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16 January 1961


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# CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

# BULLETIN





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Approved for Release: 2020/08/11 C02000174

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### 16 JANUARY 1961

#### THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Soviet Union apparently turns over two IL-18s to Guinea.

#### ASIA-AFRICA

South Vietnamese opposition continues to plot against Diem.

Laotian Government forces suffer further setbacks.

Congo--Situation in Katanga critical.

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

16 January 1961

### DAILY BRIEF

#### THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR-Guinea: The two Soviet IL-18s which arrived in Conakry last month apparently have been turned over to Guinea and presumably will be used to establish an international civil airline under the guidance of Soviet personnel. In the latter half of 1960, Czechoslovakia provided three twin-engine IL-14 "luxury-type" aircraft for a domestic Guinean civil airline to be operated by Czech personnel. Meanwhile, bloc military materiel supplied to Guinea in late 1960 appeared in a recent parade in Conakry. The display included artillery and

NO

25 armored personnel carriers.

) (Page 1)

#### ASIA~AFRICA

South Vietnam: Political opponents of South Vietnamese President Diem remain restive under his continued failure to liberalize his regime, and recent reports indicate that some opposition circles still believe a coup is the only way to bring about desired reforms. One faction of the Dai Viet party claims to have considerable military support for a plan of action to replace Diem with a coalition government of all anti-Communist groups. The government reportedly plans to stimulate a new political front prior to the presidential election scheduled for 9 April, but this is unlikely to attract the cooperation of opposition elements.

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(Page 2)

Laos: Government forces appear to be suffering further setbacks as Kong Le/Pathet Lao troops push southward Kee from the Xieng Khouang area. General Phoumi, who has dispatched T-6 aircraft in support of his ground forces, is still

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optimistic that he can redress the situation and proceed with his own offensive northward. Meanwhile, Communist China on 14 January joined the USSR and North Vietnam in endorsing Prince Sihanouk's proposal for a 14-nation meeting on Laos. The Communist airlift into Laos continues; ten Soviet military LI-2s recently noted en route to Communist China from the USSR have been scheduled to fly from Peiping to Hanoi, seemingly confirming that they are to be used in the Laos airlift. Fight additional LI-2s are en route to Peiping for Hanoi. The LI-2, which closely resembles the C-47, is a smaller and somewhat slower aircraft than the IL-14. It carries a 3,300-pound cargo load as compared with about 5,000 pounds for the IL-14. (Page 3) (Map) Congo: The American consul in Elisabethville believes that the situation in Katanga Province has become very critical and will "rapidly reach a climax." The UN representative in Elisabethville admits that UN forces "suffered a staggering reversal" at Manono when Lumumba's forces prevented significant reinforcement of an outnumbered Nigerian unit. The situation in Kivu Province is characterized as chaotic. (Page 6)

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DAILY BRIEF

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### Bloc Assistance to Guinea

The two Soviet four-engine turboprop IL-18 passenger planes which arrived at Conakry in December apparently have been turned over to the Guinean Government. One of these aircraft--with Guinean markings--was used by President Toure on his recent visit to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The other, on a flight to Casablanca last week, used Guinean callsigns. The IL-18s presumably will be used by Guinea to establish an international civil airline--Air Guinea--with Soviet guidance, pilots, and technicians. Guinea is the second nonbloc country to receive the Soviet IL-18; Ghana has been provided with at least four such aircraft.

Czechoslovakia, in the latter half of 1960, supplied three twin-engine "luxury-type" IL-14 aircraft to Guinea. These planes reportedly will be used to establish a domestic civil airline with Prague's assistance. Presumably both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union have agreed to train Guinean personnel in running an airline and operating these aircraft.

