Tarty was forned in 1921 by Social Democratic Ieft\ying dissidents, made up APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 I ii rgeIy of svdic�alists, anarchists, and other contemporary radical labor elements. At its congress in May 1967. the part% changed its name from Svedges Konnunistiska Partiel to \"(nsterr)artict-Konntntist- ema (I'artv of the Left Communist, VPK). Ill its effort to wit more Socialist support, the part\ rants c\entually drop "Communki" from its title altogether. It is the smallest of the S\ycdish ri'llitic�al parties in tcrt;es of hr;th popular .cppoIt and nenhersIf i1). Its performance in national elections since World War II has been spotl\ .And slo\ys i f general decline over the prc\\ar period. 'I'll(- 1968 elections were held shortly after the Czechosim ak crisis and restIted in it sharp setback for the Communists, who got only 30'1 of the vote and lost five scats. The VPK recouped some of its losses in 1970. however. Communist strength is centered prim aril\ in the urban industrial areas of Stockholm, Gavleborg province. and Goteborg and in raining coinimmitics in the pro\inec of Norrbotten in the north. Supporters are nainly unskilled workers in the lumber. training. rnetai, construction, and transportation industries. I'll( party also receives scattered support from Nyhitc- collar workers. professionals, and intellectuals. \lembership droppccd sharpy from an estimated 65,000 in 194.1 to approximately 11.000 in 1970. Support at the polls is considerably greater. however, and the VPK polled over 16,000 votes in the 1970 election. The \'PK has been unable to capture control of any of the national trade unions, and its nu�nnbers dotnino.tte only about 80 of the approxim atcly 9.000 union locals in Sweden. b. Organization and leadership Theoretically, the organization of the PK is similar to that of the tthcr Swedish parties. Actually. power rests in the hands of i f fe\\ leaders, who maintain discipline by forcing strict subordination of An�mbers to the� hierarch\. The supreme organ is the congress, Which is supposed to meet cycr\ I years and in theory, at (cast, decides all fundamental piestions of police and organization. The congress also elects the 35- member central committee, known since 1964 as the party hoard, which theoretically supervises national activities. The party hoard chooses the chairman and the other eight members of the executive committee, which contains the top leaders and controls the day to -day activities. There also appears to he a secretariat, but little is known about its composition. The control contrtission, selected by the congress, audits party administration and finances and recommends disciplinary action against members who violate regulations. Below the national level are 28 districts. corresponding to the 8 electoral districts, each with a as the polic\making bocdv and an exec:!tive hoard. Next are the workers' conimnncs, the principal local units, mainly in urban areas. "Their function is to coordinate hindraising, propaganda. :end training activities of the overt units factory clubs and residential associations �and the operations of the setui- clandestine cells, each consisting of three to 10 rem hers. The party's chief auxiliary organization. the Leftist youth Le:;guc�, bc�cance virtually dcfnnct in 1971 foll(ming its takeover b\ pro- Chinese elements "ho seceded from the party the \car before to form the Marxist- I,c�ninist Struggle League (MLK). Too MI.K supports the Communist Leaguc of Marxist- Leninists lKI'MI 1. another brcaka\\ay group that was formed in 1%7. Tliv \T K has no official women's organization, but the women's secretariit' in headquarters operates through various front groups. Tlic PK has been headed by -hairman Carl I Ic mik Ilermansson since january 1961, when he succeeded Ilildnng llagbcrg. if confirmed Stalinist, ho as chairman had followed the \Iosc�o\y line closely for nearly 13 \cars. Ilcrmansson, horn in 1917, is considerably *****er than much of the old guard. As leader of the revisionist faction. composed c�hiefl\ of *****er Com munisls, IlermanssoiCs immediate problem was to arrest the decline in the popular appeal of the Communists, hich had reached it low point in the 1962 local elections. I le addmssed himself to '�rejuvenatifig the parts and giving it a "ncss face." Farly in 1904 tlc Cornntuuists adopted it police designed to convince the electorate that they were a Bona fide Swedish party independent of \'IoscoN control, left- socialist ill political orientation, and committed to supporting democratic institutions. The success of the new tactics was evident ill the gains made bs the Communists in ;he clec�tious of 1964 and 1966, which appeared to mark the end of the political isolation experienced by them throughout much of the poshyar era. After sustaining great losses ill the 1968 election, Ilerniansson managed to restom momentum and captured 17 scats in the 1970 elections and if pivotal balance between leftist and bourgeois forces in the Riksdag. Ilernuutsson has an attrac�tivc personality and gives the impression of being representative of the n�w breed of Communists who now control the party His bourgeois background �he is married to the daughter of one of the country's higgest shipyard owners� appeals to many persons who :,-o ill d otherwise declin� to support a Icflist party. 19 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 IIvrnanssoi's tactics have aggravated frictions previonsiy existing within the party between the old guard Communists, who wish to naint:.ti close dependence on Mosc.rw, and the *****er revisionist elements, which have rebelled against what they consider otitnloded and ineffective policies. Lot the new principal opponent of f lernansson's ma deratte policies has been the small pro- Chinese leftwing centered in Goteborg; this group has accused Ilerrnansson of transforming the paartN into an appendage of the Social Democratic Party. ')espite gains in 1970, Ilermansson remains under attack by more radical dissident elements in the party. If the party should adopt a more radical platform at the next congress, there may he changes in the leadership. with youthful, dissident elements increasing their influence. c. Programs and policies A ne%% party program adopted by the congress in October 1972 was coached in stronger, more revolutionary language than the prograun adopted ill 1967. Previously the party had called for ;abolition of the value added tax, reductions ill military expenditures, and opposition to Conimon Market membership. The new program calls for complete abolition of the .trilled forces, formation of a people's Militia, which would replace the police, anci destruction of secret files belonging to the Security Police. 