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Memorandum

Date: September 2, 2005
To: Director Porter Goss
CIA
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From: (b)(6)
Subject: Assessment of EITs Effectiveness

Introduction

You have asked us to make judgments regarding the effectiveness of the range of enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs) used by the Renditions and Detention Group of the Counterterrorism Center of the CIA (CTC/RDG) on high value detainees (HVDs). It is my understanding that this request evolved from a recommendation in a 2004 report of the CIA Inspector General that addressed the larger issue of agency-wide counterterrorism detention and interrogation activities that took place from September, 2001 – October, 2003¹. During the course of our review, we have interviewed senior staff of CTC, CTC/RDG, OMS, OIG, DI, contract employees of CTC, as well as agents of the FBI. We have been heavily reliant on the willingness of CTC staff to provide us with the factual material that forms the basis of our conclusions and I am grateful to them and to all others who so generously shared with us their time, knowledge and experience.

Neither my background nor field of expertise particularly lend themselves to judging the effectiveness of interrogation techniques, taken individually or collectively. However, I have spent considerable time and energy studying the important responsibilities of the RDG and the role this program plays in providing extraordinarily useful intelligence to both policymakers and those on the front lines defending America.

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¹ The report contains a recommendation that asks the DDO to “conduct a review of the effectiveness of each of the authorized EITs (Enhance Interrogation Techniques) and make a determination regarding the necessity for the continued use of each, including the required scope and duration of each technique. Include in the group conducting the review non-Agency, independent experts recommended by the Director of OMS and the Deputy Director for Science & Technology”.

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Overall Program Effectiveness

It is clear from our discussions with both DO and DI officers that the program is deemed by them to be a great success, and I would concur. The EITs, as part of the overall program, are credited with enabling the US to disrupt terrorist plots, capture additional terrorists, and collect a high volume of useful intelligence on al-Qai'da (AQ). The program accounts for *over half* of all HUMINT CIA collection against AQ and associated groups, and vast numbers of intelligence reports have been produced as a result. Source validation is another major benefit of the program. There are accounts of numerous plots against the US and the West that were revealed as a result of HVD interrogations. Detainee reporting from the RDG program has played a significant role in the capture of nearly all AQ operatives and associates in US custody, no doubt saving countless American lives.

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
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