Imm
PRECEDENCE

Unclas
CLASSIFICATION

FOR COMMCENTER USE ONLY

DEX
DAC 222/08
LDX
PAGES 7
TTY
CITE
DTG
291438Z

FROM: The Situation Room
TO: Bremer for Sec Kissinger
Rodman for Gen Scowcroft
INFO: De Cair for Ziegler
+ Warren

RELEASED BY: DK

TOR: 291540Z

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

All addresses in Oreanda
TOHAK 60

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

⑤

A 8 Saturday, June 29, 1974 THE WASHINGTON POST

Soviets Modify Nixon's Stress on 'Personal Relationship'

Washington Post Foreign Service

MOSCOW, June 28—The Soviet Union indicated today that it did not agree entirely with President Nixon's evaluation of the importance of his personal relationship with Soviet Communist Party Chief Leonid I. Brezhnev.

Though convinced of the importance of this relationship in the recent history of Soviet-American relations, the Soviets appear unwilling to describe the future of existing Soviet-American agreements or detente generally in terms of personalities.

This distinction—indirectly expressed in today's Soviet press—appears to reflect the Soviets' General attitude toward Mr. Nixon's domestic difficulties. On one hand, the Soviets want to help the President in any way they can; on the other, they do not want the Soviet public to think that the future of detente depends on Mr. Nixon.

The Soviets conveyed this message with a subtle bit of editing of Mr. Nixon's toast at a Kremlin banquet, last night in his honor. Mr. Nixon expressed the opinion that existing Soviet-American treaties and agreements "were possible because of a personal relationship that was established," between himself and Brezhnev.

Moreover, the president went on, existing treaties would undoubtedly be fulfilled and new agreements negotiated "because of our personal relationship."

When Tass, the government news agency, translated Mr. Nixon's toast for the morning Soviet newspaper, the latter sentence was altered.

The Tass version quoted Mr. Nixon as saying that existing Soviet-American agreements would be fulfilled and new ones achieved "as a result of the relations that have grown up between us." The word "personal"—which Tass used in translating the President's other references to a personal relationship—disappeared, so the phrase could be read as referring to the relations between two countries, not two men.

President Nixon's press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler, told a reporter later that the American side asked the Soviets about the mistranslation of Mr. Nixon's toast. "I expect to see 'personal relationship' in tonight's Izvestia," Ziegler said, referring to the official government paper which comes out in the evening.

Several hours later, however, Izvestia appeared carrying the original mistranslation.

Tass also dropped a reference to "next year" when it translated a remark of Mr. Nixon's about the next visit of Brezhnev to the United States. The President said this would come next year, but Tass made no predictions.

The Soviet spokesman for this summit conference, Leonid Zamyatin, who is director general of Tass, did happily join Ziegler in repeated references to the special "personal relationship" at a news briefing this afternoon.

"General Secretary Brezhnev and President Nixon have repeatedly emphasized the importance of their personal relationship," Zamyatin volunteered, as Ziegler looked on with a smile.

Only when questioned about Tass' editing of Mr. Nixon's toast did the Soviet spokesman take a different tack. He insisted that the translation of "personal relationship" was accurate—though the word "personal" had obviously been dropped—and accused this reporter, who asked him about it, of not understanding Russian.

The whole question of personal relationships among statesmen is a delicate one for the Soviets. Their Marxist ideology alleges that personalities play a minor role in international relations, but in practice they have often shown a weakness for Western statesmen they thought were sympathetic to them.

Gen. Charles de Gaulle was the best example of such a figure, despite his strong anti-communism and his decision to build a French nuclear force, De Gaulle was never criticized here.

Mr. Nixon has not fared that well, but he has become one of the Kremlin's favorites. Soviet officials have openly expressed their dismay at the course of the Watergate affair—which the Soviet press has never explained to its readers, apparently to avoid embarrassing Mr. Nixon.

Clayton Fritchey

Foreign Relations—After Fulbright



For more than four years, Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, strongly opposed the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy, especially as it related to Southeast Asia, but today few in Washington mourn the coming retirement of Fulbright more than the Secretary of State.