'I'll( party Wo"Id also nationalize c�omrncrcial hanks, large companies, and important industries, and confiscate extensive industrial holdings in the name of the people. The party was compelled to advocate nore radical solutions to it variety of problems in order to prevent dissident elenu from stealing the limelight popular issues. The party has undertaken it number of foreign policy initiatives, nrtinlc on Southeast Asia, but it has been unable to derive great advantage from this issue because of the governments decision to recognize Ifanoi and increase aid to Vietnam. In all probability Vietnam will continue to fade in importance as it foreign policy issue in Sweden, and the focus will shift to issues closer to home, such as membership in the Cormmon Market. The VPK advocates independence frorn both Moscow and Peking. Despite its announced intention to avoid choosing sides in the ideological dispute bctWeen the Soviet and Chinese parties, the VPK sharply condemned Moscow for the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. d. Press and finances The VPK has duly one daily newspaper, Norrskensflamnutn, which is published in Lulea and 20 had it circulation of only :3,400 in 1969. Its central organ is Ny Dar;, published twice weekly in Stockholm. Virtually the same edition is circulated in Goteborg and Western Sweden t% %ice tinder nder the banner Arbetar- Tidningen. The party publishes a theoretical quarterly called Socialistisk Debatt, which, like its other publications, has experienced financial difficulties. In the past the annual losses sustained by the Communist press have approached USS200,000, and the VPK has resorted to special membership assessments to keep its newspapers on the street. In addition to dues, the part\ has solicited contributions from the East Germans. its well as the Sur iets, and has established domestic commercial ventures to raise additional revenue. 6. Pressure groups Swedish pressure groups representing special occupational and economic interests have achieved semiofficial status through performing a number of functions for the government. 'I'll( most important are the LO, the TCO, the SAF, the Federation of Swedish Industries, the National Farmers Union, the Consumers (inoperative Union, and some associations among educators and religions leaders. It has become customary for the government to name representatives of these groups to the agencies that regulate activities affecting their interests. In addition, these groups are given opportunities to express their views to nienbvrs Of the cabinet, governnu�nl agencies, and parliamen- tary committees in connection with proposer] legislation. As it result of these institutionalized channels, lobbying in the U.S. sense has become largely unnecessary. 7. Electoral procedures Under an electoral reform instituted in 1970, local, provincial, and national elections are held concur- rently every :3 years. The responsibility for printing the ballots devolves upon the parties. Each party hands out three ballots: it yellow one for the Riksdag, it blue one for the provincial slate, and a white one for the local candidates. Blank pieces of appropriately colored paper may also be used by voters, who simply v, in the nature of the party and list their preferred candidates. As there are five major parties, each voter is offered it minimum of li ballots (factions within parties and new parties can sometimes increase the nrttmber of ballots). "I'hc name of the part\ is printed at the top of the ballot and it number Of candidates slightly in excess of the total nrtmber of seats available in the province or APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 locality, and the designated number of Riksdag seats apportioned to the voting district are listed on the appropriate ballots. The voter marks only his party's ballots and checks the candidates in order of preference. Voters may cross o ut names of candidates of whom they disapprove and, if they desire, may write in the names of candidates of their choice. Otherwise the voter simply selects the candidates in his order of preference. The ballots, marked in secret, are put in envelopes and dropped in boxes narked Riksdag, provincial council, and local council. The 350 members of the Riksdag represent the 28 electoral districts. The number of representatives elected from each district is based on population and is subject to reapportionment every 3 years. Sparsely populated Gotland sends only two representatives to the Riksdag, while Stockholm city has 36 Proportional representation is a fundamental aspect of Swedish politics, and although it may appear complex and cumbersome compared to the simple win -lose system in the United States, it assures that all parties of any significant size will be represented in the government. The formula for auditing the results is called the weighted -odd number method. The total votes polled by each party in a particular district are divided by 1.4, which has the effect of preventing the rise of very small p artie s. The party with the highest number of votes gets the first seat, and its total is divided by three. The second seat is awarded to the party -with the next highest number of votes, and then its total is divided by three. As the system progresses, the diminishing totals of successful parties are divided by five, then Seven, then nine, and So on, until all the apportioned seats are filled. Only 310 of the Riksdag seats are awarded in this manner. The 40 remaining seats are called compensatory seats and are allotted by determining the number of seats each part would have Lyon if the entire country had been considered as a single constituency Applying the weighted odd number method to these national totals, it is determined that the more popular parties would, nonetheless, have received more seats and, to compensate for their losses under the constituency tabulation, each party is awarded an appropriate share of the 40 seats. In order to prevent the prolife of sm all parties .which might detract from the effectiveness of the major parties, a barrier of =Iii of the national vote or 12`ii of a district vote must be realized in order for a party to receive any seats. The cut -off point is controversial, because it party that receives 49i of the national vote automatically qualifies for 14 seats in the Riksdag, while one that receives 3.9 �4 gets no seats. The extent to which the Swedish population participates in elections compares favorably with voter turnout in other Westem European democracies. Among the Scandinavian countries participation is about the sa as in Denmark and Norway, but less than in Iceland. A record was set in the 1968 national elections, when 4,862,000 voters, out of an electorate Of 5.445,01'0, or 89.3 cast ballots. By lowering the voting age to 20 for the 1970 elections, new voters obtaining eligibilih in 1970 increased the electorate to 5,643,1H)0, but only �1,976,000, or 88.2Si, participated. torrent legislation lx fore the Riksdag would lower the voting age to IS. a measure which is expected to result in increased votes for the Social Democrats. D. National policies (C) Swedish pe!itical life during the past four decades has been characterized by a relatively wide measure of agreement among the non Communist parties on basic domestic and foreign police questions. The traditional police of awned neutrality and nonalliance as it has evolved during the past century_ and a half remains the cornerstone of foreign police and commands the support of the Socialist and the non Socialist parties, except for a minority among the Moderates and Liberals. On domestic issues fundamental disagreements among the parties rei.iain. but they concern not so much the goals as the pace and scope of social and economic programs which have been developed by a succession of governments dominated by the Social Denucrtts. 1. Domestic Probably the dominant characteristic of Swedish political life especially with regard to domestic police, has been the tendency toward compromise and the effort to .:welop a broad consensus among the political parties. This has been particularly true of social and economic development during the past several decades and represents a melding of long -held Socialist views with the more liberal ideas held by some of the bourgeois parties. Swedish governments during this period have placed highest priority on maintaining fill employment, sustained econoric growth, price stability, and the achievement of self sufficiency adequate in the event of war. The setbacks suffered by the Social Democrats in recent elections, however, reveal xidespread voter dissatisfaction with the growing inflation and ever- higher taxes, thus necessitating some reordering of the priorities in the domestic program. Unemployment, while not a ?I APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 serious problem by U.S. standards, reached a seasonal high of nearly 451 in early 1972 and elicited official concern. In order to control inflation, while trying to achieve virtually full employment, the government continues to emphasize industrial expansion. Although the private sector still accounts for ov; r 90ci of the industrial output, government plan ers make their influence felt by channeling public investment into areas which contribute directly to achieving the national goals of full employment and industrial growth� construction. transportation, communica- tions, and the development of hydroelectric and nuclear power facilities. In 1966 the Social Democrats managed to pass legislation establishing it goyernnuvnt investment bank which provides capital to private companies, thus competing with private landing institutions and increasing the governments role in the private sector. Special tax provisions which alloy companies to sat aside up to 105(' of their profits in a tax -free reserve further enhance governmental influence ill industry. About one -third of this reserve may he used after 5 years, but the remainder may be used only with government permission. Authorization is given when the Labor Market Roars. a state agency, determines that the economy needs a boost. as it did in 1958, 1962, 1967, and 1971. Rising food prices, perhaps the most distitrbing aspect of inflation, prompted direct popular action reminiscent of less tranquil periods i: Swedish history. Boycotts of meat and milk were widespread and effective in Februar 1972. Without a significant role in agricultural production the government semed able to do little but to manipulate the few remaining agricultural subsidies and to ease or eliminate restrictions on foreign imports. While the ever mounting taxes are hardest on the large middle class, they are needed to finance the comprehensive but still expanding social welfare systern. Already one of the most pervasive and generous in the world, the social police of the government ranges over a broad field, including social insurance, comprehensive health care programs, family and ***** welfare, public relief, and labor placement and protection. Recent reforms in the already enlightened penal system have comn ended world attention. The last major reform in conventional social welfare was the enactment in 1959 of a compulsory retirement pension program for all workers to supplement the existing old -age pensions. The program provides retirement income equivalent to about two thirds of the average pay over it worker's highest paid 15 rears. 22 Perhaps the domestic issue on which the Social Democrats have been most vulnerable is the chronic housing shoring, that has plagued Sweden throughout the postwar period. housing construction was markedly steppe =d up in 1965, when the goal \vas set for the construction of 1 trillion new dwellings over the next decade. The government encourage('. builders to step up housing production b% offering incentives, such as advantageous financing, tax concessions, and priority procurement of materiel. About 82,000 new units were constructed in 1966; by 1968 the goal of 100,000 units annually was exceeded. as it was in the 2 follo%yirg years. !laving achieved its immediate objectives in housing, the emphasis is now shifting toward providing more spacious d%%eIlirags for gro%%ing numbers of Swedes. The Moderates, for example, anticipate that rising expectations in an essentially free economy will bring an increased demand for bonne ownership; about 50 of urban residents still rent their apartments. The importance of foreign trade �it accounts for approximately one fourth of the gross national product �is an underlying factor in efforts to maintain international exchange stability. The government accords national trea tment to foreign firths operating through incorporated Swedish subsidaries.. but maintains strict control over foreign acquisition and exploitation of natural resources and the operation of certain services. Sweden's cyentuol relationship \%ith the EC, which absorbed 28'(' of its total exports ill 1971, is of great national concern. At present, the government is pledged to seek a relationship with the EC: consonant with Sweden's neutrality. 2. Foreign Despite their neutral position, most Swedes identify themselves with the ideals and aspirations of Western liberal democracy. They are repelled by the repressive policies which have characterized the Communist regimes of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In the late 1940's Sweden was faced with a fundamental decision on the question of retaining its traditional policy of nonalliance or seeking security in a larger defensive grouping, such as NATO. After intensive public debate, it was clear that majority opinion favored continuation of the policy of neutrality. Subsequent efforts ,it the part of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark to join in a Scandinavian defense alliance came to naught when the latter two countries decided to join NATO. Despite its position otntside NATO, Sweden has taken a favorable view toward the organization and has regarded it as it deterrent. to Soviet aggression against members and APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 r nonmembers alike. The division of Scandinavia between numbers of NATO and neutral nations has handicapped to some extent Sweden's policy of expanding the traditionally close ties which have existed a nong thorn. While Danish and Norwegian membership it NATO precludes close cooperation in the political and defense fields, this has been offset to sortie degree by the wide range of common policies pursued by thcsc countries in the economic, social, and cultural fields. This cooperation has been expanded to include, for example, common membership in the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the Nordic Council, free movement of Scandinavian nationals within the area, and the trend toward reciprocity and harmonization of policies covering a wide range of activities, particularly in the labor and social welfare fields. Aside from the value of promoting close ties among the Scandinavian countries, the Swedish Government considers that these tics have great significance, because the\ enable Finland to strengthen its connections Westward in a manner least likely to arouse Soviet suspicion and opposition. In line with the high priority Sweden places on maintaining an independent Finland on its frontiers, Swedish statesmen believe that the nations policy of neutrality and nonalliance affords it some leverage in alleviating some Soviet pressures on Finland. Next to its Scandinavian ties, Sweden attaches greatest importance to rnetnbership in the United Nations, which it joined in 19.16. A staunch supporter of the United Nations, Sweden provided the organization with its second secretary general, the late Dag Hammarskjold, and is an active participant in a wide range of the organizatio�i's activities. It is a strong supporter of the U.N. peacekeeping activities and has provided troops for this purpose in Cyprus, the Middle: East, and the Congo. Sweden has also been in the forefront in promoting disarmament. As a re spected neutral, S%veden has sought to provide responsible leadership for the sm -iller nonnuclear states by seeking ways to persuade the major powers to take meaningful steps toward disarmament. The problems of the former colonial areas are followed with great interest, and Swe has been a strong advocate of aid and assistance to the less developed countries. The government takes the position that the United Nations should administer aid programs and fa%ors the eventual termination of bilateral assistance agreements. ,weden sittaportti 16- principle of it? sal inbership inn the world ""c,,uization. On tions involving furrier colonial areas, it ha frequently sided with the A fro- Asmii nations. Although occasionally at odds with the United States on a number of issues facing the United Nations. Sweden visually has sought to play a useful, humanitarian role in the world body. Sweden has been a strong supporter of several nonmilitary regional organization% and has viewed membership i them as consistent with its policy of nonalliarice. Stockholm maintains close relations with its Nordic neighbors, with which it cooperates in a wide range of economic. social, a nA cultural problems. Most joint enterprises Kaye been conducted under the auspices of the Nordic Council, which Sweden helped to found in 1932. Sweden is also a member of the Council of Europe atd maintains missions to the EC and the European Atomic Energy Community (F.URATOM) in Brussels, and to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in Luxembourg. Sweden was a charter tneinber of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OE:EC) and remains a member of its successor, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In addition, Sweden is a rnemberof some 20 other international organizations dealing with trade, transportation, communications, energy, finance, science, and health. 'I'll(- creation of the Common Market in 1937 and its subsequent development have necessitated major revisions in traditional Swedish trade policies. Swedish leaders have tended to view the EC with suspicion, fearing that its policies would he discriminator\ and harmful to commercial interests, and that it would eventually divide Europe into two competing trade blocs. The EC also presents a difficult political choice: Sweden most weigh the economic importance of retaining access to the large markets of the recently expanded organization against the passibility that closer ties to the EC would require Sweden to accept certain elements of the Ronne 'treaty_ that would compromise its traditional neutrality. S\\eden was able to offset some of the economic impact of the EC by joining EFTA in 1960, but the outlook for that organization is uncertain in view of the decision in 1972 of three of its members� Denmark, Irelartd, and the United Kingdom �to join the EC. More than 3010 of Sweden's imports and exports are subject to EC tariffs as a result, and unless the Riksdag ratifies the draft free trade agreement with Brussels, the Swedish economy will stiffer. One alternative: that has been considered is to revive the Nordic Economic onion (NORDEKI concept. A major preoccupation of Swedish foreign policy is the maintenance of good relations with the Soviet t 'lion, but thi" goal has tended to he elusive because 23 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 of tile tensions in Europe engendered h the East -West struggle. Sweden's concern about relations with the U.S.S.R. derives esscriti.-fly from its proximity and overwhelming military preponderance in the Baltic area. In tit(- early post -World War II period and at the height of the (;old War. Soviet- Swedish relations were little more than formal:w correct and were characterized b\- periods of extreme chill. Notable were developments such as the Wallenberg case (the Swedish diplomat who disappeared during the Sowi(.t "liberation" of Budapest in 1945 and subsequently died in a Soviet prison), the destruction of Swedish reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic in 1952, and the frequent seizure bw the U.S.S.R. of Swedish fishing vessels. During the intervening years there have been brief periods of relative relaxation, but more usually periods of tension, as occurred in the .wake of the� Hungarian uprising, Kitrushehev's tit re atening actions against Berlin and Finland, revelations of Soviet espionage in Sweden, and the Cuban missile crisis. The Swedes were optimistic when the more pragmatic and businesslike team of Brezhnev and Kosygin assumed power, but hopes were dashed by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968. Seasoned by the tips and downs in relations with Moscow during the postwar era, the Swedish Government continues to try to reach practical agreements .which would I)e mutually profitable and contribute to maintaining Northern Europe its an area removed from direct involvement in the competition between East and West. A series of governmental, military, and labor union exchange" A -la\-ed since 1968, has served to supplement thei, Jleorts. In direct contrast to the climate of fear and suspicion %which has generally characterized Sweden's relations during the emergence of the superpower next door, relations with the United States have for the most part been relatively good. Fostered by the emigration in the latter 19th century of more than a million Swedes to the United States, where the\ settled and prospered, this rapport was further strengthened by U.S. military involverent in Woriel War If and subsequent economic aid to Europe after the war. Relations began to take a downw.ird trend in the mid 1960's, as Swedish opinion became increasingly critical of U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, Sweden's inclination to regard itself as the� "conscience of the world" and the vehement denunciations of the United States by Swedish Imblic figures and the media led to a further deterionttion in relations in J%8 and tit c1 .inn to recall the U. Arubassador. The Sovie ,,,.Sion of Czechoslovakia later that year, along 1, signs that Sweden was 24 Facing it growing number of serious domestic problems, led to an easing of the previously sharp attacks on the United States. Although its official line may not on occasion reflect the basically friendly feelings of Sweden toward the United States, most Swedes continue to regard U.S. militar\ strength as the principal deterrent to troves by Nlosccn against NATO and other nun communist countries. The Vietnam conflict provides the main source of friction between the United States and Sweden. While most of tit( governments condemnation of the United States is couched in ternis of relieving the suffering of the \r'ietnames(. people, tile extrernc bias of the Swedish protests suggests that the Social Democrats are primarily concerned with e ncouraging leftist support on other issues. However, the government would probably wish to avoid allowing relations to deteriorate to it point that would again cause disruptio it, the normal. ambassador level representation. The Social Democratic administration may continue to use criticism of U.S. policy as a means of further;ng its own o.;jectives. A case in point was Prime Mie Palme's criticism of U.S. tariff increases in 1971. Stringent efforts to control inflation in Sweden caused increase unemployment and plant closures and engendered significant opposition to the Social Democratic programs. Palme countered domestic opposition by criticizing alleged changes in U.S. trade polio, to which he attributed Sweden's economic ills. The charges had little basis in fact but gave the government time to review its own domestic policy, which was subsequently altered. Such practical politics have not prevented the Swedes from supporting U.S. initiatives in the United Nations and other international bodies. Swedea has derived much favorable publicit, from its association with the Nobel Prizes. First award -d il! 1901, the monetary awards are presented to individuals who have served humanity hest in the five fields of physics, Chemistry, physiology or medicine, lite rature and peace. The latter prize is awarded in Oslo, while the ceremonies for the other four awards are held in Stockholm. Foreign policy formulation in Sweden is the responsibilit' of the cabinet in general and of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in particular. The minister is obliged by law toconsrtlt with the Foreign Relations Council of the Riksdag, which is composed of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Riksda/;, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the King, who presides. The council meets approximately six times it Year or when a serious foreign policy issue requires an extraordinary session, and meetings are always held in carnera. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 3. Defense As in the other democracies of Western Europe, the military establishment is clearly subordinate to the popularly elected civilian government. Although military officers frequently ittenipt to Irlfluelict' and mold public opinion un matters relating to defense, thev have little direct influence in making national policy. Defense poliev is formulated by the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, who is appointed by the Minister of Defense, in coordination with the Joint Chiefs Committee, consisting of the commanders of the three armed services and the Chief of the Defense Staff. Traditionally defense matters are regarded as being above: narrow partisan interests. The non Communist parties have cooperated openly in formulating defense policy, but this pattern was broken in May 1972, when the Social Democrats used Communist support to push through a pared -down 5- year defense plan with all three bourgeois parties in opposition. The main objective of defense policy is to keep Sweden's military strength at a level high enough to convince any potential aggressor that an armed attack would be extrernely costly. This policy assumes that Swedish autharities would have sufficient warning to mobilize the defense forces, and that invasion would he only a part of a larger invasion of Scandinavia and the NATO countries. It; this event Sweden would expect to receive aid from the NATO powers. The government faces the difficult problem of meeting the rising costs in the politically important social welfare sector of the budget by instituting cutbacks elsewhere, with defense expenditures the most likely target. There is evidence that the government will try to hold the line in the fire(- of rising defense costs and will avoid in actual reduction in defense expenditures. In order to provide for the procurement of modern weapons in a period of inflation and rising costs. Sweden may resort to such measures as reducing the conscription period �a cost cutting device currently being conside b% a number of other Western European countries. Savings in training could be diverted to the aircraft industry for research and development of new generation aircraft. The recent conclusion of an agree oil Berlin, the conclusion of the agreements of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, togethe ith the marked easing of tensions in Europe, hax. -ngthened the hand of domestic critics who oppose "unnecessary expendi- tures" on the militarv. Sweden has one of the most elaborate civil defense systems in Western Europe, having a higher per capita expenditure for this purpose than any other non- Communist country. Government planning assumes there will be no capitulation to the enemy and calls for the speed% evacuation of nortessenFal persons front likely urban target areas. Those remaining in the cities Nvould he given refuge in large conventional shelters as well as in the reinforced basements which are required in every school, hospital, factory, office building, and apartment building. In the 1 �1 largest cities enornwus community shelters capable of accommodating over 2 million persons have been built underground, with SO feet or more of solid ;ock cover. The shelters are designed to permit tiler,' to be used for storage and other purposes during peacetime and are capable of being quickly converted to shelter use in an emergency (Figure 6). In addition, special underground control centers have been established to assure functioning of the various gove c,genc�ies larder wartime conditions. Military expenditures for 1971 72 reached US$1.2 billion, or about I 1 of the central government budget and TWA r of the gross national product (GNP). Estimates for fiscal 1973 indic that the proportion of funds allocated for defense purposes will decline. The following tabulation shows the percentage of the GNP budgeted for defense in selected West European countries in 1970: Belgium 3.1 Denmark 2.8 Germany 3.8 Netherlands 3.9 Norway 3.9 SWEDEN IT United Kingdom 5.8 NOTE �NATO percentages were taken from State Department/1 N R/ Research Study /RSGS -4/ 14 March 1972. The percentage for Sweden is based on approximate defense expenditures. E. Threats to government stability (S) 1. Discontent and dissidence Sweden's stable and open society offers few opportunities for the growth of subversive organiza- tions capable of presenting a serious threat to the state. The absence of dcepseated social and economic grievances universal literacv, and a standard of living second to none in Europe have contributed to the development of a socially and politically stable society in which all political parties except the Communists are committed to democratic principles. Nevertheless, the growing spirit of detente between 25 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 East and West tilts caused an increasing inimber of Swedes to Frclieve that the Soviet threat has diminished. The growing radicalization of Swedish youth lilts caused the government to nurclify its former cool attitude towltrd the Soviet ['nion..1t present this trend does not appear to present it threat to democratic institutions in swedes. 2. Communism The Pltrty of the Left- Communist is the only well organized group with any potential for unde rmining the securit rrf the slate. Iloweyer. its strength in the Riksdag is far below the level that would afford the part) even a remote chance of gaining a formalized voice in go\ernrnent councils. Furthermore, its extralegal suhversiye potential tends to he neutntlized by the awareness of the government, organized labor, and most of the general public to the tactics and ofojectiyes of the Communists. 'I'hc popular support enio\ed by the Communists dropped drastically after World \N%ir 11, and the party still attempts to persuade the electonrte that it r 't it tool of Soviet interests and that it is a hue.. A- Swedish political party committed to change through Icga! politica! processes. For a discussion of the overt role of the pithy see above, under Political Dynamics. The part} has always placed highest priority on attempting to infiltrate organized labor in order to be 26 able to disntpt the econnnty and \\eAen the strong ties between labor and the Social Deinncr.ttic P;trty. National, prow :nciA. and local governments are relatively free of (;o ill ntttnist infiltration. considemb1c number of r:onurtunists have entered the civil service, from which they iii- not excluded, but there is no evidence tlt ;tt they have attained higher level positions. Although the part\ lilts representlttiyes in the Riksdaa, they have been denied access to classified infornrtliun relating to national defense mid foreign polic on the grounds that their political loyalties are suspect and that it would fre inappropriate to disclose information ltf feet ing Sweden's sec rtrity t members of a subversive orgmiization. b\ concerted action of lh(� non Communist parties. the (;onttnunists have h( denied membership on Irtrliament try committees dealing with sensitive subjects; when foreign polic} is debated in the Riksdag classified information is not made available to Conununist representatives. Tight sec urity perctice is believed to have kept Cotnmttnist infilinttion within the defense establishment to u relatively low level. Communists entering the armed seryic(,s through the draft ary placed in nonsensitiye hosts, and known part\ nicmbers are barred from officer training. background investigations for entploees of the defense establishment and in other sensitise areas are conducted log the police in cooperAion \%ith the counterintelligence arm of the APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 FIGURE 6. The Katarinaberget bomb shelter in Stockholm can hold 17,000 people. Used as a garage, it has also a drive -in bank and a gasoline station. (U /OU) i a Defense� Staff. Individuals in highlN sensitise pmiticros are subject to periodic investigation by the Sectatity Police, which was responsible for the detection of master spy Colonel Stig Weunerstrum in 196:3. The trade union movement. which is closely associated with the Social Democratic Party, rermains it primary target of Communist penetration. As of 1961 the Swedish Communist Party had reportedIN succeeded in infiltrating some 2,000 parry members into the trade unions, %%ith the objective of obtaining information on the Social Democratic Party's plans and activities. ConttntaniQ penetration has been greatest in the unions representing the forest, mining, metal. construction. and transportation workers. Communist control, however, has been limited to approximately 80 of the more than 90X1 trade union locals affiliated through various federations with the I,O. The part has not succeeded in capturing an% of the 29 national federations affiliated with the LO, nor has it obtained representation clu the general council or executive board of the Lo. In its continuing effort to attract ne%% members, the Communist part relies heavily on front organizations for the dissemiu;ttion of propaganda in behalf of its own causes and those sponsored by the Soviet Communist Parh "These fronts are composed largely of Corm and fel!o%% travelers and are designed to enlist the support of non- Communists who are symPathetic to the� Communist position oil ecrtain issues. Thr two most important fronts are the Swedish Peace Committee and the Association for the Promotion of Cultural and Economic Relations between Sweden and tit(. Soviet Union. The Swedish Peace Committee, founded it, 1919 as a local branch of the Cormunist- dominated World Peace Cotancil, was the host in Stockholm for t%%o congresses of the council �the meeting in 19.30 that launched the Stockholm Peace Appeal ::rd it 1954 conference for the r+mlaxation of international tensions. In 1966 it was host for a meeting ill Stockholm of Communist and pacifist groups to launch "a world campaign to stop the war in Vietnam." In recent \cars such activities have been overshadowed by the activities of the S.vedish !'ictmant Committee, which includes several extremely leftwing Social Democrats. The Association for the Promotion of Cultural and Economic Relaticmts between Sweden anti the Soviet Union is a friendship socieh' w?th the avowed purpose of promoting contacts beh%een the two countries through exchanges of artists, scientists, students, and members of labor. sport, and women's organizations. It :also conducts liussian language courses and serves as the chief agency for distributing noncommercial Soviet films. The association reported1% seers as a channel for funds proN ided by Communist coalltries to the SN%edislt Communist part, 3. Extremist groups Sweden's traditional tolerance of activity by individuals representing a wide range of the political spectrum has led to it proliferation of extremist groups of marginal importance on the national polite, -al scene. Most if these groups are comprised of leftwig theorists who have split off front the Communist part) for reasons of ideology, or y,tasi- fascists bitterly opposed to Sweden's brand of social democracy. After splitting off from the Communist part\, muut% of the left extremists have stafdividcd over the Sino- Soviet split. I'll(- KFNIL, it recognized political part\ that received only 0.4!71 of the \cite� in 1970, split in 1970. The pro Maoist element formed the K FM L(r the "r" stands for revolutionary. The same \car the Clarte Federation, a Swedish briiach of the French Clarte moyc nac'nt founded in 1919 to promote understanding between socialist parties, subdivided and formed it more orthodox :onrrmunist faction called the Clarte M -1, (for Marxist- Leninisti. 