

File

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

29 JUNE 1961

~~TOP SECRET~~

1. Cuban air force dependence on Bloc extended.


A contingent of Cuban air force radio operators are slated for a 6-month training course in Russian equipment. 50X1
Shipment of Soviet-made transport aircraft will probably soon supplement the MIG fighters recently delivered. 50X1

2. Iraq-Kuwait

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a) Most Iraqis are astonished at Qasim's audacity--many probably hoping he can get away with it, many others worried that he has taken on more than he can handle; 50X1
b) Several Iraq government officials have expressed their frank opinion that Qasim is crazy; 50X1
c) As of 28 June, no evidence of abnormal military activity in Baghdad area;
d) Most likely Qasim objectives for the present are to establish juridical claim to Kuwait and to buttress himself as Arab nationalist;
e) But even if he does not move militarily now, Qasim--half cuckoo and half fox--will be watchful for international crisis likely to tie British hands.

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3. Austria favors UN membership for Communist China



50X1

50X1

NOTES

- A. De Gaulle, speaking in Lorraine, and Debre, in Paris, yesterday repeated intent to partition unless rebels unbend in Evian talks. [redacted]
- B. Bonn has reportedly decided to offer food supplies to East Germany. (West German press) [redacted]
- C. Nkrumah, faced with impending financial crisis, will ask for a 280 million dollar Soviet loan during his July visit to Moscow according to high Ghana official. [redacted]

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WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS--28 June

- A. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the United States or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action against US forces abroad, US allies, or areas peripheral to the Bloc in the immediate future.
- C. BERLIN: The Watch Committee sees no indications which would lead to a different conclusion from that of the Berlin Committee of USIB on 27 June. 50X1

LAOS: The Communists will maintain their pressures on the Boun Oum government to accede to the establishment of a "neutralist" coalition government favorable to them while they continue small-scale military operations against government forces and the consolidation of their military position. The ability of the Royal Laotian Government to maintain its cohesion and determination to resist is becoming increasingly eroded.

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I. [redacted] Khrushchev's 28 June speech in Moscow - We summarize it as follows: 50X1

It contained the usual mixture of threats and inducements which he still hopes will bring the West to make concessions on Berlin and Germany at the bargaining table. Khrushchev served notice that urgings of Western "hotheads" for mobilization and other military measures will not deter the USSR from signing a separate peace treaty with East Germany and warned that Moscow is "taking the necessary measures" to counter any Western moves to declare a mobilization. Khrushchev, on the other hand, complained that the West is distorting his proposals on Berlin and Germany and stressed his readiness to reopen negotiations. He contended Soviet proposals would protect West Berlin's right to choose its own social and economic system under international guarantees. He also sought to minimize the consequences of a separate treaty by again stating "there will be no blockade of West Berlin of any kind" and no "restrictions" on access, provided that interested powers reach an agreement with East Germany. Khrushchev also hinted that a second meeting with President Kennedy might be "useful," although he did not link this directly to the Berlin question. [redacted]

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE