

S/O: JLTopping 8/1/61  
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

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DATE: July 25, 1961

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Inter-Departmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin.

<b>PARTICIPANTS:</b>	White House:	Mr. Owen	USIA:	Mr. Phillips
	Defense:	Mr. Nitze	State:	Mr. Johnson
		Gen. Gray		Mr. Achilles
		Col. Armstrong		Mr. Kohler
		Mr. Rowan		Mr. Hillenbrand
<b>COPIES TO:</b>	Treasury:	Mr. Sullivan		Mr. Ausland
		Mr. Fowler		Mr. Brandin
	CIA:	[REDACTED]	Fb(1)	Mr. Cash
			Fb(3)	Mr. Stern
				Mr. Day
				Mr. Chayes
				Mr. Tubby
				Mr. Vigderman
				Mr. Topping
				Mr. Mautner

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Mr. Kohler said that the meeting was called in anticipation of the Paris meetings of the Working Group and the Foreign Ministers, and to line up the back-stopping operations in Washington. He pointed out that two meetings on the Berlin problem had been held since the ICG had last met -- that of the NSC on July 19 and the meeting with the representatives of the Embassies of Great Britain, France and Germany held by the Secretary on July 21. These would be followed by the President's statement on television and radio that night, which our Ambassadors would promptly deliver to the Government to which they were accredited, and which would be given strong play by USIS.

Mr. Kohler expected to be in Paris from July 28 until about August 12, after the Foreign Ministers Meeting. He hoped it would be possible to push through a series of reviews of the Berlin contingency planning. The French would prepare the formal agenda for the meetings, but he would undertake to have them cover the following points:

1. Political and negotiating steps;
2. Consideration of the military situation, and possible military actions;
3. Non-military counter measures;
4. Reviews of the basic Berlin contingency plan;
5. Consideration

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5. Consideration of a new military paper, involving the Live Oak project; and
6. Reviews of the proposed propaganda campaign.

Mr. Kohler said that the British, French and Germans had been given copies of the "Memorandum on Berlin" dated July 21, and suggested that all members of the ICG read it.

Mr. Kohler pointed out that all of the work the Working Group does in Paris will be on an ad referendum basis, which meant that if papers were to be finalized there would be a considerable volume of telegraphic traffic with the Department. During his absence, he hoped that Mr. Johnson would chair the Group, and that Mr. Davis would cover for EUR. He felt that communications originating from our delegation in Paris would become heavy about Monday, July 31, and that some of the members of the ICG might move into available quarters in S/O, including particularly representatives of the Department of Defense (Col. Moody), the Treasury Department (Mr. Sullivan) and possibly someone from the Department of Commerce, though this latter would have to be investigated further. There should also be representatives of EUR.

The question was raised whether the Government of West Germany would be represented in the Working Group in Paris. Mr. Kohler said that both the United States and Great Britain hoped so, and had so advised the French Government. The Germans would be prepared to attend. However, the final decision and invitation was up to the French. He hoped that this could be resolved favorably during the first working day that the Group met.

General Gray and Mr. Nitze explained that General Norstad had recently sent in a request to augment the space assigned to the Live Oaks Staff, so that it could have an operational as well as a planning capability, including both British and French representatives. The JCS had notified him of its approval, and it was understood that the British had probably also approved the proposal. It was agreed that steps would be taken to determine whether the British, and the French, have actually agreed.

The meeting discussed the possibility of German inclusion in Live Oak. It was noted that the establishment of a German liaison office had been approved. Mr. Kohler said that the British had approved the proposal in London, and that it would be necessary to check with the French to determine their decision. This led to the question of extent of Live Oak responsibility, that is, whether it extended only to the handling of an initial probe or went beyond that point. Members of the Group were of the opinion that the initial instructions for Live Oak mentioned a probe, and also included general wording about measures to restore access to Berlin. There was a

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problem arising from the difficulty of determining precisely when the operation changed from Live Oak to NATO responsibility. It was noted that the Germans want to participate in the Live Oak planning. It was agreed that the problem would probably arise in the Working Group next week. Live Oak is a tripartite exercise, with forces from other NATO members not involved in the probe. Under present troop dispositions in Western Germany, no forces other than those of nations involved in Live Oak were stationed in the area from which the probe would be mounted.

The meeting discussed what papers the American delegation should have available in Paris. The British and French would have the existing mutually agreed papers, or ones worked out together with them. We should make sure that when talking with them we are talking about agreed and not about internal United States papers. Mr. Hillenbrand said that the existing papers are covered in the BerCon series. It was agreed that those members of the Group having copies should take them along. They should also bring their copies of the "Memorandum on Berlin", and the paper tabled by the British on the information program, copies of which would be distributed.

Mr. Fowler raised the question of study of the effects of economic counter-measures on our allies. Mr. Kohler was of the opinion that to this date this was an internal American exercise, and will have to be handled in Washington. He added that the question of balance of payments considerations, both military and otherwise, would have to be looked into. Mr. Fowler said that the problem has been discussed periodically during the last several months at the OECD level with our allies, and that, depending on the results of the Paris meeting, it might have to be changed to an ad hoc basis. Consideration would also have to be given to the problems of alternative sources of supply and of panic buying. There was some discussion of the British financial problems, and of their desires in that connection. Mr. Nitze said he understood that they covered two general categories: (1) weapons systems development problems; and (2) what we can get the Germans to do to increase procurement in Britain. Mr. Owen mentioned the British desire for German help in connection with the expenses of the British military in Germany. Mr. Hillenbrand said it would be helpful to get some idea of the total amount the Germans will be expected to pay in connection with military build-up in West Germany. Mr. Nitze suggested agreement on a principle that we will not let financial troubles interfere with political and military action, and will try to avoid letting third parties obtain benefits from resultant movements of international capital.

Mr. Nitze said that a fundamental question was what kind of directive this Group should recommend their Ministers give their military. It was agreed that this was a difficult matter, because of the confused and

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overlapping responsibilities and interests of the various tripartite, quadripartite and NATO groupings. General Norstad would be in Control of the Live Oak probe, but at some point this might shift into a NATO operation and the question would then arise as to whom he was responsible. This might be something in the nature of an executive committee of the Heads of State of the member nations of NATO. The Group cannot decide the matter, which is one of high policy, but it was agreed that the matter will come up during the course of the discussions in Paris.

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