'f'he United National Liberation Front Groups heads the liberation nimements and is believed to have peen involved in the more violent anti American protests in Sweden over the Viehiatn issue. Students for a Democratic Society, the MLK, the Trotskyite Federttiott of fievolutionary Marxists, and the .anarchists Federation of Sweden are all part of the extreme left Most of these organizations try to iofiuence students, conscripts, auu naentbers, and nearly all of them publish propaganda tracts. "Their membership and scope of operations are very small, and they pose virtually no threat to government stabilit 'I'hc� same is true for the various rightwing organizations which have been credited with occasional anti Semitic acts. Three of the inost prominent organizations among the Fascist groups are the Neo- Swedish Movement, the Nordic National Part, and the liberal Union Party. Sweden has had far more trouble from e :uigre groups to which it offers asyhun than fron; its native extremists. Of particular concern are the violence prone Yugoslav enigres, who assassinated the Yugoslav Ambassador in Stockholm in 1971 and reportedly placed a bomb on board it Yugoslav airliner before it departed Stockholm for Belgrade in 1972. Such terrorist activities are ;lien to tilt Swedes amd eta\ cause the government to reconsider its liberal police of accepting exiles, particulariy those who advocate violetwe as it means of redressing grievances. 21 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 F. Maintenance of internal security (S) t. Police The maintenance of la\\ and order is facilitated b\ the relative stability of social and ecUmnmic c�rnnditions. The police are honest and efficient. Although subject to fairly frequent e\alualions and criticism by the public and the news media, the\ enjoy a greater treasure of respect !hall do their co IIvagoes it almost any other \Vestern European eouulr\ outside of Scandinavia. Tl'itditionall\ more decentralized than else\\here ;n Europe, the police s\�slem, because of "inc�reasiug problems altenaing the naaimtenance of public order in it complex, modern, industrialized nation," \\,ts full%� nationalized only ill 1965. :vnIralized coordination was required hvcattse of the gro\\ing geographic nobility and acute problems of road traffic control (S\\eden ranked third among the stations of the world ill per capita automobile Ownership, with 8 automobiles per 100 population ill 1969) and the complexities inherent ill modern crtmd control and crime dovo. and prevention. The openness of the government process, as Well as some� built -in restraints at butts the national ;uul the local levels, assures protection from possible police abrtse. \t the national level it command group plans and coordinates all polio- efforts. The National Police Board, consisting of the (thief of the National Police, Isis deputy, and six la\ mendwrs appointed b\ the Ding- in- :oumcil, heads the eonstnancl group. \II Policy decisions must be approved b, the board, and the activities of the conusartd group are under the :miJanl scrutiny of the Minislcr of Justice. B\ constitutional la\w all dotmestic official plans and doctunents, except the fee\\ that 111,1\ be classified '�secret for limited, specified reasons, are public proper!. and are available to the press. Loc police chiefs are (directly� acc�o lit tit No. to the rational authority and in administrative matters to the provincial governor. Under the (thief of the National Police are ifree special assistants or chiefs, each heading it separate (department (1';gurc 7), lVice Bureau I Of Department A has nationwide responsibility for the planning and coordination of suryeillamc�e ;tcliVihes and the protection of life a property. Specifically, it hits irisdictiou over yefaicnlar traffic, civil arnned guards, patrol activities, alien control, and social policy work. Contingency planning for tntilizotion of the entire police force, the armed forces, and the civil defense cstablishtnetnt in the event Of' \yar is coordinaWd ?5 through this hurcau. hdic�c Bureau 1 1 has national jurisdiction over tlu� crimiva! police, inducting those concerned \\ith both the suppression and detection of crinu�. Th(� National (lomic�ide Commission, under the jurisdiction of this bureau, coordinates and supervises countr\\wide investigative procedures in imst;uu�es of diffictnll murder cases and serious violent crime,. TIiv bureau also tn;tinlaius c�ontac�t \with INTEIIN)l., Tliv two bureaus of Department B are msponsible for teclnnoIog and Iruiuing, and I :epartmenl C is concenied \\ith administrative alld legal matters. In keeping with the gradual centralization of the police, an ama;algannation of locid police autho,rit\ has deyelopc(d since the earl\ post\\ar \cars. \chest there \\ere 7 00 seniaulouonu,ns police districts. By 1962 the number of districts had been redttctO to 562, \\ith it total of 909 police stations. In 19 S\\eden had reduced administration l0 119 police districts, \\ill just o\( 500 police stations. Fach of the districts is headed b\ a chief constable. Pulic�e chiefs in the 1) royimces it it(', Stock Itoltit coordinate all protection, surycillance, and criminal \\ark among the districts under their jurisdiction. Addilionall\, both men and horses of the special maotsnted police divisions for riot and general er(md control stationed in Stockholm, Goteborg, and Malmo may be transported rapidl\ to ;u) place of potential need. \n exception to the general pattern of enhanced public security has been the detuonstration: since the latter 1960's b\ both resident foreigners and S\%vdish nationals against certain foreign enbassies in Stockholm. The S\%vdish Government ha, responded b contracting \\ith a private org ;mization to furnish guards, eolttipped \\ith ra(Iios, at i lit porlait t inter section, throughout entba>s\ re,\\. Their job is to r;kdio for regular police in the e\�enl of a sport :uteous demonstration or attack. Another mlati\c I\ serious disrtptio of public order kwcurred in 14170), Mien dissident youths ill Stockholm and other principal cities ;unpaged throttgl IFte business districts, \andali�ring and looting stores. The rioters took advantage of it nationwide 2 day "sick out" occasionc(I b\ police dissatisf;ction With the practicer of assigning junior officers to tempor;try positions of' authority \\thou cotnme�nsurate increases in salar\. Successful bargaining be raven lino Polioc Union and the authorities�probabl\ heiped by tlu� disorders quickly resolved the probleun. 