Some of the Sov	iet arms and	l military	equipmen	nt delivered	t
to Guinea late last y	ear were dis	splayed in	Conakry	on 23 Dece	)m-
ber in a parade hono	oring Ghanai:	an Preside	ent N <mark>kr</mark> ur	nah and Ma	ıli's
head of state, Modibo parade observed art					
personnel carriers.		, , ,			
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# Opposition Restive Under Restrictions Of South Vietnamese Regime


President Diem's continued postponement of political and social reforms which would rally popular support has apparently encouraged further coup plotting since the unsuccessful paratroop coup effort last November. A faction of the once influential anti-Communist Dai Viet party claims to have a plan of action and the necessary military support to overthrow Diem and replace him with a non-Communist coalition representing government and opposition groups. Other Dai Viet factions are reported to have received Communist of fers of cooperation.

No Dai Viet faction currently has sufficient influence to challenge the government without backing from the military, which demonstrated its loyalty to Diem in suppressing the November uprising. Continuing dissatisfaction in the armed forces, however, is evident in the statements recently made to the American ambassador by the air force commander. He expressed doubt that Diem ever intended to introduce reforms or that reorganization of the command structure would halt political interference at all levels of the military.

Diem has indicated that he plans some additional reorganization of his cabinet and intends to strengthen both appointive and elective representation at the village level. No changes have been announced, however, and he still seems reluctant to consider adequate reforms. Moreover, some opposition circles are spreading rumors—so far unsubstantiated—that there has been severe repression against regime opponents not implicated in the November attempt.

The government reportedly hopes to channel and control opposition activity through the creation of a new political front before the presidential election on 9 April. However, the planned front, apparently to be an outgrowth of the government-inspired People's Committee Against Rebels and Communists which was organized to ferret out collaborators in the November coup attempt, is unlikely to attract such cooperation or satisfy demands for an open opposition party

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#### The Situation in Laos

and the second s
Government forces south of Xieng Khouang have re-
ceived a further setback. The capture by Kong Le - Pathet
Lao troops of the village outpost of Ban Ta Viang was ap-
parently intended at least to disrupt General Phoumi's plans
for a multipronged offensive designed to retake the Plaine
des Jarres area and could signal a rebel intent to push south-
ward toward Pak Sane. In the latter event, an early target
would probably be Tha Thom, an important Phoumi base about
15 miles east of Ban Ta Viang. Phoumi, however, continues
optimistic that his T-6 aircraft now flying ground-support op-
erations in the Ban Ta Viang area, together with reinforce-
ments recently sent to Tha Thom, will shortly enable him to
proceed with his own offensive.

	Chinese Nationalist officials apparently still want	heir
ir	regular troops in Burma to have some role in Laos.	

Ex-Premier Phoui is considering a trip to Phnom Penh to discuss with Souvanna Phouma a broadly based government in Laos. Phoui has told American Embassy officials in Vientiane that it is essential for Souvanna to return, and that Souvanna might be induced to accept a government representing all political shades minus the Communist-front Neo Lao Hak Sat as a preliminary to "complete national reconciliation." Phoui feels strongly that Laos can never be won by force of arms and that the present government does not enjoy sufficient popular support.

On 14 January Communist China joined the USSR and North Vietnam in endorsing the proposal made by Cambodia's Prince