Since Dr. Kissinger took over the State Department last fall, he and the Democratic senator from Arkansas, who was defeated last month for renomination, have not only worked together harmoniously but have become good personal friends. It was made possible by U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam, the detente with Russia and China and the administration's effort to establish peace in the Mideast through a new deal with the Arab nations, all of which have long been favored by Fulbright.

It is no secret that in recent months the Secretary of State has privately as well as publicly consulted Fulbright on almost every administration move and, in the process, has kept the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a whole well informed on plans and operations. It has been a remarkable and constructive example of bipartisan foreign policy.

As an incidental result, Dr. Kissinger knows he can now count on getting a fair and sympathetic hearing when, at his request, Fulbright and the committee review for the second time the Secretary's role in the controversial White House wiretapping case.

If there is a silver lining to Fulbright's defeat, and the consequent loss of perhaps the most experienced and best-informed chairman in our time, it is the legacy of bipartisan independence he will leave behind, and, along with it, a renewed sense of committee responsibility and self-respect.

After a long period of being little more than a rubber stamp for the White House, the committee in recent years has been standing up to both Democratic and Republican Presidents (notably Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon), and, in the process, inspiring the Senate to reassert its constitutional role in the making of foreign policy.

Sen. John Sparkman (D-Ala.), who will become chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in Janaury, is no Fulbright. His tendency is to get along with whatever administration is in power, as exemplified by his support of the Vietnamese war. He will be surrounded, however, by determined colleagues. Sparkman says he doesn't believe in a "controlled committee." Moreover, as he adds, "You can't control it anyway—there are a lot of strong individuals on it."

The committee does include some of the most prominent senators of both parties. On the Democratic side there are two former presidential nominees (Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota and George McGovern of South Dakota) and a former vice-presidential nominee (Edmund Muskie of Maine). Just behind Sparkman in seniority is Majority Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana, and behind him is the young and forceful Frank Church of Idaho.

Church seems destined to be chairman in the not-too-distance future, for both Sparkman and Mansfield are in their 70s and probably won't run again. The other Democrats are all seasoned, influential senators: Stuart Symington of Missouri, Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island and Gale McGee of Wyoming.

The Republicans (all moderates or liberals) are headed by the venerable George Aiken of Vermont, one of the most respected men in the Senate. The others in order of seniority are the independent Clifford Case of New Jersey, Jacob Javits of New York (called the most "intelligent" member of the Senate), Minority Leader Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, James Pearson of Kansas, presidential hopeful Charles Percy of Illinois and Assistant Minority Leader Robert Griffin of Michigan.

Critics of the committee have recently argued that, as one wrote, it "has lost power to the relatively obscure, but more united, active and aggressive House Foreign Affairs Committee." The assessment is wide of the mark. The reason the House group is "relatively obscure" is that it deserves to be. It does not compare in caliber or performance with the Senate committee.

Where the House panel has been united chiefly in merely doing the bidding of the White House, the Senate committee has been united, often unanimously or near unanimously, in the boldest kind of independent action, such as successfully sponsoring the War Powers Act, which is designed to stop Presidents from plunging into wars without consulting Congress.

Under Fulbright and former Republican Sen. John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, the committee repealed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which Lyndon Johnson used to legalize the Vietnamese war. It led the fight to force U.S. withdrawal from Cambodia. It cracked down on military aid to military dictatorships. It encouraged the rapprochement with China and Russia.

In addition, it has put so-called executive agreements as well as formal treaties under sharp scrutiny. And, among other things, the creation of two new subcommittees headed by Sens. Church and Symington has extended the committee's influence over U.S. foreign bases and the rapid spread of powerful multinational corporations all over the world.

Walter Lippman once said that the removal of Fulbright from public life would be "a national calamity." When he leaves next year, however, the loss will be cushioned by the fact that he leaves a committee that is likely to carry on for some time in his unpartisan, independent tradition.

© 1974, Los Angeles Times

20

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

SALT: The Dangers in Deadlock

MOSCOW—Behind plush outward signs of cordiality greeting President Nixon here Thursday, there is no evidence of a break in the dangerous deadlock between the weakened President and the high-riding Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev on the crucial nuclear weapons question.