'I'eehnical and training facilities are of ;a high order. The Natiorai Institntc of 'fechnir;I Police in Stockholm is responsible for technical criminal investigation and research for the courts, public APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 25X1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 25X1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 25X1 by the National Central Bureau of Statistics in Stockholm, contains detailed and comprehensive figures on nearly all aspects of economics and social affairs. The Yearbook of Nordic Statistics 1970, published by the Nordic Council, provides a comparative statistical frame for all the Nordic countries. Stockholm's Enskilda Bank publishes a a 32 ready reference called Some Data About Sweden (19;0 -71), with charts and graphs of various business indicators. For worldwide comparisons the UN Statistical Yearbook includes entries on Sweden in ruarly every category. Biographical information on many Swedish personalities is found in Vern or det (1971), the Swedish Who's Wilo. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 I Chronology Wou) 800 -1060 Swedish Viking expeditions head eastward. Rurick founds Russion state at Kiyev about 862). 829 -1160 Christianity comes to Sweden. 1157 -1293 Conquest of Finland takes place. 1397 The Union of Kalmar brings the kingdoms of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark under one crown and endures desultorily until c. 1520. 1435 The first parliament Riksdag) is convened, comprising representatives of the mobility, clergy, burghers, and Peasants. 1523 Sweden becomes an independent national state under Gustav Vasa as King. 1630 -48 Sweden battles with brilliant success in the Thirty Years' War, losing King Gustavus Adolphus at the battle of Lutzen in 1632. 1809 Sweden surrenders Finland to Russia. June Sweden obtains a new constitution, the Instrument of Government, the first of four fundamental laws on which the present political system is based. 1810 August Jean Baptiste Bernadotte, one of Napoleon's marshals, is proclaimed heir apparent to the Swedish throne by the Riksdag; he assumes the crown in 1818 as Charles XIV John. September The Act of Succession, the second fundamental law, is adopted, confirming the Bernadotte line on the male side as heirs to the throne. 1814 January Denmark is forced to cede Norway to Sweden by the Peace of it iel. A 2 -month war with Norway, Sweden's last, brings Norway into union with Sweden. 1866 January The Riksdag Act, the third fundamental law, is adopted, replacing the old representative assembly with .its four estates by a bicameral body. 1882 Swedish emigration constituting 20% of mean popula- tion between 1860 and 1930) to the United States reaches its peak. 1889 April The Swedish Social Democratic Labor Party is founded. 1905 May Union with Norway is dissolved. 1914 -18 Sweden maintains neutrality in World War I. 1919 Universal suffrage is attained with granting of vote to women. 1920 March The first Social Democratic cabinet is formed under Hialmar Branting. 1932 October The Social Democrats become the ruling party and form a government under Per Albin Hansson. 1939 -45 Sweden maintains neutrality in World War 11. 1946 November Sweden joins the United Nations. 1948 April Sweden becomes a charter member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, later the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 1949 The Freedom of the Press Act, the fourth fundamental law, updates previous laws safeguarding liberty of the press. 33 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 1952 March Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Iceland create the Nordic Council joined by Finland in 1955). 1960 March The Riksdag ratifies Swedish membership in the European Free Trade Association. 1961 December Sweden applies for associate membership in the European Economic community. 1966 September The governing Social Democratic Party suffers a sharp setback in the provincial and municipal elections. 1967 May The International War Crimes Tribunal, sponsored by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, convenes in Stock- holm purportedly to investigate the extent and nature of "U.S. aggression in Vietnam." 1968 February Olof Palme, Minister of Education, marches alongside North Vietnamese diplomats in an anti- American demon- stration in Stockholm. .34 September Social Democrats win a clear majority in elections for the Riksdag. 1969 January Sweden recognizes North Vietnam. October Palme succeeds Tage Erlander as chairman of the Social Democratic Party and assumes leadership of the govern merct. D member Miners in Kiruna begin 2 -month long wildcat strike. 1970 September In first elections under electoral reform, Social Democratic Party loses clear majority but retains control of govern- ment. 1971 January New unicameral Riksdag convenes for first session. 1972 J� -uary Housewives demonstrate against high food prices. June U.N. Enviro C `iference is held in Stockholm. December Sweden rhtilift free tracl< Rreement with the European COM11lllll10"K, Sw'edrn re-- onizes East Germany. APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6 SECRET Glossary (u/ou) ADMEVIA-rZON SWEDESH ENcLtsa ABF Arbetarnes bildninsuforbu Workers Educational Association ***** DFFG Centerpartiet De Forenadc'-V�_ Central Party JPPerna United National Liberation Front FP F 1k -ad Groups F1 O;RJ W Fa Fund Liberal Party Liberal Youth League KDS itch Arwa&mr,.,j �ling Christian Democratic Union KF Mjjjjj F f Consumers Cooperative Union KFML K 0,06WdSAA I Marxist- Communist League of Marxists- LO AMWof M4 Land4,, Leninists MLK Marxistt Federation of Trade Unions -,T. aamPforbtjndet Marxist-Leninist Struggle League MP Moderatasarnhngsj)artiet Moderate Coalition Party RLF Riksforbundct Landsbygdens Folk National Farmers Union SAF Svenska arbetsgivareforeningen Swedish Employers Confederation SAP Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbeta- Swedish Social Democratic Workers reparti Party (Social Democratic Party) SIF Sveriges industriforbund Federation of Swedish Industries SKP Sveriges Kommunistiska Parliet Swedish Communist Party SSU Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Ungdoms- Swedish Social Democratic Youth forbundet Association TCO Tian-stemannens Gentralorganisation Central Organization of Salaried Em- ployees VPK Vansterpartiet Kommunisterna Party of the Left�Communist Places and features referred to in this Chapter (U/OU) SECRET 35 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090019-6 COORDINATES O 0 X 0 'E. Gbteborg 57 43 11 5s hinkiiping. I 57 47 14 11 Kiruna 67 5 1 20 13 I'lliell 65 3.4 22 10 1,111111 55 42 1:3 11 MaJ1116 M 36 13 00 Norrk6ping 58 36 1 11 Stockhohn 5A 18 03 Sundsv all 62 23 17 18 L' "'ell 63 50 20 15 Uppsala 59 52 17 38 SECRET 35 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200090019-6 SECRET SECRET 1 APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA- RDP01- 00707R000200090019 -6