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Sihanouk for a 14-nation conference	
	Communist China has
sent letters to the 1954 Geneva Conf	erence cochairmen
Great Britain and the USSRasking	immediate action on the
Sihanouk proposal. The Chinese, like	ce their bloc colleagues,
probably feel that if such a conference	ce does eventually take
place, it would have little immediate	effect on the military
situation in Laos and would provide	a forum for condemnation
of the United States. They may also	see the proposed confer-
ence as a convenient means for hedg	ing against any suggested
solutions to the Laotian crisis that n	aight favor the West.
Khrushchev,	A 1.
favorable note of French support for	took
ment in Laos and appealed for French	a wide coantion govern-
"American military interference."	w cooperacion in stobbing
imorious military interiorence.	
Moscow radio is denouncing the	introduction of T-6 air-
craft into Laos as a "deliberate prov	Ocation" and has called
for the "most resolute measures" to	check this "dangerous
Washington enterprise." A Soviet co	mmentary heamed to
Europe on 13 January noted that the	United States justified
this action as a means of "self-defen	se'' for the Boun Oum
government and asked, "Cannot the I	lawful government of Lags
which is the victim of aggression, ac	t likewise?" Peining on
14 January quoted Kong Le as warning	g that if the US does not
halt such "aggressive acts," he will	"appeal to the fraternal
countries and peoples to supply the	ie Souvanna Phouma gov-
ernment with similar arms." Accord	ling to Western press re-
ports from Laos, Kong Le's headquar	rters claims some Lao-
tians have left for Moscow to receive	pilot training. While
these statements may be intended to	prepare the ground for
increased bloc military commitments	s to counter the arrival
of the T-6s, there is as yet no evider	nce of preparations to in-
troduce similar bloc aircraft into La	.os.
Soviet transports continued to fl	y into Laos through 15
January. Ten Soviet military LI-2 to	ransports have arrived

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at Peiping from Irkutsk and are scheduled on to Hanoi. In addition, eight more Soviet LI-2s are en route to Peiping for Hanoi. The LI-2, which closely resembles the C-47, is a smaller and somewhat slower aircraft than the IL-14. It carries a 3,300-pound cargo load, as compared with about 5,000 pounds for the IL-14.

The number of LI-2s involved suggests that some if all of the IL-14s now engaged in the airlift from Hanoi was be replaced. Five of the IL-14s have been flying almost tinuously since 3 December; the second group of five, warrived in Hanoi on 14 December, has been continuously gaged since that time; and there are no aircraft service ities at Hanoi capable of performing major maintenance.	vill con- hich en- facil-	
tites at Hanor capable of performing major maintenance.		

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#### The Congo Situation

The American consul in Elisabethville believes that the situation in Katanga Province is very critical and will "rapidly reach a climax." The UN representative in Elisabethville has admitted to the consul that UN forces "suffered a staggering reversal" at Manono, northern Katanga, when Lumumba's forces prevented reinforcement of an outnumbered UN unit of Nigerian troops. The UN, however, will continue to attempt to reinforce its garrisons, act as a buffer between clashing forces, and use moral suasion to prevent a civil war.

Meanwhile, the small Katangan air unit continues its reconnaissance operations; its air strikes appear to have been made against Baluba rebel forces rather than Lumumba's troops. Moreover, the presence of Lumumba's troops has led to greatly increased activity by Baluba tribesmen sympathetic to Lumumba. According to a press report, Balubas attacked a Swedish UN unit on 15 January and reinforcements were being rushed in to support it.

Reporting that Balubas had shot down a Katangan tra	ans-
port plane on 11 January, the Lumumba command at Ge	mena,
in reiterating its need for support,	Gizen-
ga requested "speed in sending the arms so that he can	send
soldiers from Stanleyville via Kivu to the Baluba forces	so
they can free the rest of Katanga Province."	
the Stanleyville regime implied that Lumu	mba's
supporters in Kasai Provincenorthwest of Katanga Pr	
were being hard pressed by Mobutu's forces.	
Gizenga requested an "urgent supply of arms	" so
that he could send reinforcements to Kasai; the Lumum	
forces there fear that Kalonji will gain control if they do	
get help quickly.	

Meanwhile Congolese Premier-designate Joseph Ileo and Minister of State Albert Delvaux have publicly accused the Soviet Union of working through the UAR to support Lumumba. Delvaux also accused Ghanaian UN troops in south Kasai

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the situation in Kivu Province is chaotic.  Lumumba's forces in Kivu are reliably reported to have shelled the Belgian trust territory of Ruanda on 12 and 13 January. According to press reports, Belgian Army units in Ruanda have repulsed some 40 invading Congolese soldiers.					
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The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Detense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

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The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

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Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

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