Indeed, it will take something close to a miracle for Mr. Nixon and his beleaguered Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to dent, much less break, the strategic weapons impasse now confronting the United States with a military-psychological threat unmatched in post-war history.

That threat was clearly spelled out in Kissinger's detailed presentation to Mr. Nixon and the National Security Council (NSC) in the White House last Thursday.

Using charts to show the potential explosion in numbers of Soviet long-range missile warheads starting in 1975, Kissinger's top-secret briefing posed this deadly threat: If Moscow moves ahead full speed to maximize production and deployment of its newly-tested cluster missiles (capable of carrying between 3 and 8 individually-targeted warheads or MIRVs on a single missile), the United States could find itself on the short end of a 6 to 1 Soviet lead in simultaneously launchable intercontinental warheads.

Any such frightening Soviet decision to "de-stabilize" the balance of offensive nuclear power agreed to in the 1972 "interim agreement" might conceivably mean its abrogating the agreement itself in 1975, two years before it runs out. That prospect, admittedly remote, has nevertheless been discussed within the U.S. government as a further hypothetical hazard.

Accordingly, the immense political and psychological advantages that would accrue to Moscow if it did decide to maximize its new technology by deploying its giant MIRV-able missiles (the SS-17, 18 and 19) as fast as possible are causing deepest concern.

Moreover, Kissinger's strenuous efforts to convince Brezhnev & Co. that the mere threat of this potential imbalance is unacceptable to the United States have failed. Although Kissinger told the NSC that Brezhnev may now be "intellectually prepared" to understand the absolute necessity of a ceiling on MIRV deployment, there is no guarantee Moscow will play along.

The very minimum deal, according to high American officials, would be agreement by Moscow limiting deployment of the giant new missiles to a maximum of 70 to 80 launchers a year, starting next year. As computed by Pentagon strategists, the maximum deployment rate could run higher than 200 a year. These would, of course, replace the existing generation of Soviet launchers with their single warheads.

The arithmetic is staggering. At maximum production and deployment rates, the Russians could deploy no fewer than 23,000 warheads or RVs (re-entry vehicles) on MIRVed missiles if each warhead were arbitrarily limited to an explosive force of 40 kilotons. At the same 40-kiloton payload, the United States by contrast would have only 4,500 warheads on its own, far less powerful MIRVed missiles. And this could be accomplished without breaking the 1972 "interim" agreement.

Yet the "conceptual" breakthrough and the hard negotiating on ceilings on RVs that Mr. Nixon is striving for may be far off. If so, the President will go to Congress on his return to warn that immediate escalation of U.S. strategic weapons programs is essential.

Slippage in the negotiating process since the strategic arms limitations agreement (SALT) was signed two years ago, including the interim offensive agreement, hints at intentional Soviet policy of continued deadlock.

It has been forgotten, for example that the June 1973 Washington summit produced the "basic principles of negotiations on the further limitation of strategic offensive arms." Explaining it, Kissinger said then that "it states a deadline for the completion of the agreement in 1974."

"The two leaders would not have made this formal statement," Kissinger said then, "if they did not believe that this goal was . . . attainable."

In fact, it is clearly not "attainable." Instead, the American objective has been drastically scaled down: persuading the Russians to grasp the point that the U.S. cannot accept the de-stabilizing impact of all-out Soviet deployment of MIRVed missiles. But Brezhnev may calculate that the scandal-weakened American President is too eager to avoid a setback in detente, his main defense against impeachment, to risk the showdown that seems to be so essential here.

© 1974, Field Enterprises, Inc.

(3)

NIXON AIDES SPLIT ON MISSILE PACT

Kissinger and Schlesinger Arguing Over What Is Attainable in Moscow

By LESLIE H. GELB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 28 — President Nixon flew to Moscow with his two principal advisers on national security still in disagreement over what would constitute an acceptable accord now to limit strategic nuclear weapons, high Administration officials have disclosed.

These officials described Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger as having the kind of fundamental differences where neither can be shown to be right or wrong. "It is a matter of judgment," one high official explained, "and the President has a clear choice."

Both Secretaries want a comprehensive agreement eventually. But Mr. Kissinger believes the United States should press for a limited agreement now to restrain the deployment of more nuclear warheads, known as MIRV's, for multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles.

Mr. Schlesinger, on the other hand, is arguing that a limited accord reached in Moscow could prevent the achievement of a comprehensive treaty later.

Mr. Schlesinger favors an agreement that would limit the number of missiles, base limits on MIRV's on the sizes of missiles, and limit the number of bombers and the size of strategic nuclear forces in and around Europe.

Mr. Kissinger favors such an agreement but insists that the Russians will not sign one now and seeks an agreement that he feels can be signed.

From the day the Presidential

Continued on Page 10, Column 3

4

Nixon Aides Split on Missile Pact With Moscow

Continued From Page 1, Col. 7

party left Washington, the two Secretaries or their subordinates have continued to air their varying views through news conferences and news leaks. Mr. Kissinger has been arguing the need for at least an agreement in principle now. Military officials have been warning about military security being sacrificed to a diplomatic triumph.

Nothing could be learned about the President's attitude or even whether he has already made a decision. Mr. Schlesinger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented their recommendations annd Mr. Kissinger his at a meeting of the National Security Council last Friday. Mr. Nixon presided, but, according to sources, no decisions were made then.

Another Factor

Another factor in the President's ultimate decision is that Mr. Kissinger is with the President, while Mr. Schlesinger remains in Washington and learns only what Mr. Kissinger is prepared to cable back.

Mr. Kissinger, in his news briefings, is apparently trying to assuage Pentagon sensitivities. He alternately plays up and plays down the chances of reaching any missile accord in Moscow, and when he plays it up, he stresses that the accord could be only a "statement of principles."

The Kissinger-Schlesinger dispute is not over the 1972 treaty limiting defensive missile systems on both sides or the proposal in Moscow now to further limit these systems.

Instead, the controversy is centered on the agreement, reached at the same time, to limit offensive nuclear missiles. This agreement, which does not cover weapons such as bombers and MIRV's, expires in 1977. The accord limits missile totals to 1,710 for the United States and 2,360 for the Soviet Union.

MIRV is the name for the part of the missile containing nuclear warheads that can be aimed at individual targets once it arrives over a target area. One missile can be used to destroy several targets, and such multiple-warhead missiles are more accurate than a missile with a single warhead.

The officials in Washington who revealed the split between the two Secretaries said they were doing so not to cause a public controversy but to insure that the two different approaches to the nuclear arms negotiations received a public hearing.

As disclosed by these high officials and confirmed in the State Department and the Pentagon, the dispute is over questions of timing, leverage, the score of the agreement, and what kind of accord Soviet leaders are likely to accept.

Acceleration Feared

Mr. Schlesinger argues that accords covering only parts of the arms race will inevitably lead to an acceleration of competition in weapons that are not included. He cites MIRV developments since the 1972 agreement as an example.

Mr. Schlesinger does not believe that it is possible to achieve a comprehensive accord in Moscow now. He thus maintains that the United States should continue its research and development programs for new weapons to be used as bargaining chips for a wider accord later.

The Defense Secretary contends that Moscow would be amenable to a comprehensive approach later when it has to confront the costs of matching American arms developments.

Mr. Kissinger responded to these arguments at the National Security Council meeting, saying that the Soviet Communist party leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, would not sign a comprehensive accord because Soviet Defense Minister Andrei A. Grechko would not accept it.

Kissinger's Argument

Mr. Kissinger argued that he wanted to negotiate something Soviet leaders would sign. His plan was to seek a simple extension of the present missile accord if, and only if, Moscow would agree to limit the deployment of its new large missile able to carry many MIRV's. The United States, in turn, would restrict its own further deployment. Controlling MIRV's, Mr. Kissinger maintained, was the immediate problem and the negotiable issue.

But the Pentagon and Mr. Kissinger remain divided on how to achieve such control. While the officials were vague on this subject, the dispute seems to be over allowable numbers of Soviet missiles able to carry MIRV's and verification of MIRV deployment.

Reports from oMscow confirmed in Washington indicate that Soviet-American discussions are, for the moment, focusing on MIRV's. The officials said the Soviet Union is willing to limit its MIRV deployments—predicted to begin soon—below the current American level of MIRV's if it can keep its lead in numbers of missiles in general and heavy missiles in particular.

The differences between Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Kissinger go beyond typical Pentagon-State Department disputes, in terms of the negotiating process, the two men are playing traditional roles. The Defense Secretary is arguing for a tough bargaining stance, and the Secretary of State is trying to negotiate what is negotiable.

But from the standpoint of the traditional arms control goal of conntaining strategic arms competition as a whole, Mr. Schlesinger might be viewed as the dove and Mr. Kissinger as either an owl or a hawk. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, officials related, has taken a position closer to Mr. Schlesinger's than to Mr. Kissinger's.

But perhaps the most unusual aspect of the situation is that a President embarked on a major negotiating venture without first ironing out basic compromises among his top advisers.

✓

Policy At Home And Abroad

By C. L. Sulzberger

WASHINGTON — Although Leonid Brezhnev has made it amply clear he is not concerned with American politics, the dismal Watergate scandal, or current attempts to cut down Henry Kissinger, there is little doubt that the impact of these affairs is bound to diminish results of the present Moscow summit talks.

Mr. Brezhnev let it be known prior to this meeting that he regarded President Nixon as United States chief of state with powers intact and that therefore the President and his famous diplomatic lieutenant were quite as able to negotiate as in any previous superpower colloquy. But while this may continue to be true in Soviet and other foreign eyes, the debilitating effect of successive crises is producing injurious repercussions abroad.

The United States is a glaring example of a political fact that plagues more than one country today, namely, that no society can nourish a crisis in authority for any extended period without paying some price. That price is expressed in limitations on the application of foreign policy.

■

The consequence is that at this particular Brezhnev-Nixon summit American hopes seem less ambitious than in the past and more intent on "rescuing" fundamental policy goals to be pursued later than in breaking new ground. It is all too evident that the President had lost momentum in his search for superpower détente before leaving for Moscow.

Political weakness at home has so far prevented him from making good on credits and advantageous trade conditions previously promised to Mr. Brezhnev. Now the argument over whether Mr. Kissinger was too generous in earlier SALT negotiations — a discussion hinting at differences between the Secretaries of State and Defense — further handicaps the U.S. position.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

It is impossible to know whether this fact in turn may embarrass Mr. Brezhnev. Despite his dominance of the Soviet scene, he has been indirectly criticized by Soviet hawks for placing too much stock in détente. Logically speaking, the obstacles holding up fulfillment of Mr. Nixon's pledges could give apparent reason to arguments of Soviet hard-liners. Certainly Moscow has recently backed away from co

its own way—[illegible]ow signs of internal weakness approximately equivalent to that of the United States and producing foreign policy reflections. These are massive China and tiny Israel, both curiously impinging upon the Soviet-American relationship.

■

The trend toward developing Sino-American friendship, so carefully worked out by Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai together with the Nixon-Kissinger team, has slowed down. A gap in authority has caused a sag in diplomatic effectiveness.

While Mr. Kissinger seems to have eluded efforts to reduce his personal role, the same is not true for Premier Chou whose influence has lessened. Revived factionalism in China has affected that country's present capacity to act much as the Watergate paralysis is hampering the United States.

This must clearly comfort Mr. Brezhnev's critics. The greatest conceivable threat in the minds of Soviet strategists is some kind of anti-Russian combination in which America and China are joined.

The role of Israel in U.S.-Soviet relationships is obviously different but not negligible. The entire pattern of Middle East change worked out by President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger depends upon Israeli willingness to move toward settlement with its neighbors; yet the political weakness of the Jerusalem Government complicates and hinders progress.

It was made clear during Mr. Nixon's recent Middle East tour that the whole new fabric designed to achieve ultimate settlement will dissolve unless a formula is found to compose Israeli relationships with the Palestinian Arabs. This must be done relatively soon if the area is not to explode again into another phase of violence.

■

However, Israel's new Government has such a tenuous political majority in its Parliament that it must make concessions to minority parties—above all the Orthodox religious faction—in order to keep control. The religious faction is ready to do almost anything to block a settlement with the Palestinian Arabs and this freezes national policy.

Thus, although there has been dramatic movement on significant diplomatic fronts during President Nixon's second Administration, for a variety of reasons some of the most important aspects of this movement still remain tentative. Unless key governments involved—starting with our own—can improve their internal position by enhancing their political authority, some of the structure of their foreign policy may ultimately prove as fragile as a house of cards.

Détente Marches On

By Russell Baker

WASHINGTON, June 28—Following is the leaked record of the first conversation between President Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow yesterday.

• • •

Mr. Brezhnev said it was good to have the President back in Moscow again and asked if his trip had been pleasant. Mr. Nixon said it was always good to come to Moscow, which was so much more friendly than New York. As for his trip, he said he could not bear to remain in one place as long as the Washington-Moscow flight required him to stay in the Presidential jet, so he had gone to Belgium at the halfway point.

Mr. Brezhnev said he thought Belgium was a more sensible place to break the trip than San Clemente would have been.

The President called Mr. Brezhnev's attention to the fact that this visit, being his second to Moscow, constituted a Presidential "first," since it was the first time a President had made two trips to the Soviet capital.

Mr. Brezhnev said the President was wrong in that case. The trip was not a Presidential "first" but a Presidential "second," he said.

Mr. Nixon said Mr. Brezhnev was not thinking clearly. As he was the first President to make a second trip, the trip was not a Presidential "second" but a Presidential "first." The next President to make two trips to Moscow, he said, would score a Presidential "second."

OBSERVER

Mr. Brezhnev said he had not intended to denigrate Mr. Nixon's achievement. He had merely thought that since scoring Presidential "firsts" had become so commonplace to the President, Mr. Nixon might enjoy President, Mr. Nixon might enjoy scoring a Presidential "second" as a change of pace.

He suggested a change of subject and asked what Mr. Nixon had been doing with himself lately. The President said he had been touring the Middle East. Mr. Brezhnev asked if he had kissed any Arabs. Mr. Nixon said he had delegated the kissing of Arabs to Secretary Kissinger, who did it very well.

was sacrificing the opportunity to become the first President to kiss an Arab.

Mr. Nixon asked if Foreign Minister Gromyko kissed Arabs and, if so, whether he did it as well as Secretary Kissinger. Mr. Brezhnev said Mr. Gromyko was too bashful to kiss Arabs. Mr. Nixon said he was bashful, too, but that Mr. Gromyko should not be discouraged because, as his own experience proved, bashfulness was no bar to success.

Mr. Brezhnev asked if the President would like him to help unpack. The President declined, saying that he had brought some presents for Mr. Brezhnev and did not want him to see them until the final day of the visit.

Mr. Brezhnev said he was delighted because he loved to receive presents, but he especially liked to guess what they would turn out to be. The President said there was no point in Mr. Brezhnev's guessing because he was not going to be told until the final day.

Mr. Brezhnev nudged the President in the ribs and, with a smile, said he would bet one of the presents was an atom bomb of his very own.

▪

The President said Mr. Brezhnev would just have to wait and see. But, he observed, giving an atom bomb to Mr. Brezhnev would be like giving smog to Los Angeles.

Mr. Brezhnev winked at the President and said he would also bet the President was going to give him an American helicopter in which to carry his very own atom bomb.

The President said he would admit that Mr. Brezhnev was getting warm but he would not yield to cajolery and spoil Mr. Brezhnev's surprise before the packages were opened. He suggested they talk, instead, about wheat.

Mr. Brezhnev said the President had already given him wheat. Personally, he had appreciated the wheat but Mrs. Brezhnev thought it was dull. The President said Mrs. Nixon thought the collected works of Lenin were dull.

Mr. Brezhnev said was that so? What about Watergate? he inquired.

Mr. Nixon said what about the Soviet grain failures? Mr. Brezhnev said he did not need any American atom bombs since they were probably like American cars and only got eight miles to the gallon.

At this point the conversation was interrupted by Secretary Kissinger who said he was ery sorry to disturb the train of the discourse but would very much like to have Mr. Brezhnev's permission to kiss Mr. Gromyko. Mr. Brezhnev said that would be most amusing and Mr. Gromyko left the room hurriedly, pursued by Secretary Kissinger. President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev ended their colloquy when Mr. Brezhnev proposed that they both hurry outside and see whether Mr. Gromyko could get away.